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Abstract 
Today, few people would contest the idea that people with learning disabilities are equal 
citizens, and that as such, they have equal political, civil, and social rights. But what does 
citizenship mean in the day-to-day lives of those who require extensive support to complete 
basic tasks, have limited verbal language, and have little to no prospects for independent 
living and paid employment? How is their citizenship lived? And how is it facilitated or 
hindered by those working with them? 
Through an ethnography of an art workshop in Glasgow, UK, this thesis draws on 
anthropological perspectives to explore how abstract ideals of citizenship manifest in the 
everyday lives of people with learning disabilities who have high support needs. In my 
enquiry, I divert from normative and rights-based understandings of citizenship, in order to 
foreground alternative meanings that can be ethnographically derived from everyday practice 
and interactions. 
This thesis explores the complexities of choice-making, independence, sociality, and 
social value through examples of artmaking with people with learning disabilities. It examines 
the material conditions, relational aspects, and affirmative measures that practicing citizenship 
requires. In doing so, it articulates more inclusive understandings of citizenship, whose 
implications do not only pertain to people with learning disabilities but are relevant for 
everyone.   
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Why study the citizenship of people with learning disabilities? 
 
Aysha is a woman in her mid-thirties. She loves colourful dresses and wears her dark 
hair in a slick ponytail. Sensitive and affectionate, she has unconditional adoration for her 
support worker, Diana, whom Aysha considers her best friend. Because of her outgoing 
personality, Aysha is a popular character in her neighbourhood. However, she sometimes gets 
into trouble with strangers for hugging them and talking too much. Aysha is one of three 
sisters, all of whom have significant learning disabilities. Aysha lives with her parents. She 
needs help with basic tasks like crossing the road, and her carers have to remind her to eat 
because otherwise she would go without food for extended periods of time.  
Kenny is a man in his early forties. He is lean and tall, and he sports thick framed 
glasses and a buzz cut. Kenny is gentle and shy: he mostly speaks when someone asks him a 
question. Even then, his answers are curt one-word responses, uttered in a stuttering rush. 
Kenny used to be institutionalised at a long-stay hospital for people with learning disabilities, 
where he had little say over things like what he wanted to do with his day, or who he wanted 
to spend time with. He now lives in supported accommodation. With the help of this support 
staff, he has dinner with his father every fortnight, regularly hangs out with his friend (also a 
man with learning disabilities), and partakes in a multitude of leisure activities devised by his 
care organisation. The extent to which he has a say in his everyday life is difficult to 
ascertain: according to his support staff, Kenny often seeks to please people, therefore he says 
what he thinks people want to hear. 
Jack is a soft-spoken man in his late thirties, who has an expansive pop-cultural 
knowledge. His arms are covered in tattoos of anime characters. Jack lives alone and, unlike 
Aysha or Kenny, he does not need support with everyday tasks. He receives financial support 
from the government for his housing and living costs, but he is worried that his benefits will 
be taken away when his support needs are reviewed. Jack has partaken in sheltered 
employment programmes, but has not had a paid position because of his difficulties with 
reading and writing. Since his mum passed away a couple of years ago, Jack’s primary 
companion is his aunt, whom he visits once or twice a week: together, they have dinner and 
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watch television. Jack goes to art class twice a week, and spends most of his time hanging out 
in his flat with his cat or strolling around the streets of Glasgow. 
Aysha, Kenny, and Jack are artists with learning disabilities whom I met at Project 
Ability’s art workshops during my ethnographic fieldwork. Had they lived in the 1960s – 
sixty years prior to the writing of this thesis – their lives would have been very different. They 
might have lived with their families, like Aysha is currently. However, if their families had 
not been able to afford to provide for them, they would have been committed to a long-stay 
hospital like Kenny had been, except they would have had very few prospects of returning to 
a life outside of institutions. Former residents’ accounts give an indication of what Aysha’s, 
Kenny’s, and Jack’s lives would have looked like in a long-stay hospital (e.g. Bentley et al., 
2011; Cooper and Atkinson, n.d.): they would have had no say in when they got up and went 
to sleep, the food they ate, the clothes they wore, and the people they spent time with. They 
could have left the hospital grounds with permission only, and would not have been allowed 
to freely interact with their neighbours, have pints with their parents, go to art class, or have a 
pet. They certainly would not have been allowed to have their own accommodation and they 
would not have been supported to be independent. They might have been subjected to abuse 
by hospital staff and discrimination by the outside world. They would have had little support 
and opportunities to pursue education, enter employment, or start a family. They would have 
been denied voting and participation in political life, and would have had few options for 
recreational activities.  
Much has changed since then in Scotland, where Aysha, Kenny, and Jack live. The 
long-stay hospitals are gone: people with learning disabilities who do not live with their 
families are provided accommodation in their own flats, supported housing, or small 
residential care homes. Instead of locking them away in segregated institutions, social policy 
now encourages them to participate in the so-called mainstream society. Their rights to do so 
are internationally recognised by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (United Nations, 2006). This covers the right to live independently and be 
included in the community, respect for home and family, health and education, rehabilitation, 
work and employment, adequate standards of living and social protection (including housing, 
financial assistance, respite care), and participation in public life as well as recreation, leisure, 
and cultural life. In the UK, these rights are upheld by the Equality Act 2010, which grants 
people legal protection against discrimination.  
The concept of citizenship has been key in propelling changes in the way people with 
learning disabilities have been treated. It has been a keyword in learning disability activism, 
advocacy, and scholarship for a long time (Duffy, 2017): the parent and the disabilities rights 
movement, (self-)advocacy groups, and academics all deployed the concept to advocate for 
what they regarded as better treatment of people with learning disabilities. Citizenship is also 
a recurring concept in British social policy: in the past three decades, every major government 
publication reiterated the importance of treating people with learning disabilities as citizens 
(Duffy, 2017). Writing in 1991, learning disability scholar Jan Walmsley (1991) observed 
increasing social policy interest in the concept, noting it had become a “fashionable topic” (p. 
219). While she remained optimistic of citizenship as a tool to further claims to rights, justice, 
dignity, and inclusion for people with learning disabilities, she warned that if the practical 
limitations to these claims were not addressed in practice, citizenship would be no more than 
a “hollow claim” (p.226).  
Thirty years later, Walmsley’s warning remains relevant, as the figures demonstrate 
prevailing experiences of injustice and inequality among people with learning disabilities in 
the UK. Although they make up 0.5 per cent of the population (Scottish Learning Disabilities 
Observatory, 2011), people with learning disabilities have poorer health than their non-
disabled peers (Krahn and Fox, 2014). They also die, on average, thirteen years younger, 
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many of them from preventable causes (O’Leary et al., 2018), and a higher proportion of them 
live under the poverty line (Emerson, 2007). Many of them are subjected to harassment and 
hate crimes (Walters et al., 2016). Despite having been relocated from segregated institutions 
into community-based facilities, many of them continue to experience loneliness and isolation  
(Alexandra et al., 2018; Bigby et al., 2017; Gilmore and Cuskelly, 2014; Kamstra et al., 
2015).  
These figures raise several questions. While citizenship as a legal status guaranteed 
people with learning disabilities equal rights and protection – which is a significant progress – 
there is still much to be achieved in terms of their social inclusion, belonging, and 
participation. Citizenship has granted them economic, social, and cultural rights (United 
Nations, 2006), but in practice it is yet to counter poverty, inadequate housing, poor health, 
and limited prospects for employment and further education. All this raises the question 
whether there is further potential in the concept of citizenship to be deployed in service of 
addressing the prevailing inequalities people with learning disabilities experience?  
This is the central question I explore in my thesis. In part, I set out to examine how 
ideals of citizenship guide engagement between individuals with learning disabilities and their 
communities. In addition, I aim to document the particular inequalities and injustices people 
with learning disabilities face, and the related support they need, lack, or are provided. 
Of course, issues of inequality and injustice are not limited to people with learning 
disabilities: poverty, unemployment, discrimination, and isolation constitute the everyday 
experiences of many other groups who are also considered citizens by their legal status. One 
may ask, why should we focus on special provisions for people with learning disabilities who 
constitute only a small minority of those who suffer from the consequences of inequality and 
injustice? Some people may argue that people with learning disabilities are already provided 
with basic material support, opportunities for employment and education, options for 
socialising and leisure. How much more additional support should they be given by their 
family, community, and the state? I have heard these questions voiced with the well-meaning 
intention to avoid offence and stigmatising, worrying that surely people with learning 
disabilities would not want to be, for instance, employed out of charity, or have people spend 
time with them out of pity.  
In practice, many people with learning disabilities do need extensive “atypical social 
arrangements” (Nussbaum, 2006: 99) to enjoy basic activities, like socialising, leisure, or 
work. The atypical social arrangements I discuss in this dissertation extend beyond 
patronising charitable interventions. Rather, I focus on the personal and institutional support 
that, first of all, enables people to develop capabilities to engage with other individuals and 
communities, to establish meaningful relationships, to participate in public life and social 
activities, to experience joy and affection, and to live a dignified life; and secondly, that 
enables individuals and institutions to ethically engage with people with high support needs -
who experience inequalities and injustices. When the support needs of people with learning 
disabilities are framed like this, they become a question about ethical engagement with issues 
that do not only pertain to disabled people but are relevant for everyone.  
 
 
How this thesis approaches the concept of citizenship 
 
I have had a long-standing interest in questions of belonging prior to this doctoral 
project. As someone who was born to Vietnamese parents, grew up in Hungary, and then 
spent a decade moving from country to country, I have always been interested in what 
citizenship meant for those who were not considered first-class citizens. During my graduate 
studies in medical anthropology, I became interested in embodiment, non-verbal interactions, 
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and their possibilities in shaping belonging and collective action. That is where my primary 
interest lay when I first started this project. For me, learning disabilities had been first and 
foremost a concept through which I could explore the margins of belonging and the 
possibilities of mobilisation – the notion of citizenship, when tested against the lives of people 
with learning disabilities could reveal the fundamental gaps in the way belonging, justice, and 
equality are thought about and practiced. 
Although my priorities and views on learning disabilities have changed significantly by 
the time I completed my fieldwork, the reason I found the concept of citizenship compelling 
for such an enquiry is due to its ambiguous and fluid nature that allows it to be deployed by a 
wide range of actors in pursuit of diverse aims. Writing on the definition of citizenship, 
anthropologist Sian Lazar (2013) observed that the concept has been used by political actors 
of all interest and scale. It is not only evoked on the level of nation states but also serves to 
organise local communities and international movements; it is used in the context of 
healthcare, education, governance, protests, even by multinational big corporations like Coca 
Cola and BP. Lazar (2013) notes that the wide appeal of citizenship lies in its ability to evoke 
themes of equality, liberty, community membership, political and cultural participation, and 
social and economic entitlements. Fundamentally, it is about ethical engagement between 
individuals and their communities. 
Citizenship is thus what theorists refer to as an essentially contested concept (Duffy, 
2017; Gallie, 1956; Lister, 1997), meaning not only that there is no consensus over its 
definition, but that its ambiguity provides a platform on which broader philosophical and 
political debates can take place.  
Having said that, the definition formulated by T. H. Marshall (1950) in his seminal 
essay Citizenship and Social Class is a common starting point for scholars and theorists:  
 
“Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All 
who possess the status are equal with respect to rights and duties with which the status 
is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties 
shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of 
an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measures and towards which 
aspiration can be directed” (p.28). 
 
Seeking to theorise the historical development of citizenship, Marshall came to 
distinguish between three of its facets: civil rights (including liberty, equality in face of the 
law, and the right to own property), political rights (such as the right to vote), and social rights 
(like welfare and social security). It is the last point that denotes Marshall’s major 
contribution to the citizenship literature. For Marshall, social rights marked a significant 
progress in the development of citizenship: he saw these rights as a counterpoint to protecting 
people from the effects of capitalism and social inequality. Marshall’s work continues to 
frame writings on citizenship in the field of disability studies: this is apparent in field’s 
preoccupations with equal rights in relation to material injustice and inequality  (Duffy, 2017) 
– a point to which I will return in my next chapter. 
It is not my intention to provide an in-depth critique of Marshall’s works, but for the 
purposes of this thesis, there are two important points to note. Firstly, as critics of Marshall 
have argued (e.g. Beckett, 2006; Lazar, 2013; Lister, 1997; Turner, 1990), his formulation of 
citizenship exemplifies a liberal tradition of citizenship. Liberal traditions – that have a long 
history going back to the 17th century social contract theorists – understand citizenship in 
terms of individual status that grant members of a certain community the right to pursue their 
interests with minimal interference. In exchange for these rights, members – citizens – are 
expected to fulfil certain duties, such as pay taxes and partake in political deliberation (Lazar, 
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2013). Although Marshall was a proponent of social welfare, which classical liberal traditions 
would see as excessive state interference, for him the purpose of social rights was not to erase 
inequality, but merely to protect the most vulnerable individuals from fluctuations in the 
economy (Beckett, 2006). In fact, Marshall has been critiqued for essentially justifying 
inequality because of his conviction in equality of opportunity, especially of educational 
meritocracy: he argued that achieving upward mobility by demonstrating unequal abilities 
was the right of every citizen (Turner, 1990). 
This leads to my second point: Marshall’s vision of citizenship is static. In her feminist 
analysis, Lister (1997) argues that approaching citizenship as a status fails to take into account 
the struggles that surround claims-making. The liberal tradition, often implicitly, assumes 
equality among individuals, and fails to take consider the social and economic inequalities 
that prevent people from pursuing their aspirations. In practice, Lister (1997) observes, the 
concept of citizenship does not only function to grant people freedom from interference, but 
provides social movements a language with which they can demand and defend existing civil, 
political, and social rights, as well as claim new ones, such as reproductive rights. “A focus 
on citizenship as a process and not just an outcome, in which the struggle to gain new rights 
and to give substance to existing ones is seen as being as important as the substance of those 
rights,” Lister (1997) writes, “citizens appear on the stage of both theory and practice not 
simply as the passive holders of rights but as actively engaging with political and welfare 
institutions, both as individuals and in groups” (p.6). 
Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach provides some guidance on what citizenship 
as a process of active engagement may look like outside of political movements, for people 
who rely on extensive support in their daily lives. Drawing on economist Amartya Sen’s 
work, Nussbaum (2006, 2009) argues that for humans to be able to live a life with dignity, 
society is obliged to provide measures that foster their abilities, support them to flourish, and 
enable them to engage with others to the fullest of their capacities. For Nussbaum, capabilities 
are entitlements without which human dignity and basic functioning are not possible. She 
gives an outline of ten human capabilities, which are subject to continuous revision and 
cultural adaptation. These are:  
1) Life: being able to live until the natural end of life and not die prematurely. 
2) Bodily health, including having good health, as well as nourishment and shelter. 
3) Bodily integrity: being free to move, free from violence, and having a say in matters 
of reproduction. 
4) Being able to sense, imagine, think. 
5) Being able to experience a range of emotions, develop human connections, and feel 
love and care for others. 
6) Engaging in practical reasoning, including having a conception of good. 
7) Affiliation: this includes being able to live with others, and being treated with 
respect. 
8) Being able to live with other species and nature. 
9) Play and enjoying leisure activities. 
10) Having control over one’s political and material environment.  
In formulating my understanding of citizenship in this thesis, I draw on two aspects of 
the capabilities approach. The first one is the idea that human dignity requires more than 
simply guaranteeing individuals’ basic rights; it also means enabling them to engage in 
activities they find valuable. Secondly, the capabilities approach foregrounds the affirmative 
measures needed for individuals to function and flourish, and makes their provision a matter 
of social justice. A just society ensures that human’s basic entitlements are met and that 
citizens are supported to live life to their full capacity; justice hinders when these needs are 
ignored or impeded upon. 
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I will draw on Lister’s and Nussbaum’s arguments to frame my approach to citizenship 
as a process in which individuals are actively engaged, and as a set of capabilities that can be 
developed with the help of affirmative measures. In this thesis, I take an anthropological 
approach to exploring what all this means for people with learning disabilities in their 
everyday lives. 
The field of anthropology seeks to contextualise citizenship as practice (i.e. what people 
do that construes them as citizens), and examines the social, historical, political, and cultural 
contingencies in which these practices take place (Lazar, 2013). This involves an 
interrogation of political and philosophical ideas associated with citizenship (e.g. community 
membership, rights, ideals of good life, rules of social participation), as well as the lived 
experiences of these ideas.  
So far, little has been written about what citizenship means for people with learning 
disabilities in day-to-day existence. An anthropological examination is timely, firstly, because 
it further complicates taken-for-granted and rather idealised images of what being a citizen 
means. This is important because the seemingly neutral language of equality and liberty in 
classical liberal citizenship theories often assumes that citizens are able-bodied and able-
minded individuals. Because of this, they often exclude people with learning disabilities, and 
fail to take account of their needs and interests when articulating the principles of equality, 
justice, and community membership (Carey, 2009a; Davy, 2015). Secondly, reformulating 
citizenship to be more inclusive for people with learning disabilities holds strategic political 
value: it provides a powerful language to claim justice, and address the persisting inequalities 
they continue to face.  
An anthropological study of citizenship thus comprises two tasks. It requires 1) 
addressing the challenges that learning disabilities pose for prevailing ideals of classical 
liberal citizenship, and 2) comparing and contrasting these ideas with the everyday 
experiences of people with learning disabilities.  
This thesis takes upon these challenges by exploring how citizenship is lived by people 
with learning disabilities and by describing how their citizenship is facilitated (or hindered) 
by those who work with them. I approach citizenship not as a normative starting point to 
study service provision; rather, I treat it as a concept that can be ethnographically derived 
from everyday practice and interactions (Ootes, 2012). I thus ask: how do different 
understandings of citizenship manifest in the day-to-day activities of people with learning 
disabilities? How do these understandings guide their activities and social life? To what 
extent do certain understandings help or impede inclusion? Which aspects of citizenship do 
people with learning disabilities practice, and to what end? What kind of support do they need 
to be able to do so?  
The ethnographic material focuses on people who present complex challenges to pre-
existent frameworks of citizenship: people with significant disabilities. The people I discuss 
have never had paid employment. They often have high support needs: most of them depend 
on their family members and carers to perform basic tasks. Many of them have physical 
impairments. In addition, they have little or no verbal language, and have a limited capacity to 
express themselves. I am interested in exploring how they are engaged with and recognised as 
citizens. 
The context of this ethnography is a Glasgow-based organisation called Project Ability, 
which provides art workshops for people with learning disabilities. Scottish social policy, 
much like the other countries within the United Kingdom, upholds the support of people with 
learning disabilities as a priority. Its social care sector provides them financial and personal 
support, assistance with housing, and social activities. Project Ability presents a compelling 
and complex case, as it distils different aspects of citizenship into day-to-day artmaking. It 
provides a safe space for its participants to socialise, and supports with (artistic) choice-
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making. It engages with them as responsible subjects. Importantly, it provides them with a 
platform to contribute to society in ways other than paid employment. Yet, Project Ability 
exist in an austerity-struck Britain, where public services have been continuously cut over the 
past ten years, exacerbating the injustices people with learning disabilities had been facing. 
This raises question of how participants at Project Ability experience citizenship under 
austerity, and whether citizenship can be re-appropriated and made emancipatory in the 
context of spending cuts and shrinking pubic services.  
 
This thesis explores these issues by examining the following research questions:  
1) How do people with learning disabilities practice – i.e. negotiate, manipulate, and 
reconstitute – ideals of citizenship in their everyday lives?  
2) How are they supported and hindered in developing capabilities associated with 
citizenship?  





Chapter one starts with examining the different ways in which social policy 
understands citizenship. This reveals broader assumptions about personhood and belonging 
that are rooted in long traditions of Western political philosophy that, for the large part, 
ignored people with learning disabilities. I argue that an anthropological study of citizenship 
as everyday practice can help formulate alternative, more inclusive definitions. 
The second chapter explores approaches to learning disabilities. I discuss why there 
has been relatively little theorisation on the social position of people with learning disabilities. 
I also explore the conundrums social theories and disability rights movements have 
encountered when facing the realities of learning impairment and the idea of inability. Then, I 
suggest theoretical frameworks that approach learning disabilities as a productive condition. 
The third chapter describes where the empirical material came from: the site of my 
fieldwork, the participants, and my methods, with a discussion of inclusive research and its 
ethical and epistemological implications. 
The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters present the ethnographic material. 
Through examples of artmaking, I examine the ways in which the different aspects of the 
citizenship of people with learning disabilities are recognised, supported, negotiated, or 
hindered. The fourth chapter looks at the complexities of choice making. The fifth chapter 
asks what independence means in the context of risk management. The sixth chapter 
explores sociality and friendship. Finally, in the seventh chapter, I ask, what kind of artists 
can people with learning disabilities be and how can they be valuable to the lives of others.  
In the final, eighth chapter, I return to the initial question of what alternative 
formulation of citizenship can be derived from the way it is lived. I discuss what this means 
for community participation, ethical engagement, and the institutional and structural support. 
 
 
A note on the language 
 
Regarding the language of this thesis, I use the term learning disabilities to be 
consistent with the British context in which my ethnography takes place. Having conferred 
with disability scholars, I decided to use the term significant learning disabilities instead of 
moderate to profound and multiple disabilities in order to avoid the medicalised undertones of 
the latter. I follow the convention regarding the use of impairment, by which I mean a loss or 
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difference in physical or cognitive functioning caused by illness or injury. I use disability to 









Chapter one:  
Citizenship in learning disability 






Citizenship is a relative newcomer to British learning disability policy and service 
provision (Johnson et al., 2010). Since it first emerged in the 1950s, it has become a keyword 
in and organising principle of social services. “The lives of people with learning disabilities 
have changed,” starts the ministerial foreword to the 2019 governmental publication detailing 
the framework and priorities for the Scottish learning disability policy. “People with learning 
disabilities are citizens who want to play a full part in their communities across Scotland” 
(Scottish Government, 2019a: 2). Successive British publications have reiterated the same 
sentiment. “Rather than being a passive recipient of services, citizens can become actively 
involved in selecting and shaping the support they receive,” wrote the strategy paper, the 
Keys to life in 2013 (Scottish Government, 2013b: 17). Even before that, the review of 
Scottish services published in 2000 starts by quoting the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Disabled Persons (Scottish Government, 2000). “People with learning disabilities 
are citizens too,” states simply Valuing people, the paper defining the direction of British 
service provision for the 21st century (Department of Health, 2001: 23). Despite the common 
occurrence of the term, policy and service provision never defines what they mean by 
citizenship. In fact, a closer examination reveals how different meanings of citizenship have 
been deployed to advocate for a wide range of changes in the treatment of people with 
learning disabilities. 
This chapter has three aims. The first one is to explore the different meanings of 
deployments of citizenship in learning disability policy and provision. I will not employ a pre-
defined meaning to evaluate policy and service provision; instead, my goal is to derive the 
meanings from policy rhetoric and implementation. By doing do, I argue that these policies 
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have a complex legacy that often ended up curtailing the ideals they set out to promote. My 
second aim is to demonstrate that some of the shortcomings these are of a philosophical 
nature: namely, that their underlying assumptions of what makes a citizen comes from liberal 
philosophical traditions that are unequipped to address the challenges people with learning 
disabilities face. Finally, I contend that an anthropological investigation of citizenship not 
only addresses these philosophical challenges, but also provides a lens through which the 
impact of these philosophical assumptions can be investigated.  
In the following sections, I first provide a brief historical overview on the trends in 
learning disability policy and service provision, with a focus on how people with learning 
disabilities came to be thought of as “citizens”. Then, I contextualise their citizenship ideals 
within the liberal philosophical traditions. Finally, I make the case for an ethnography 
examination of the citizenship of people with learning disabilities, and consider how it could 
contribute to both the field of anthropology and disability studies. 
 
 
Constructing the learning disabled citizen in social policy and service 
provision 
 
In 1961, Enoch Powell announced the government’s plan to halve the number of long-
stay hospital beds in the upcoming fifteen years. These were bold visions from a Conservative 
health minister; at the time and for the most part of the century, long-term hospitals were the 
primary statutory provision for people with learning disabilities and mental illness. Powell’s 
speech radiated optimism. “[I]f we are to have the courage of our ambitions,” he declared in 
front of the National Association of Mental Health, “we ought to pitch the estimate lower 
still” (Rivett, 1998). 
The announcement was preceded by reports raising concerns about the abuse, 
mistreatment, and lack of safeguarding in these institutions (Concannon, 2005). Amongst 
them was the pamphlet titled 50,000 Outside the Law, published by the National Council for 
Civil Liberties just ten years prior to Powell’s speech that read, 
 
“The idiot, the imbecile and feeble-minded are an integral part of the human race; their 
existence constitutes an unspoken demand on us. The extent to which we guard their 
right to the fullest and most useful life, the extent to which we guarantee to them the 
maximum freedom which they can enjoy and the extent to which we help their families 
to give them the love they need, is a measure of the extent to which we ourselves are 
civilized” (quoted in Concannon, 2005: 29).  
 
The language of this pamphlet is notable: it was one of the first publications in the UK 
that explicitly evoked ideals of citizenship (“right to the fullest and most useful life”) to 
appeal for a better treatment of people with learning disabilities (Johnson et al., 2010).  
In this section, I provide a brief overview of how subsequently citizenship came to be a 
central concept in learning disability policy and service provision. I do not aim to give an in-
depth historical account of learning disability care. Rather, my aim is threefold. Firstly, I seek 
to demonstrate that citizenship is an ambiguous concept whose meaning in social policy has 
changed over the past decades. Secondly, I argue that many of the inequalities people with 
learning disabilities face today are a result of decade-long systemic measures, and that 
individualist policy formulations of citizenship are constitutive of these inequalities. 
To do so, I look at three eras in learning disability service provision: 
deinstitutionalisation, personalisation, and austerity. I discuss how the term citizenship was 
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deployed in these periods by various actors, and examine the practical impact that some of the 
staple policies in these periods had on the everyday lives of people with learning disabilities.  
 
 
The beginnings: deinstitutionalisation 
 
Prior to the Second World War, policy and service provision did not consider people 
with learning disabilities citizens in any sense. They were denied basic civil and political 
rights, such as the right to vote or get married, and were often exempt from duties like 
military service (Carey, 2009a). Although most people were cared for by their family and 
relatives, long-stay hospitals were the primary mode of formal care provision (Walmsley and 
Rolph, 2001). These hospitals were partly established to provide sanctuary for the disabled 
and poor people (Wright, 1998), but by the turn of the 20th century, people with learning 
disabilities were often institutionalised involuntarily. These institutions later came to 
represent the prevailing social exclusion of people with learning disabilities: segregation, 
abuse, and lack of choice and control. 
It was the Second World War that brought about major changes in the practice and 
ideology of care provision (of which learning disability scholars like Welshman (2007) and 
Walmsley (2007) have written a detailed historical overview). Broadly speaking, some of 
these changes were due to the practical circumstances created by the war: for instance, while 
the eyes of the medical establishment were on the fronts, hospital workers found a freedom 
that enabled them to experiment with mixed care arrangements (Bennet and Morris, 1982; 
Thomson, 1998). Some changes coincided with an ideological shift, including the emergence 
of the disability rights, anti-psychiatry, and parent movements that inspired seminal 
sociological essays challenging the effects of mental institutions (e.g. Foucault, 1961; 
Goffman, 1961). These movements corresponded with reports on the abject conditions and 
abuse in hospitals (The Herald, 2002), erupting in subsequent conversations on the rights of 
residents and society’s responsibility towards them (e.g. National Council for Civil Liberties, 
1951).  
In England and Wales, the process of hospital closures started in the 1950s, in response 
to demands by advocacy groups and families of institutionalised people. Calls for its necessity 
came to a head in 1979 with the publishing of the  Jay Committee report, which, somewhat 
unusually for the time, started not by reviewing services but by outlining the rights of people 
with learning disabilities to “enjoy normal patterns of life in the community” (Concannon, 
2005: 41). Subsequent policies proceeded to formalise community provisions by carving out 
the space and funding, while simultaneously closing down long-stay hospitals. All this 
culminated in the 1990 National Health Service and Community Care Act, which made 




In the UK, deinstitutionalisation frames current citizenship debates in complex ways. 
Advocates of deinstitutionalisation emphasised the civil rights of people with learning 
disabilities (Marshall, 1950), such as the freedom from repression by challenging the overt 
restrictions, control, and exploitation that took place in institutions. Deinstitutionalisation also 
asserted individuals’ right to be free from discrimination based on their disability by putting 
forward their entitlement to normality.  
However, deinstitutionalisation – both as an ideology and practice – also created new 
forms of exclusion, thus  leaving a complicated legacy. Evaluations on the impact of hospital 
closures and moving residents into community care are still split between those who applaud 
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the intentions but take issue with the implementation, and those who are more critical about 
the underlying idea that moving care from hospitals into the community can foster the 
sociality of people with learning disabilities (Hazelton, 2005). From the 1950s to the 1970s, 
parent organisations, disability rights advocates, and academics welcomed 
deinstitutionalisation as a milestone in changing perceptions of learning disabilities 
(Welshman, 2007). However, in the 1980s, the Conservative government recognised that 
increasing reliance on informal care networks could help their cost-cutting agenda: it is during 
this period that attitudes towards deinstitutionalisation and community care grew more 
ambivalent among academics and advocates (Walmsley, 2007). 
The 1980s was marked by disillusionment in Scotland in particular, which was lacking 
in both commitment and coordination to undertake a task of such magnitude: up until the 
1990s, there were no substantial resources nor adequate planning in place for the 
establishment of community care (Long, 2017; Stalker and Hunter, 1999). In Glasgow, the 
process was further exacerbated by problems related to deep poverty: the task of setting up 
community services created additional strain on the already underfunded and understaffed 
Department of Social Work (Long, 2017). Later appraisals sharply criticised the lack of 
governmental commitment to resource allocation (Jones, 2006; Thomson, 1998), including 
accounts that saw deinstitutionalisation as an attempt largely driven by the economic 
expectation to reduce costs (Walmsley, 2007). More recent critique suggests that 
deinstitutionalisation left the power of the medical establishment untouched despite hospital 
closures: policies simply relocated participants from segregated institutions to often similarly 
segregated facilities that happened to be located in community settings (Hall, 2010, 2011; 
Ootes et al., 2013; Power, 2013; Power and Bartlett, 2015).  
Without the funding, deinstitutionalisation’s commitment to civil rights alone was 
inadequate to in addressing systematic inequalities. Ideologically, deinstitutionalisation put 
forward a vision of citizenship in which people with learning disabilities had the right to be 
part of the community. However, it said little about that what the right to be part of the 
community really meant for someone with learning impairment: deinstitutionalisation policies 
did not discuss the kind of interactions community “participation” could entail, and the ways 
in which substantial participation could be enabled and sustained. The lack of funding 
invested in community care did not allow enough space and resources to be invested in 
exploring these questions. All this suggests that deinstitutionalisation might have missed a 
trick: in lack of a comprehensive vision for citizenship, it cleared the path for a particular 
political agenda to co-opt its language to promote market interests. 
 
 
Privatisation, personalisation, and the consumer citizen 
 
By the late 1980s, the discontent voiced by disability activists and advocacy groups 
surrounding the underfunding of community care reached the Conservative government, 
which subsequently tasked Sir Roy Griffiths with examining these issues. During his 
investigation, Griffiths received numerous complaints from local authorities about the lack of 
resources in community-based services. While he acknowledged these, he also stated: 
resource allocation was outside the scope of his work. Instead, he offered an alternative 
explanation and thus solution for the funding issues. Rather than the ineffective resource 
allocation by the government, he suggested that the problem was in fact the lack of incentives 
in community care which led to cost-inefficient services. Community care, Griffiths famously 
wrote, was “everybody’s distant relative but nobody’s baby” (quoted in Wanless, 2006: 10).  
Conservative prime minister Margaret Thatcher responded with government measures 
that incentivised the care sector through competition, deregulation, privatisation, and 
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commodification (Langan, 1990). In the old social care system, the residential care for people 
with learning disabilities was paid for by the government’s financial support. Griffith’s 
concern was that this form of financing created services based on the budget that was 
available rather than the need of service users: his report suggested that this system did not 
allow for funding to be invested in exploring alternative ways into supporting people, outside 
of residential care (Wanless, 2006). 
The reforms thus aimed to enable the diversification of care. In the new system of care 
provision, local authorities and social workers went from being care providers to care 
coordinators, whose primary task became assessing people’s needs and then referring them to 
third party providers. These providers – a mixture of private and third sector organisations – 
were to compete with each other for governmental funding and clients. The stated goal was to 
create a system which was more cost-effective, flexible, responsive, and offered people more 
options and independence (Langan, 1990).  
It is important to note that these changes corresponded well with the demands of the 
independent living movement, which gained prominence in the UK about the same time in the 
1980s. For many of those living with physical disabilities, these reforms allowed them to have 
more control over their support and their finances by enabling them to receive their support in 
cash and employ a personal assistant (Pearson, 2012). However, the new care arrangements 
conspicuously refrained from addressing the care providers’ primary complaint: inadequate 
funding for community care services that people with learning disabilities relied on. 
Observing these changes, policy researcher Mary Langan (1990) noted, the new provisions 
bore “a striking Thatcherite synthesis of the principles of the free market and the attitudes of 
the strong state” (p. 59). These social care reforms shared ideological principles with a wide 
range of reforms introduced under Thatcher’s government, such as the restriction of trade 
union power, the privatisation of water, gas, and steel industry: they all demonstrated 
trademarks of economic liberalism, privatisation, and tight public expenditure. 
Ten years later, by the late 1990s, the subsequent New Labour government inherited a 
care sector which was further fragmented and poorly coordinated (Hudson and Henwood, 
2002; Wanless, 2006). The Royal Commission tasked with investigating the funding issues in 
the social care sector identified a number of challenges that linked to Thatcherite reforms. 
Among these were the prioritising of individuals with high support needs at the expense of 
those perceived as having lower needs. A further criticism was that the system was overly 
complex, offered little choice, and over-incentivised residential care, despite aiming to do the 
opposite (Wanless, 2006). The New Labour government sought to salvage the care sector by 
finding a “third way” between the welfare state and the free market, and by creating services 
that balanced individuals’ entitlements and duties. What resulted was a hybrid “workfare” (as 
opposed to “welfare”) system, in which people’s benefits were tied to paid employment: 
recipients of state welfare were encouraged to develop marketable skills and seek 
employment in exchange for financial assistance. Paid employment was considered the 
primary way to inclusion for people with learning disabilities: the government introduced a 
range of practical support, from job brokers to coaching to adjustments for special needs to 
supported employment schemes (Redley, 2009).  
Central to this era’s provision was the so-called personalisation of care: the 
rearrangement of services, where the care-recipient’s personal care plan was rendered to serve 
their aspirations (Scottish Government, 2009). In Scotland, personalisation offered social care 
service users four options for arranging their care. Accordingly, they could opt 1) to be paid 
the cash equivalent in the form of direct payments, 2) to select the support they need, which is 
then arranged by their local authorities or care organisation on their behalf, 3) to have their 
support both selected and provided by the local authorities, or 4) to receive a mixture of the 
first three options (Scottish Government, 2013a). In particular, direct payments and individual 
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budget represented a staple policy, which enabled people with disabilities to design their care 
package, with the possibility to receive the cash equivalent of their care to employ a personal 
assistant. With direct payments, care-recipients were given the opportunity to assemble their 
care plan themselves and employ a personal assistant.  
On paper, these measures echo the principles of the independent living movement, 
which advocated for “all disabled people having the same freedom, choice, dignity and 
control as other citizens at home, at work and in the community” (Scottish Government, 2017: 
27). In particular, members of the movement saw the right to cash payments and employ 
personal assistant as a means to independence on their own terms, beyond pre-existent service 
structures (Pearson, 2012). Direct payments was also heralded as a victory for social justice 
(Ferguson, 2012): it was a long-awaited recognition that disabled people were entitled to have 
control over their care, and capable of managing their finances (Needham, 2014; Pearson, 




From this era’s reforms emerges a new kind of citizen, one who is defined by the ability 
to exert choice and control through becoming a consumer of social care services. The New 
Labour government’s expectation was that these measures would increase choices and  
transform care and welfare recipients into autonomous, independent, and responsible citizens 
(Redley, 2009). This is most apparent in the language of the 2001 government publication 
Valuing people, which presents a clear outline of how policy and service provision imagined a 
citizen with learning disabilities at the time (Department of Health, 2001). The paper lays out 
proposals “based on recognition of their rights as citizens, social inclusion in local 
communities, choice in their daily lives and real opportunities to be independent” (p.10). It 
further reiterates the government’s commitment to people’s “enforceable civil rights” (p. 23): 
the right to education, voting, to have a family, to freedom of expression, and freedom from 
discrimination. 
There is, however, an incompatibility between people with learning disabilities and the 
image of the citizen upheld by these policies. Later evaluations (Burton and Kagan, 2006; 
Hall, 2011; Redley, 2009) note an uneasy amalgam of the marketization of welfare and the 
human rights discourse adopted by much of disability movement. Writing in relation to 
feminist movements, critical theorist Nancy Fraser (2013) warned that emancipatory efforts 
which rely on the marketization can simultaneously disintegrate social protections and 
solidarity, and therefore further entrench the marginalisation of those who continue to be 
excluded from the market. 
Fraser’s warning applies just as much to the disability movement at the time. The 
consumer citizen discourse and subsequent modes of empowerment were largely conceived 
and supported by articulate, politically active, physically disabled people. Little thought was 
spared for the different needs and capabilities of people with learning disabilities (Hall and 
Kearns, 2001; Shakespeare, 2006). The policies favoured those whose family members, care-
givers, or themselves had the resources and time to take advantage of the purported consumer 
power offered by mixed provisions (Ferguson, 2007; Lymbery, 2010; Scourfield, 2007). 
However, individuals and families who needed more guidance on navigating the complex and 
elaborate service system received little help (Abbott and Marriott, 2013) 
The ill-fit between ideology and practice is well-illustrated by the slow uptake of the 
opportunities offered by personalisation among people with learning disabilities, particularly 
in Scotland (Pearson, 2004; Priestley et al., 2007). At the time, in her condemning appraisal, 
Pearson (2004) partly attributed this lag in uptake to provider ignorance, as well as Scotland’s 
anti-market discourse among social workers and care practitioners, which regarded much of 
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personalisation as a sign of further privatisation and a threat to local authority services. But 
later reviews – which were far more critical of the consumerist ethos of personalisation – note 
that the low uptake indicates that such empowerment was inappropriate and perhaps 
undesired by people with learning disabilities, especially those of older age and more 
significant impairment (Hall, 2011). 
The vision of citizenship that these policies outline are strikingly individualistic: a 
citizen is someone who participates through paid employment, lives independently, and is 
personally responsible for managing their own care. A problematic consequence of 
conceiving citizenship exclusively in terms of autonomy, independence, and choice in public 
services is that it ignores the relational aspects of citizenship (Ootes et al., 2013; Pols, 2016; 
Redley, 2009). These ideals speaks little to the fact that for those with significant disabilities, 
their everyday lives are embedded in complex webs of dependency with others: care is an 
ongoing relationship rather than a market transaction (Mol, 2008).  
One of the complications resulting from introducing market relations into care 
arrangements relates to the question of whether to allow family members to be paid for taking 
on care-giving responsibilities. Hall (2011) provides a succinct summary of the debate: one 
side argued that commodifying family care could change the relationship between the family 
carer and care-recipient, and could cause tensions between the paid and unpaid family 
members. The other side of the debate was concerned that since care for people with learning 
disabilities were largely provided by their family members, not allowing family relationships 
to be financially compensated could devalue these relationships. However, Hall (2011) points 
out that debates revolving around the cost of care still frames care in terms of the market, 
which comes at the expense of discussing its implication on social justice, in particular 
regarding the gendered aspect of the care economy. Currently, care responsibilities 
overwhelmingly fall on women, much of which is either unrecognised and unpaid, or is low-
paid and provided by women of from disadvantaged backgrounds (Lister, 1997). The 
language of personalisation which emphasises disabled people’s rights and empowerment sits 
uncomfortably with its silence on the rights and empowerment of the people who provide the 
care (Hall, 2011; Shakespeare, 2006). 
Another consequence of personalisation paying little attention to relationships was that 
policies around it led to the closure of many communal spaces of privacy, safety, comfort, and 
friendship, such as day care centres (Needham, 2012; Shakespeare, 2006). While the fear that 
these spaces might have constituted new forms of segregation akin to long-stay hospitals, 
little effort was invested into preserving the sense of belonging, safety and solidary 
established in these spaces. This is especially troubling in light of the rejection people with 
learning disabilities continue to experience when pursuing narrow routes to inclusion through 
employment. 
Despite the mixed impact and experiences of personalised care, social care policy 
continues to hail it with unvarnished optimism: for instance, in its recent annual report 
published in 2019, Scotland’s Chief Medical Office wrote, “with a growing number of people 
now living with multiple, complex and frequently fluctuating health conditions, the need for a 
personalised approach is greater than ever” (Scottish Government, 2019b: 6). Therefore, it is 
important to reiterate: this form of citizenship excludes many people with learning 




Care and belonging in the time of austerity 
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There is, of course, the question of whether the poor fit between people with learning 
disabilities and some of the personalisation policies were due to bad implementation. It is 
undeniable that the timing of any change in care provision instituted in the past decade was 
deeply unfortunate: in 2008, the UK was hit by the global financial and economic crisis that 
reframed the conversation around public spending (e.g. Hilsenrath et al., 2008; Stewart, 
2008). “Trusting people, sharing responsibility, decentralising and devolving power,” 
Conservative candidate and future prime minister David Cameron announced at his party 
conference the following year, “When it comes to running public services, that’s the way you 
get new ideas, new people, new ways of doing things” (Cameron, 2009). His words stood in 
stark contrast with his government’s subsequent actions, namely, the systematic withdrawal 
of funding from public services. 
These spending cuts frame the everyday experiences of people with learning disabilities 
to this day. Although it is difficult to put an exact figure to the cuts, some estimate that since 
austerity was introduced in 2008, a total of £30 billion pounds were taken away from welfare, 
housing assistance, schools, police, courts, libraries, road maintenance, and so on (Mueller, 
2019). In practice, these figures meant rising child poverty (Kingsley, 2018) and hunger (The 
Trussell Trust, n.d.), falling life expectancy (Collinson, 2019), an increase in preventable 
deaths (Helm, 2019), and exacerbating ethnic inequality (Gentleman, 2019). 
People with disabilities were disproportionately affected by austerity (Duffy, 2013; 
Ginn, 2013). Sheltered workplaces – which had been a primary route to citizenship in the 
previous government’s workfare regime – were deprived of funding and subsequently shut 
(Brindle, 2011; Hall and McGarrol, 2013). People with learning disabilities further lost spaces 
that offered opportunities for activity, participation, and socialising. Many local authority day 
centres closed; those that stayed open restricted their access by, for instance, limiting it to 
people not living in residential housing (Needham, 2012). Many of the leisure centres, 
libraries, art, and education programmes also came to a similar fate. No alternatives were put 
in place to substitute the closures (Hall, 2011; Roulstone and Morgan, 2009). Critics remarked 
that these were also spaces of safety and belonging; with them gone, people with learning 
disabilities were pushed into further social isolation (Hall, 2011; Hamilton et al., 2017; Malli 
et al., 2018; Needham, 2014; Power et al., 2016).  
The language of personalisation was often used to justify these closures (Hamilton et 
al., 2017; Power et al., 2016). Disability studies scholars Power et al. (2016) observe that 
because spaces dedicated specifically for people with disabilities were often judged as a new 
form of segregation, closing them catered for both the social inclusion rhetoric and money 
saving policies. They note that, 
 
“Whilst the authors do not advocate the return to static, inflexible day centres, given the 
often poor outcomes involved, the findings nonetheless reveal a growing social 
precarity in people’s lives, an individualization of risk and evidence of deep isolation 
and boredom when collective sources of support are removed and not replaced or 
reimagined.” (p. 190) 
 
As a result, the third sector organisations – including the charities tasked with providing 
care and services for people with learning disabilities – that pulled through the cuts became 
over-subscribed (Walker and Hayton, 2017). To seize a spot in these programmes, one had to 
be either referred by social services, their private care provider, or pay for the programmes 
from their own funds. Those who could not get into the programmes had to rely on their 
family relationships for care and support, presenting a particular challenge for people who did 
not have close family networks, especially elderly people with learning disabilities, many of 
whom relied on variable and inconsistent neighbourhood support (Power and Bartlett, 2019). 
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Even those who could retain their support and gained space at a programme had to 
reckon with further difficulties of getting to the place of support. Because most people with 
learning disabilities do not drive, they rely on accessible public transport, and personal and 
financial support with travel. However, as a consequence of austerity measures, transport 
infrastructure and support were significantly cut (Power and Bartlett, 2015). Human 
geographer Andrew Power noted that funding withdrawal “fail[ed] to appreciate the 
limitations and struggles that disabled people experience travelling through public space on an 
ongoing basis” (Power, 2016: 283).  
Concurrently, the workload of social and support workers increased. Because people 
often rely on social workers for referrals into care programmes, the chronic understaffing of 
the social work department resulted in an increase in the unmet needs of disabled people. 
Stalker et al. (2015) give an account of carers feeling like they had to “fight” for the attention 
of social workers to be able to receive a referral for services. Care organisations became 
similarly understaffed, posing a further challenge. A man with learning disabilities 
interviewed by Bates et al. (2017) said, “People who live in residential places don’t really 
have a choice about whether they can go to a meeting or not. There is no support worker to 
take them. And the creative arts groups are struggling to get money, there’s less people at 
those meetings” (p. 169). Brimblecombe et al. (2018) spoke to a carer who explained the lack 
of time support workers had to attend to individual clients: “[the support workers] probably 
got, you know, ten people to get up in the morning or whatever and. they’ve been allocated 
three quarters of an hour to get that person. up, washed, dressed, fed, and – and everything 
and, you know, three quarters of an hour is not – it’s not sufficient” (p. 224). 
While social policy continued to emphasise the importance to treat people with learning 
disabilities like citizens, empirical studies on the impact of austerity highlight that the 
spending cuts and the subsequent erosion of the public and support infrastructure prevented 




Reviewing past trends in learning disability policy and service provision illustrates how 
citizenship as essentially contested concept functions in learning disability policy and care 
provision (Duffy, 2017; Gallie, 1956; Lister, 1997). As a term that is much evoked yet never 
defined, the polyvalence of citizenship is reflected both in rhetoric and practical care service 
arrangements. Since the start of deinstitutionalisation, citizenship has been deployed to 
advocate for civil rights and the freedom from repression and discrimination, which in 
practice served drivers of hospital closures and the establishment of community care. 
Towards the 1980s, citizenship increasingly came to mean the right to self-deliberation, 
choice, and control, a trend that continues to this day, albeit with different elements 
emphasised by various service provision frameworks. For the Thatcherite government (with 
the backing of disability rights organisations), consumption was the key element to supporting 
individuals’ ability to have control over their support, which was reflected in the privatisation 
of the care sector. New Labour introduced the element of individual obligation towards 
society, which was key to their inclusion through  workfare regime. Currently, citizenship is 
deployed to uphold the personalisation framework, which is an amalgamate of social rights 
and market logic. 
When observing the ambiguity of citizenship in Dutch mental health services, 
anthropologist Sabine Ootes (2010) noted how the heterogenous meaning of the concept 
allowed various actors (service providers, healthcare professionals, patients) to create a 
bridges between diverse goals in mental healthcare. For her, citizenship was a productive and 
inviting concept because it could be used to talk about social obligations, rights, and 
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inclusion, thus creating a common language that binded together an often fragmented sector 
with conflicting goals.  
I only partially share Ootes’ optimistic assessment. While British learning disability 
policy and service provision certainly evokes these powerful ideas, it also confounds them 
with market interests, which have been used to justify spending cuts in the care sector. In 
addition, despite the ambiguity of the term, the way citizenship has been used demonstrates 
common ideals of autonomy, independence, choice, and control. When reviewing the policies 
of the past decades, it becomes clear that the overemphasis of these ideals came at the 
expense of fostering care relationships and a sense of belonging. 
 
 
The root of the problem 
 
It is not a coincidence that policies that emphasised individualistic ideals fell short. In 
addition to problems with their practical implementation, I argue that these policies suffer 
from a fundamental philosophical problem, which makes them ill-equipped to address the 
needs of people with learning disabilities, and serve them justice and equality. These ideals 
are in fact rooted in long traditions of liberal theories of citizenship, which have, for the large 
part, ignored people with learning disabilities. In this section, I provide a brief overview of 
this philosophical tradition and its relation to learning disabilities, in order to suggest a way 
forward in discussing citizenship. 
The perhaps most influential and enduring liberal tradition of citizenship rests upon the 
idea of the social contract, a thought experiment that outlines a mechanism by which 
principles of social justice and cooperation are decided. In their classic 17th century form – 
best represented by the works of thinkers like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean Jacques 
Rousseau – theories of the social contract tell the story of political communities emerging as a 
result of individuals coming together to negotiate rights. The basic premise of the social 
contract posits that in a distant past, individuals existed without laws, governance, and 
society. Life in this state of nature was decidedly unpleasant: “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, 
and short,” as Hobbes (1651: 62) famously wrote. Seeing that this state of nature always 
carried a threat of violence, people decided to come together and outline rights that provided 
them equal entitlement and protection. At the beginning, these rights, negotiated on the basis 
of mutual interest, mostly comprised property rights. Later thinkers, including Marshall 
(1950), expanded these to include economic, cultural, and participatory rights (Beckett, 2006).  
One of these modern thinkers was political philosopher John Rawls (1971). Rawls’s 
work is highly influential in the liberal tradition because, while keeping the basic narrative 
premise of the social contract, he addressed some of the gaps left by his predecessors. One of 
these were the neglected interests of women, children, and the elderly: classical social 
contract theories assumed that individuals were men of equal capacity. Rawls’s rectifies this 
by accounting for the plurality of interests in an inherently unequal world. He dismisses a 
common assumption in classical works that everyone has the same conception of ‘good’; 
instead, his central preoccupation was to find a method by which people with different 
interests could achieve a set of political principles in a cooperative and mutually beneficial 
manner. The subsequent hypothetical negotiating situation Rawls devises is one where 
individuals are shrouded by a ‘veil of ignorance’, therefore they do not know their position: 
this negotiating position, Rawls posits, compels individuals to moral impartiality. 
Despite its comprehensive nature, Rawls’s theory does not address justice for people 
with learning disabilities (Beckett, 2006; Nussbaum, 2006). In fact: no reiterations of the 
social contract include them (Nussbaum, 2006). Rawls himself recognised this, he deferred 
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the question and suggested that until a solution was found, thus inadvertently admitting that 
his theory was unprepared to address the problem of learning disabilities (Nussbaum, 2006).  
In her in-depth critique of Rawls, political philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2006) argues 
that the difficulties Rawls faced when trying theorise justice for people with learning 
disabilities lies within the basic architecture of the social contract. There are two major, but 
flawed assumptions: 1) the assumption that individuals devise and uphold the social contract 
in pursuit of mutual advantage, and 2) that the parties at the negotiating table are of equal 
rationality, verbal self-expression, cognitive capacity, and socioeconomic productivity.  
The problem with the former, Nussbaum argues, is that contractarians, including Rawls, 
conceptualise mutual advantage primarily in an economic sense, and do not have space to 
account for human benevolence to promote human dignity. The idea that economic advantage 
is necessary for participating in society is exclusive of people with learning disabilities, many 
of whom do not have the means or support to achieve paid employment and become 
financially independent (Redley, 2009). The second, similarly exclusive assumption comes 
from a long tradition of Western philosophy, which posits that it is the capacity to reason that 
sets humans apart from animals, while simultaneously denies people with learning disabilities 
said capacity because they do not fit into this idealised image of a rational person 
(McKearney, 2018a; Nussbaum, 2006). Accordingly, rational deliberation enables humans to 
make judgements of what is “good”, and subsequently participating in the social contract. 
Therefore, according to contractarians, it is a necessary condition of moral agency without 
which and individual cannot be a member of society. This view of personhood has been 
extensively critiqued from a disability and the ethics of care perspective (Beckett, 2006; 
Erevelles, 2011; McKearney, 2018a; Nussbaum, 2006; Vehmas and Curtis, 2017). As 
Nussbaum (2006) eloquently summarises the major issue with this philosophical construct: 
 
“[This view of personhood] suggests the idea that the core of our personality is self-
sufficient rather than needy, and purely active rather than also passive. In so thinking 
we greatly distort the nature of our own morality and rationality, which are themselves 
thoroughly material and animal; we learn to ignore the fact that disease, old age, and 
accident can impede the moral and rational functions, just as much as the other animal 
functions” (p.132). 
 
Social contract theories, although they may seem abstract at first glance, continue to 
shape the social imagination on what citizenship is: they provide the basic narrative on why 
people live in a community, how they can partake in that community, and who sets the rules 
for participation. Furthermore, these theories have an impact on the treatment of people with 
learning disabilities by framing the language and ideals of social policy and service provision, 
and by governing relationships between individuals (Lister, 1997).  
A concrete example illuminates how. First of all, the principle of mutual advantage, 
defined narrowly in economic terms, is apparent in the fact that, outside of paid employment, 
there is little discussion on how people with learning disabilities can be valuable and 
contributing members of society. The fact that people with learning disabilities should be 
treated with dignity, and that engaging with them has value beyond increasing economic 
productivity is often an afterthought, rather than something policies actively seek to foster. 
Secondly, rationality as a condition to participation is apparent in the way choice, inclusion, 
and responsibility are conceived: as products of rational deliberation, conditional to verbal 
self-expression and cognitive capacity. None of the paths to empowerment take into account 
the possible limitations of that learning impairment can pose.  
Revising the ideals and assumptions of liberal citizenship is essential in addressing the 
injustice and inequality people with learning disabilities face today. Social policies that are 
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based on liberal ideals fall short partly because the philosophical theories they draw on do not 
take into account the needs, interests, and desires of people with learning disabilities. It is 
important to note here that outside liberal theories, there have been notable efforts in 
rethinking citizenship in relation to disability. These alternative theories recognise that as long 
as the people with learning disabilities cannot participate in setting the principles of social 
cooperation, their rights and citizenship is as case of charity rather than something that is 
ingrained in the basic architecture of society. I shall return to these theories in the second 
chapter. 
Seeing the exclusionary tendencies of the liberal citizenship – which continues to 
dominate citizenship theories, social policy, and therefore ethical engagement with people 
with learning disabilities in the UK – one may ask whether citizenship as a concept has ceased 
to be theoretically and politically valuable?  
Seeing the exclusionary tendencies of liberal citizenship, philosopher Annemarie Mol 
(2008) argues against its deployment in healthcare policy. She contends that “[i]n a 
democratic state, people are interpellated as citizens who govern themselves and one another. 
If this model is introduced into health care, and patients are called upon to overturn the 
dominance of their doctors and emancipate themselves, something is lost” (p.12). Mol (2008) 
takes issue with the fact that the liberal citizenship overemphasises empowerment, autonomy, 
and independence. “Emancipation may well be an improvement over oppression, but at the 
same time it is a rather limited ideal,” she notes (p.30). Because the language of 
empowerment often comes at the relative neglect of relationality, treating people as (liberal) 
citizens may lead to poor care. For Mol (2008), good care is not solely a product on rational 
deliberation, but requires the recognition that we are inherently vulnerable and dependent. It 
is also tactile and involves the negotiation of sensory pleasures, like unhealthy food and 
alcohol. It is, above all, relational: a joint venture undertaken by doctor and patient. The 
idealised rational, immaterial citizen does not have space for bodily vulnerability and 
interdependency, she argues. Witnessing the entanglement of citizenship with exclusionary 
individualism, Mol (2008) asks, ought we not discard the concept of citizenship altogether in 
the context of care?  
Although Mol’s (2008) analysis focuses on healthcare, her concerns are relevant for the 
care of people with learning disabilities, whose ability to perform everyday tasks – like 
bathing, eating, and using transport – is often reliant personal support and care relationships. 
Due to the enduring and inherently exclusive nature of liberal citizenship in policy and service 
provision, the question is, can we reformulate the concept of citizenship to make it more 
theoretically relevant and strategically useful for people with learning disabilities? 
 
 
Citizenship as practice and self-making 
 
In the works I discussed so far, citizenship has been primarily framed as a philosophical 
and intellectual project. However, anthropological works demonstrate that citizenship is a 
productive analytical concept because it exists beyond political philosophy, legislation, and 
social policy. It is more than just abstract rights: it is an ontological condition, i.e. a way of 
being which permeates every aspect of everyday life. Anthropology approaches citizenship as 
a concept that manifests through and can be derived from everyday practices. In doing so, it 
can provide a lens into how citizenship is lived; it may also help revise the exclusive 
principles. In this section, by providing an overview of the anthropology of citizenship, I 
demonstrate that studying citizenship as everyday practice reveals the way it can be 
manipulated and rearticulated to serve claims-making. I argue that studying the citizenship of 
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people with learning disabilities as a practice helps rearticulate the concept in a way that 
supports their claims to equality and justice. 
Anthropologist Aihwa Ong (1996) famously wrote that citizenship is a dual process of 
“self-making and being made” (p.737): on the one hand, it is a process by which individuals 
are “being made” by the disciplinary mechanism of power relations exercised through 
administrative and surveillance systems. On the other hand, citizenship entails processes of 
“self-making”, meaning that it is the language by which individuals gain their capacity to act 
and challenge pre-existing power relations (Ong, 1996; see also Rosaldo, 1994). 
Ong (1996) illustrates this point with an ethnographic example of Cambodian asylum 
seekers, who, upon arriving to the United States, are labelled welfare-dependent subjects by 
the state administration and public perception. The living circumstances in which these 
asylum seekers were placed did not help their public perception: housed in deprived 
neighbourhoods, many of them were left to survive on low-wage, blue collar work. 
Cambodian men who had been wage-earners struggled to make a living in their country of 
arrival. In contrast, Cambodian women, who formerly had been confined to the domestic 
sphere and financially dependent on their spouses, found an unexpected form of agency: some 
of them learnt to navigate the welfare system to their advantage and to improve their material 
conditions, which allowed them unprecedented freedom from their husbands. One of Ong’s 
(1996) informants explained that Cambodian women, as primary carers for their children, 
were the ones interacting with social workers and welfare services. They were the ones 
receiving the welfare cheques, and thus became the ones controlling the household’s finances. 
Ong (1996) recounts that many Cambodian women found ways to claim additional financial 
assistance by hiding their marital status, child’s age, or work-related income. Cambodian girls 
who became pregnant were sometimes married to the father of their children with a Khmer 
ceremony, but did not register their marriage with the local authorities, in order to receive 
statutory financial support. The hope of these young Cambodian women was to save up the 
benefit payments and eventually be able to have their own homes. These practices were a 
source of major frustration for social workers. However, taking disciplinary action to sanction 
their benefit payments only pushed these women back from the brink of achieving economic 
independence and reinforced their reliance on welfare (Ong, 1996). 
Ong’s (1996) ethnography illustrates that formulations of citizenship, including rules 
and conditions of belonging, rights, and participation are not monolithic entities. Rather, once 
articulated by state bureaucracies, they take on their own lives and are used by individuals, 
often from systematically disadvantaged groups, to define themselves, frame their 
interactions, and in many cases, to make claims. People – like the Cambodian asylum seekers 
– navigate, negotiate, and manipulate the entitlements associated with citizenship to improve 
their living conditions. These examples clearly illustrate that citizenship can provide a 
theoretically and politically productive lens to shed light on the diverse and unexpectedly 
emancipatory potential of a seemingly exclusive concept. 
Because of this, citizenship has enjoyed a particular popularity among studies of 
grassroots mobilisation and political movements: these works served to expand the political 
vocabulary of those seeking to contest the boundaries of national identity and belonging in 
relation to diasporas (e.g. Siu, 2001; Verdery, 1998), problematize the production of legal 
categories in migration and displacement (e.g. Feldman, 2007; Genova, 2013), and claim 
ethnic minorities and indigenous rights (e.g. Blackburn, 2009; Sieder, 2011).  
The language of citizenship is not confined to contesting the nation state. Ethnographic 
accounts document citizenship used to make claims under neoliberal regimes or against 
market deregulation (e.g. Hale, 2005; Lazar, 2004), to appeal to humanitarian regimes (e.g. 
Fassin, 2012; Ticktin, 2006), and contest post-colonial power relations (e.g. Lukose, 2005).  
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Citizenship as a self-making practice is a fertile lens of analysis to explore claims to 
health and healthcare – an angle that holds particular relevance for people with learning 
disabilities. In 1996, anthropologist Paul Rabinow observed that new forms of biotechnology 
– like diagnostic categories or treatment possibilities – produce new forms of identities, 
subjectivities, and social life: biosocialities, as he called it (Rabinow, 1996). The language of 
citizenship often underlines these socialities to help describe emergent forms of belonging and 
claim rights to treatment, protection, and resources.  
One of the most poignant and comprehensive examples comes from Petryna’s (2003, 
2004) ethnography in which she explores the new forms of citizenship that emerged 
subsequent to the 1986 explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Petryna gives account 
of the disaster and the Soviet leadership’s subsequent failure to protect communities, which 
became central in the Ukrainian government’s case for independence, promising generous 
compensation for those affected. In the context of economic instability and unemployment 
caused by market transition, being able to demonstrate ill-health linked to the Chernobyl 
explosion became the only guarantee for citizenship entitlements, such as social and 
economic rights. What followed was an unprecedented mobilisation among people to master 
knowledge about radiation, compile evidence on radiation-related sickness, and negotiate with 
the medical system and the state with the purpose of expanding the diagnostic categories that 
entitled people for state benefits. In analysing and documenting the new forms of belonging, 
rights, and claims made on a biological basis, Petryna (2003, 2004) coined the concept of 
“biological citizenship”. Biological citizenship proved to be a remarkably productive 
analytical tool for understanding claims-making in diverse contexts, as in HIV/AIDS activism 
(Biehl, 2007; Fassin, 2007, 2012; Kalofonos, 2010; Nguyen, 2007, 2010), the global 
pharmaceutical market (Biehl, 2007; Ecks, 2005), and civil partnerships in medical 
knowledge production (e.g. Gibbon, 2006; Rabeharisoa, 2003).  
These works are important and informative in providing an empirical guide to studying 
citizenship. However, a limitation of these approaches is that they tend to focus on organised 
collective action led by politically savvy, articulate individuals who are often well-versed in 
the rights discourse, medical procedures, and have extensive social networks. Focusing 
exclusively on collective action and claims-making can neglect less visible practices of 
citizenship and community participation.  
Not only relationships between the individual and the state hold a potential for rewriting 
citizenship: there is also potential for citizenry in interactions between individuals. It is these 
small, everyday interactions that medical anthropologist Jeanette Pols (2006, 2016) focuses 
on when she observes psychiatric nurses assisting elderly patients with washing in a 
residential home. There are nurses, Pols says, who help patients wash themselves because 
they see cleanliness as a precondition to other activities. Others regard washing as an activity 
through which residents can exert their autonomy. Some, however, see washing as a social 
activity they can undertake together with the resident. These are three different visions of 
citizenships, enacted through the act of assisted washing: “In their actions, the nurses and 
patients can be seen as bringing different social worlds into being,” she writes (Pols, 2006: 
79). 
Pols’s work resonates well with many people with learning disabilities who do not 
participate in collective action, resist, or make claims: people who need support with basic 
tasks of self-care, and whose main social network often consist of their family members and 
care-givers (also see Hall, 2010; Ootes, 2012). That Pols sees the potential for citizenry in 
these mundane relations is helpful. Her focus, however, is centred around care practices and 






These works offer some tools to address the question of what it means to be a citizen 
with learning disabilities. One is an ethnographic imperative, which, instead of seeking an 
answer in political philosophy, derive the meaning of citizenship from practices of belonging 
and claims-making. The second is a recognition that citizenship as a concept manifests in 
fluid, diverse, and sometimes quiet ways in practice, and that people are active and 





My aim with this chapter has been threefold. Firstly, my goal was to illustrate that the 
concept of citizenship is polyvalent, and that learning disability social policy and service 
provision has deployed citizenship in a variety of ways to serve different purposes. Secondly, 
I demonstrated that these various understandings of citizenship drew on liberal traditions, 
which, I argued, are fundamentally unequipped to address the needs of people with learning 
disabilities. Finally, by outlining an anthropological approach to citizenship as a practice, I 
contended that by examining how people with learning disabilities enact citizenship in their 
everyday lives, we can articulate a new, more inclusive understandings that bear actual 
correspondence to what matters to them.  
This chapter identified three gaps in the literature. First of all, I showed that without an 
interrogation of everyday practice, there is a danger that citizenship remains solely a 
philosophical and intellectual project, thus creating further lines of exclusion for people with 
learning disabilities. Anthropological works highlight that citizenship is more than just the 
abstract concept of rights. The concept exists outside of political philosophy and policy 
papers, and permeates every aspect of everyday life. It is an ontological condition, meaning 
that its meanings, ideals, and assumptions shape lived experiences. The literature on the 
citizenship of people with learning disabilities predominantly examines citizenship as a 
philosophical concept; there is a gap on how it is lived in everyday practice. 
Secondly, the academic literature on citizenship has illustrated how the rights discourse, 
market interests, and political ideologies amalgamated in different understandings of the 
concept. This analytical approach – i.e. deriving the meaning of citizenship from discourse 
and practice instead of starting with a predetermined definition – allows us to ground 
philosophical debates on citizenship in everyday practice, account for the agency of various 
stakeholders in strategically negotiating and deploying abstract ideals. The literature has 
primarily focused on how policy measures and service provision articulated ideals of 
citizenship through practice. Little is known about the different meanings of citizenship that 
can be derived from studying how people with learning disabilities and those working with 
them reconstitute the meanings of citizenship. This is the second gap that this thesis will 
address. 
Finally, while the anthropology of citizenship has showcased a wide range of examples  
on how everyday practices negotiate, manipulate, and reconstitute the meaning of citizenship 
for claims-making purposes, its primary focus has been organised, collective political action. 
In addition, anthropology has relatively neglected learning disabilities. In this thesis, I will 
address these omission by exploring the less visible acts of citizenship that manifest in the 
process of artmaking by people with learning disabilities.  
The literature I reviewed in this chapter illustrates that citizenship is a theoretically and 
politically valuable concept, which can be re-appropriated by people with learning disabilities 
to aid their claims-making. In the following, guided by Aihwa Ong’s (1996) framework of 
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citizenship as self-making and being made, I will explore the ways individuals with learning 
disabilities (and those who work with them) practice pre-existent, predominantly liberal ideals 
of citizenship. I will further examine how these ideals are negotiated, deployed, and 
rearticulated in the process. Doing so may do something interesting: not only does it reiterate 
pre-existent critiques and highlight gaps between rhetoric and practice, but may produce new 






Chapter two:  





Having established my approach to citizenship, I now turn to the concept of learning 
disabilities: what it means and what we as a society can and should do about it. Margaret’s 
and Deoiridh’s example – both of whom I met at the art workshop during my fieldwork – 
illustrates some of challenges learning disability scholars and advocates have faced when 
trying to answer these questions. 
Margaret is a woman in her sixties who sports a tidy pixie haircut and speaks with a 
measured voice. Since she retired, she has been accompanying her daughter, Deoiridh, a 
young woman with learning disabilities and autism, to the workshops. Deoiridh, cannot travel 
alone. Therefore, each week, Margaret takes the train with her daughter to the workshop 
(taking one hour, door-to-door), sits with her in the studio, and then travels with her back 
home. Although Deoiridh lives in supported accommodation, but Margaret remains her 
primary companion and source of support.  
Margaret and I attended a talk at the Project Ability studio, given by an artist, Beth, and 
her mother. Beth has autism. Since she started at Project Ability, she became a recognised 
artist. Her small, quirky animal drawings appeared in children’s books as illustration, and her 
work has been commissioned for national public art projects. With the help of her mother, she 
set up an online shop on Etsy, where they sold postcards, notebooks, and mugs. Beth’s talk 
was a personal account of her experiences of autism in the art and business world. It was part 
inspirational talk, and part workshop for participants with entrepreneurial aspirations.  
I caught up with Margaret in the tea room after the talk. Considering that Margaret and 
Deoiridh shared similarities with the speakers – mother and daughter with autism and artistic 
talent, supported by Project Ability – I asked Margaret if she would also consider starting up 
an online business with Deoiridh. 
Margaret sighed. “No,” she said and shook her head. She explained that although 
Deoiridh also had autism, her learning disabilities would not allow her to do what Beth does. 
Margaret told me that although Deoiridh was a prolific artist and she has sold artwork via the 
studio gallery, her productivity was not consistent. Margaret pointed out that Deoiridh did not 
have the concentration to produce large numbers of artworks that were consistent in quality. 
Whereas Beth could make hundreds of small animal drawings that were identical in style and 
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size within a short period of time, Deoiridh could take days to finish one – that is, if she did 
not lose interest halfway through.  
“It’s great that in this country you can set up your own business,” Margaret said, as if 




Margaret’s and Deoiridh’s example resonates with a broader issue in the disability 
world. Historically, in order to make a case for people with disabilities to be treated as equal 
citizens, much of the scholarship and activism set out to prove that having an impairment did 
not make an individual any less worthy than their non-disabled peers. However, as I discussed 
in my previous chapter, liberal traditions of citizenship link equal worth to equal capacity. 
Hence, in the fight for equality and justice, one of the strategies employed by the learning 
disability scholarship and advocacy – whose language is informed by the liberal language of 
individual rights, autonomy, and independence – was to prove that having an impairment did 
not make an individual any less capable. This is apparent in two of the major ideological 
movements that have shaped the way the citizenship of people with learning disabilities have 
been imagined: normalisation and the social model of disability (Stalker, 2012).  
Following decades of disability rights activism, a growing self-advocacy movement, the 
proliferation of the learning disability scholarship, and increasing opportunities for people 
with learning disabilities to tell their own stories through life histories and autobiographies 
(famously, Hunt, 1967; also see Atkinson and Williams, 1990; Atkinson et al., 2000), it is 
now widely proclaimed in social policy and service provision that, with support, people with 
learning disabilities can do what their non-disabled peers do (Department of Health, 2001; 
Scottish Government, 2013b). People like Beth – a talented artist with disabilities who rose to 
national recognition with the support of an arts organisation – perfectly illustrate this point. 
People like Deoiridh pose challenges to these success stories. Although Deoridh is also 
a talented artist, her learning impairment poses particular difficulties to her artmaking – and 
her everyday activities. Like many of the participants I met at the workshops, Deoridh lives in 
supported accommodation, and has few prospects of becoming independent (Bigby and Fyffe, 
2009). She cannot travel alone, and requires assistance with basic tasks like shopping, 
cooking, taking her medication, planning her weekly schedule, and socialising with others 
(Mencap, 2016). Like all of those I encountered at the workshop – with the exception of one 
participant – Deoridh has never been in paid employment (Melling et al., 2011). However, 
there is little theorisation on the social position of people like Deoridh – people with more 
significant learning disabilities – in social policy and in disability studies (Stalker, 2012). 
There is a danger that in focusing exclusively on success stories – which emphasise ability – 
that the specific needs and interests and interests of people with more significant impairments 
are side-lined (Johnson and Walmsley, 2003; Mietola et al., 2017; Nind, 2014).  
There is thus a dilemma one faces when writing about learning disabilities. On the one 
hand, describing learning disabilities as a deficit or lack of capacity echoes past 
discriminatory practices, and risks denying people with learning disabilities their agency, 
capabilities, and dignity, as well as justifying current injustices and inequalities that people 
experience. On the other hand, emphasising ability may ignore the difficulties and support 
needs that people with learning disabilities face.  
The central aim of this chapter is to find an approach that engages with people with 
learning disabilities as individuals with capabilities while recognises the limitations of 
learning impairment, significant impairment in particular. First, I will provide an overview of 
the major theoretical frameworks that have dominated learning disability scholarship and 
service provision, and assess the extent to which these frameworks have engaged with the 
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nature of learning impairment. In the second half the chapter, I turn to an emerging body of 
works on vulnerability and the ethics of care, and reflect on the ways they can provide an 
alternative framework for thinking about learning disabilities. 
 
 
Learning disability and its medical definitions 
 
Although in this thesis I approach learning disabilities from a social science perspective, 
a significant proportion of the research comes from the medical field, which has defined the 
ways in which learning disabilities have been theorised.  
Besides being a social phenomenon, learning disabilities is also a medical label. 
However, it is ill-defined, and its diagnosis often relies on clinical judgement more than 
standardised testing (Mietola et al., 2017). The World Health Organization’s (WHO) 
classification list, the 11th revision of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases 
and the Related Health Problems (ICD-11) (2018) classifies disorders of intellectual 
development as a form of neurodevelopmental disorder, which entails: 
 
“a group of etiologically diverse conditions originating during the developmental period 
characterized by significantly below average intellectual functioning and adaptive 
behavior that are approximately two or more standard deviations below the mean 
(approximately less than the 2.3rd percentile), based on appropriately normed, 
individually administered standardized tests.” (Section 6A00)  
 
The ICD-11 identifies four levels of impairment based on standardised IQ tests scores 
and levels of support need:  
 
1)  Mild: characterised by IQ scores two to three standard deviations below average, 
some difficulties in language and academic skills, but a capability in fulfilling self-care, 
basic tasks, employment, and independent living. 
 
2) Moderate: IQ scores three to four standard deviations below average, basic language 
and academic skills, an ability to complete self-care and basic tasks, but support needed 
to achieve independent living and employment.  
 
3) Severe and 4) profound are both defined by IQ scores four or more standard 
deviations below average, sensory and motor impairments, limited communication 
abilities, and the need for substantial and ongoing support. The ICD-11 differentiates 
these two levels on the basis of adaptive behaviour and the level of support needed with 
daily tasks. 
 
The ICD-11 recognises potential issues with relying on standardised IQ testing, and 
specifies that where tests are either not available, not applicable (like in the case of children), 
or difficult to administer (as in the case for people with severe and profound levels of 
impairment), diagnosis should be made with reliance on clinical judgement. In addition to 
issues with availability of administration, social scientists have problematized the practice of 
standardised IQ testing for a range of reasons. These include the fact that IQ tests essentialise 
complex and varied abilities by simplifying them to a single score; that IQ testing singles out 
and measures culturally specific, Euro-American skills, which are then presented as universal 
intelligence; the way IQ is constructed neglects the importance of social skills and critical 
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thinking; and finally, IQ scores have been used to justify racial discrimination and 
exploitation (Cohen, 2002).  
Other major diagnostic manuals, like the 5th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual (DSM-V) issued by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) defines learning 
disabilities as limitation in areas of conceptual functioning, social behaviour, and practical 
skills. This reflects the APA’s intention move away from a reductionist understanding of 
learning disabilities based on IQ scores, in order to move towards a more ecological 
framework within the medical field (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
The majority of the participants I met in the workshops would be categorised as having 
moderate to profound learning disabilities. However, as Mietola et al. (2017) argue, 
significant learning disabilities is complex, and these categories only capture part of these 
complexities. The medical approach to learning disabilities has been thoroughly critiqued by 
the disability scholarship for being reductionist, framing disability solely in terms of 
deficiency, and being exclusively interested in problems and solutions on an individual level 
(for a learning disabilities perspective, see Goodley, 2010, 2014). My aim in the following is 
to find alternative approaches to learning disabilities (especially significant impairment), 
which can describe people in their full complexity and outline a vision on how to engage with 
them as a society. 
 
 
Normalisation: the right to an “ordinary life” 
 
Normalisation has been and remains perhaps the most influential theoretical framework 
to guide learning disability scholarship, policy making, and service provision  (Johnson and 
Walmsley, 2010; Stalker, 2012). In the following, I assess the extent to which normalisation 
engages with the nature of learning impairment, and discuss whether normalisation still holds 
any unfulfilled potential for people with learning disabilities sixty years on. 
At its conception in the early 1960s, normalisation was radical in the way it envisioned 
the place of people with learning disabilities in society. This is best illustrated by the seminal 
ethnography by anthropologist Robert Edgerton (1993), who in the 1960s spent a year 
following up people with learning disabilities who had been residents of a state hospital in 
California. Edgerton observed their everyday lives after their discharge: their living space, 
work, spare time, and relationships. He noticed that despite the lack of support and the stigma 
of the learning disabilities label (or “mental retardation”, as it was called), the people he spent 
time with were able to develop various strategies to pass as “normal”. These observations 
contradicted the medical thinking around learning impairment at the time: contrary to the 
prognoses of medical models that saw little chance for development, Edgerton argued that 
people with learning disabilities were capable of adapting to their social environments. The 
struggles of these former patients struck Edgerton. “[…] we see an eloquent testament to 
man’s determination to maintain his self-esteem in the face of overwhelming cultural 
rejection and deprecation,” he wrote (p. 194). 
A few years later in the 1970s, service provision efforts to help former residents adapt 
to life outside the hospital walls were articulated as a set of principles. These principles came 
to be referred to by the umbrella term “normalisation” (and later on, Social Role 
Valorisation). Primarily led by academics and health professionals, normalisation set out to 
provide people with learning disabilities with “ordinary” living conditions within the 
“community”, as opposed to the highly controlled life inside the segregated long-stay 
hospitals (Walmsley, 2001). For one of the founders of normalisation, Danish academic 
Bank-Mikkelsen, ordinary living conditions comprised “making normal mentally retarded 
people’s housing, education, working and leisure conditions” (Bank-Mikkelsen quoted in 
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Culham and Nind, 2003: 67). Wolfensberger, his US counterpart went further and argued that 
people with learning disabilities needed not only material normativity but also a cultural one: 
they needed to be provided opportunities to inhabit socially valued roles (Wolfensberger et 
al., 1972). Wolfensberger’s model expanded the focus from learning disabilities to include all 
groups who were considered deviant: his theory of normalisation saw integration in all 
aspects of life – not only in terms of living conditions, but also in behaviour, appearance, 
experience, and status – as pivotal to one’s social value, while negatively perceived social 
differences could perpetuate social devaluation (Culham and Nind, 2003). 
It is easy to see the appeal of normalisation. Its principles of people’s right to life in the 
community, to be treated as individuals first, and to have support to enable personal growth 
translate easily into clear and individualised goals for policymakers and service providers 
(Walmsley, 2001). Current policy language continue to reflect this. “People with learning 
disabilities should have the same opportunities as other people to lead full and active lives and 
should receive the support needed to make this possible,” the British Department of Health 
wrote in 2001 when setting out their vision for people with learning disabilities (Department 
of Health, 2001: 17). “Independence in this context does not mean doing everything unaided,” 
they proclaim (p. 23). 
However, Mike Oliver (1999), leading figure of the social model of disability famously 
critiqued normalisation for prioritising individualised goalsetting at the expense of addressing 
the material needs that people with learning disabilities require to achieve said goals. Oliver 
argued that normalisation failed to provide a political and economic analysis of the social 
disadvantage disabled people live with. Because of this omission, he concluded that 
normalisation had little to contribute to the struggles of the disability rights movement. 
Normalisation, he wrote, was “at best a bystander in these struggles, and at worst part to the 
process of oppression itself” (p.163).  
It is not only the material needs that normalisation neglects: it says very little about the 
support needs of those who cannot perform the most basic tasks of said “ordinary life”, for 
instance, taking a shower or crossing the roads. Tensions in the scholarship and service 
provision that result from this omission are well illustrated in two areas of activity, which aim 
to promote the social participation of people with learning disabilities: self-advocacy and 
inclusive research. Both areas purport – amongst other things – to enable people with learning 
disabilities to participate in socially valued activities, i.e. advocacy and research (Walmsley, 
2001). Despite notable efforts to support people with learning disabilities to fulfil these roles, 
both areas have struggled to involve people with significant learning impairments, and 
because of this, both have endured recurring – albeit timid – criticisms from some learning 
disability scholars for sometimes opting for tokenistic rather than meaningful ways of 
inclusion (Bigby et al., 2014; Frawley and Bigby, 2011; Schelly, 2008).  
For instance, Redley and Weinberg’s (2007) observational study highlights the 
limitations of social participation via public speech. They cite several instances from self-
advocacy meetings where self-advocates either spoke inaudibly, were perceived to digress 
from the topic, or did not reply to questions posed by non-disabled facilitators. Redley and 
Weinberg (2007) argue that although self-advocates were responsive in all these instances, 
their responses were deemed inappropriate  – therefore meaningless contributions – by service 
providers. Their study highlights that while efforts to include people with learning disabilities 
in public debates is laudable, it cannot be accomplished without, first of all examining the 
(conversational) rules by which they are expected to participate, and secondly, addressing the 
special assistance they require.  
Walmsley and Johnson (2003) noted similar normative barriers people with learning 
disabilities experienced when partaking in research. Specifically, they found that the language 
and abstract concepts of social research were not easily made accessible for people with 
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learning disabilities who took up the roles of co-researchers. To ensure that the research did 
not exclude learning disabled co-researchers, they thus had decided to forego theorisation in 
some of their research projects because they could not find a way to make it accessible for 
people with learning disabilities. Walmsley’s and Johnson’s (2003) account highlights their 
commitment to inclusion. However, what their examples does illustrate is that expecting 
people with learning disabilities to participate in (research) activities the way non-disabled 
people do is restrictive and ignorant of the specific limitations that learning impairments pose.  
Ultimately, these examples of self-advocacy and inclusive research highlight the limit 
of normalisation’s engagement with the nature of learning impairment. Despite 
acknowledging that people with learning disabilities require support with their everyday lives, 
normalisation still foregrounds ability at the expense of discussing the impact that learning 
impairment has on people’s ability to participate in “normal” activities. Part of the problem is 
that in normalisation, the rules of participation are set by people without learning disabilities. 
There is little alternatives for those who – due to their learning impairment or for another 
reason – deviate from these rules (Culham and Nind, 2003; Williams and Nind, 1999). 
Consequently, in practice, normalisation fails to engage people with more significant 
learning impairments, for whom the even the most ordinary tasks of “ordinary life” pose 
serious challenges. This is reflected in the way many of the social policy favour activities that 
are more suitable for people with mild learning disabilities: these include the closure of 
specialist services in favour of integrated, mainstream housing, healthcare, and education. All 
these measures raised ardent criticisms from scholars for setting unrealistic expectations for 
people living with significant impairments who could not or did not desire to be part of these 
normative visions (Clegg et al., 2007; Clegg and Bigby, 2017). Yet, no substantial discussion 
took place in policymaking about what care services could provide for people for whom 
mainstream education was not feasible, who could not hold paid or voluntary jobs, and who 
lived in supported, supervised homes with little say over location and housemates.  
Again, these issues demonstrate that normalisation is an incomplete framework for 
policymaking and service provision because it operates with a limited idea of learning 
impairment and its impact on the everyday life. As Burton and Kagan (2006) aptly noted, 
policies that follow the normalisation framework often imagine people with learning 
disabilities as individuals with mild cognitive impairments who live in idyllic, welcoming 
communities, and do not struggle with additional mental health problems and physical 
disabilities. This is obviously not the case (Chaplin et al., 2010; Krahn and Fox, 2014; 
Timmeren et al., 2017). However, unless proponents of normalisation engage with the nature 
of significant learning impairment, the needs of people with significant learning disabilities 
will continue to be neglected. 
Engaging with people with significant learning disabilities within the normalisation 
framework entails asking how their diverse inner lives, desires, abilities, and practices could 
be reconciled with the principles of the “ordinary life”. What is meaningful interaction and 
sociality for people who do not have the capacity to express themselves with verbal language? 
What are the valuable roles which they could fill beyond employment? What alternative ways 
are there for them to be advocate for themselves and making their voices heard, beyond public 
speaking? Answering these questions requires reckoning with the nature of learning 
impairment: its limitations, its impact on people’s everyday life, and its support needs. If 
normalisation addresses these issues, it could generate new visions for people with learning 
disabilities, ones that engage them on their own terms.  
 
 
Disability and impairment: the social model and critical disability studies 
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While normalisation proposes to extend the privileges of mainstream society to people 
with learning disabilities, the British social model of disability calls for overturning said 
mainstream society altogether. In this section, I assess the extent to which the social model 
addresses the specific support needs of (significant) learning impairment. I do so first by 
outlining the theoretical foundations of the social model, and secondly, by reviewing the ways 
in which its propositions have been taken up by the learning disability scholarship and 
advocacy. 
The basic tenet of the social model of disability rests upon a conceptual separation of 
impairment and disability. Whereas impairment is seen as a biological condition, disablement 
is attributed to the social circumstances that surround impairment. For instance, while 
impairment to one’s legs may lead to someone not being able to walk, their limited mobility 
(disability) is the result of their built environment that pose barriers by not considering their 
needs. A potential solution thus involves altering the social circumstances that cause 
disablement: in the example of the person with limited mobility in their legs, this would 
involve removing barriers to mobility introducing wheelchair access to buildings. 
The conceptual distinction between disablement and impairment enabled scholars to 
examine the social conditions of disability, and formulate demands for policy and service 
provision. It infused the scholarship with a wave of optimism: "Once social barriers to the 
reintegration of people with physical impairments are removed, the disability itself is 
eliminated," wrote Vic Finkelstein (1980: 22), disability rights activist and writer.  
The social model was first articulated with only physical impairment in mind. In 1976, 
when the UPIAS (the Union of Physically Impaired against Segregation) formulated the 
distinction between impairment and disability, it made no mention of learning impairment: 
 
Disability is the disadvantage or restriction caused by a contemporary social 
organisation which takes no or little account of people who have physical impairments 
and thus excludes them from the mainstream of social activities. (UPIAS, 1976 in 
Stalker, 2012: 122) 
 
Key texts on the social model of the time rarely mention learning disabilities (e.g. 
Finkelstein, 1980; Oliver, 1990). Subsequently, much of the policy actions derived from the 
social model focused on physical barrier removal in public spaces, and little effort was made 
to understand and address barriers that people with learning disabilities faced (Shakespeare, 
2013; Stalker, 2012). 
What the social model did provide learning disability scholars was an analytical lens to 
examine the material conditions that shaped the lives of people with learning disabilities. 
Stalker (2012) argues that the materialist perspective of the social model helped address 
inequalities that disproportionately affected people with learning disabilities, such as housing, 
discrimination, hate crimes, poverty, and health (Emerson, 2007; Emerson and Baines, 2011; 
Emerson and Hatton, 1998; Emerson and Roulstone, 2014). This is a significant and lasting 
contribution of the social model to the learning disability scholarship: material inequalities 
continues to be one of the major focus in learning disability studies, especially in face of the 
spending cuts that service provision underwent during the period of austerity (Needham, 
2014). It is also notable that the disability rights movement – which was galvanised by the 
social model – effectively mobilised against the mistreatment and abuse many people with 
disabilities endured in long-stay hospitals, and their campaigning contributed to the 





Scholars from the field of critical learning disabilities studies have tried to adapt the 
theoretical foundations of the social model to learning impairment, and argued that learning 
disabilities, much like physical disablement, were caused by social arrangements (Chappell et 
al., 2001; Goodley, 2001; Goodley and Runswick-Cole, 2016; Race et al., 2005; Roets and 
Goodley, 2008). This theoretical position took inspiration from gender studies, which 
observed that sex was socially constructed and thus could be studied from a social science 
perspective. In an effort to repeat “the Judith Butler move” (Shakespeare, 2013: 57) – 
referring to the gender theorist who famously articulated this – critical learning disability 
scholars aimed to illustrate that (learning) impairment itself was nothing but a product of 
discourse.  
Part of their objective was to problematise the medical diagnosis of learning disabilities. 
For instance, some argued that the IQ scores – which provided the base for the learning 
disabilities construct – were arbitrary in their cut-off points, and measured only a narrow 
range of intellectual capacities (see Bogdan and Taylor, 1982; Whitaker, 2013). Some 
scholars challenged the validity of learning disabilities as a product of the education system 
labelling children’s undesirable behaviour (Goodley, 2001; Mercer, 1973; Sleeter, 1986, 
2010). Mercer (1973) herself made the case that some children – at the time referred to as the 
“six-hour retarded child” – who were well-functioning at home were labelled learning 
disabled at school when they did not do well in performance tests. Furthermore, diagnoses 
closely related to learning disabilities, such as autism/Asperger’s and Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) have been contested on the basis of diagnostic 
inconsistencies (Schrag and Divoky, 1975). Disability studies scholar Campbell (2009) went 
as far as to state that all these practices – intelligence testing, school performance exams, the 
diagnosis of certain behavioural disorders – contributed to a definition of normalcy that serves 
the interests of dominant groups to subjugate those without power.  
A different line of argument points to the fact the concept of learning disabilities has 
been continuously redefined over the past decades, reflecting changing social concerns, 
values, and economic circumstances. For instance, in the UK, “idiocy” became “lunacy” 
when the perceived increase in levels of poverty and shaped welfare policy – hence lunacy 
was closely associated with socioeconomic strata (Barfoot, 2009; Carey, 2009b; Jones, 1960; 
Wright, 1998). Lunacy gained further moral character at the turn of the 20th century, when 
industrialisation-related phenomena – such as accelerated immigration, increasing crime and 
alcoholism levels, and growing pessimism around care provision – brought about the label of 
“feeblemindedness”, which corresponded with societal anxieties about what some saw as the 
loosening moral fabric of society (Carey, 2009b; Simmons, 1978; Walmsley, 2000). These 
findings led Dan Goodley and his colleagues, notably Griet Roets and Katherine Runswick-
Cole to conclude that learning disabilities as a concept was unstable and primarily socially 
produced. Pointing to these discursive practices around learning disabilities, they then sought 
to undo concepts such as rationality, capability, and independence (Goodley, 2001, 2009; 
Goodley and Rapley, 2001; Goodley and Roets, 2008; Goodley and Runswick-Cole, 2016; 
Roets and Goodley, 2008).  
These analyses have merits. They, rightly so, demonstrate how restrictive and 
contingent definitions of normalcy have been deployed to discriminate against people with 
learning disabilities (amongst other groups of people, like immigrants, ethnic minorities, and 
poor people). They also highlight the lifelong mistreatment of people who were labelled 
disabled by flawed systems of intelligence testing, education, the pharmaceutical market, and 
social anxieties (notably, the institutionalisation of women who were institutionalised because 
they had children out of wedlock).  
However, these arguments centre around people with mild learning disabilities. Those 
who require high levels of support are either not included in the scope of these works, or are 
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only mentioned in passing. Subsequently, the proposition for political action in these works 
are also tailored for those with less significant impairments. For instance, Bogdan and Taylor 
(1982) advocate for autobiographies, and Goodley and Roets (2008; see also Roets and 
Goodley, 2008) call for more self-advocacy. It is unclear, however, if critical learning 
disability studies offers any specific call for action for people with significant impairments. 
Given their early affinity with the social model of disability, it is rather striking that 
works in the critical learning disability scholarship rarely includes a material analysis. In fact, 
they include little reflection on the nature of learning impairment and its impact on the 
everyday lives of people with learning disabilities. Goodley’s (2001; Goodley and Rapley, 
2001) assertion that impairment is mere difference in human cognitive capacity is highly 
problematic once weighed against the experiences of people with learning disabilities. He 
argues that once learning impairment is deconstructed, people with learning disabilities will 
be able “to creatively re-configure and re-invent themselves to resist (professional) control, 
voyeurism, bio-power, existential challenges and oppressions they have to face in their 
everyday lives” (Goodley and Roets, 2008: 248). Yet, he is not clear about how this is meant 
to be achieved, and what it would look like in practice.  
Given the lack of engagement with the everyday experiences of their subject matter, it 
rings rather intellectually facetious to claim that learning disabilities are simply a product of 
the medical establishment, the education system, and political forces. To say that learning 
disabilities are entirely a social construct would be denying the everyday difficulties many 
people face and the level of support some of them require with everyday tasks. “[… ] the 
answer, in my view,” writes Shakespeare (2013), “is not to claim that there is no problem, and 
that if it was not for the social interventions, folks with mild intellectual disabilities would be 
fine. They would not” (p. 62).  
In the absence of an examination of the everyday lives of people with learning 
disabilities, these works have little purchase on learning disabilities activism, policy, and 
service provision. They thus offer little more than an intellectual exercise. 
 
 
Recognising impairment: the alternatives 
 
In the 1990s, disability studies experienced a backlash against the dominance of the 
social model for ignoring the inherent difficulties caused by impairment, which spurred a 
discussion on embodiment and the lived reality of physical impairment (Crow, 1996; Morris, 
1991). Feminist disability activist and artist Liz Crow (1996: 4) wrote that even if social 
barriers were removed, “pain, fatigue, depression and chronic illness [were] constant facts of 
life” for people who lived with impairments. Subsequently, Crow called for disability studies 
to “bring back impairment” (p. 4), and recognise its impact on disabled people’s experiences. 
She wrote: 
 
“Many people find that it is their experience of their bodies – and not only disabling 
barriers such as inaccessible public transport – which make political involvement 
difficult. For example, an individual's capacity to attend meetings and events might be 
restricted because of limited energy. If these circumstances remain unacknowledged, 
then alternative ways of contributing are unlikely to be sought. If our structures and 
strategies – how we organise and offer support in our debates, consultation and 
demonstrations – cannot involve all disabled people, then our campaigns lose the 
contributions of many people” (p. 5). 
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Subsequent scholars met Crow’s call by theorising on the body’s role in the politics of 
disablement (Hughes and Paterson, 1997; Thomas, 1999, 2007). Thomas (1999) coined the 
term “impairment effects” specifically to examine the limitations caused by physical 
impairment. Activist and writer Jenny Morris (1991) went further and demanded the 
recognition of experiences of disabled people in the feminist movement, making the 
limitations posed by impairment central to her politics. “It is not normal,” she wrote, “to have 
difficulty walking or to be unable to walk; it is not normal to be unable to see, to hear; it is not 
normal to be incontinent, to have fits, to experience extreme tiredness, to be in constant pain; 
it is not normal to have a limb or limbs missing” (p. 16). Hughes and Paterson (1997) further 
politicised impairment-related pain and argued from a phenomenological perspective that 
suffering was in fact the embodied manifestation of disability. Connecting the personal 
(impairment) to the social (disability), they urged disability studies to engage with an 
embodied politics of disablement. Although none of these accounts discussed learning 
disabilities, they signalled the task ahead, namely to find a theoretical framework that 
acknowledges the difficulties of learning impairment while engages with it in a productive 
manner. 
Tom Shakespeare’s broader conceptualisation of impairment-as-predicament does this 
by describing impairment as “the intrinsic difficulties of engaging with the world, the pains 
and sufferings and limitations of the body” (p. 86). Predicament presents a language which 
acknowledges that impairment makes life harder, but without evoking a sense of personal 
tragedy. Impairment-as-predicament recognises that impairment may lead to exclusion, 
discrimination, and disadvantage; true to the spirit of the social model, it proposes that these 
should be addressed. However, it recognises that even once these barriers are removed, 
impairment will continue to pose difficulties for disabled people.  
Because impairment will always be a fact of life, the task is to explore why specific 
impairments evoke certain reactions in the social world? Why are some impairments 
accommodated, others discriminated against? What special arrangements do specific 
impairments require to minimise their undesirable impact on daily functioning? 
When applied to learning disabilities, impairment-as-predicament addresses two issues 
that the social model, critical learning disability studies, and normalisation all share. First of 
all, Shakespeare’s framework emphasises that people with different impairments have 
different needs regarding services. Many people with mild learning disabilities identify with 
the aims of mainstreaming and welcome opportunities to work, exercise independence, or to 
partake in self-advocacy and research (Shakespeare, 2013). However, the complex mental 
health and chronic conditions people with significant disabilities often have require specialist 
provision (Clegg and Bigby, 2017). This may be an obvious distinction; however, few 
services differentiate themselves accordingly. 
This recognition is crucial to devising a strategy for mobilisation, which often assumes 
a collective disabled identity. Experiential accounts, on the other hand, suggest that many 
disabled people do not have common goals or necessarily identify as disabled at all (Beckett, 
2006; Watson, 2002). This is the case with people with learning disabilities too, evidenced by 
the credo of the largest learning disabilities advocacy in the UK, People First: “label jars, not 
people” (Stalker, 2012). People with learning disabilities often do not feel they share much 
commonality with other (learning) disabled people. In fact, people with mild learning 
disabilities tend to reject similarities with people with significant learning disabilities (Clegg 
and Bigby, 2017; Shakespeare, 2013). 
Shakespeare’s impairment-as-predicament allows us to ask, what intrinsic difficulties, 
limitations, and pains are associated with learning impairment? There is an important body of 
scholarship that examines this question in relation to the impact of health and social 
inequalities and injustices – I have discussed these in my introduction. In addition, thinking of 
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learning impairment as predicament enables difficult discussions about capacity and 
behaviour. As disability scholar Simplican (2019) points out, some people with learning 
disabilities are at risk of injuring themselves or are prone to aggressive behaviour towards 
others, yet challenging behaviours have little attention in disability studies. Learning 
impairment means that people with learning disabilities can be more vulnerable to 
exploitation and ridicule (Fyson and Kitson, 2010). For some, learning impairment can make 
it hard for them to hold a job, perform well in education, or accomplish basic tasks. How all 
this connects theory, policy, and activism is yet to be explored: Shakespeare’s work does not 
specifically discuss issues related to learning disabilities. However, by foregrounding 
dependency and care as an ontological fact for people with disabilities, he drives forward 




Disability as a productive condition 
 
The works I discussed so far outline a dilemma one faces when describing impairment. 
Focusing entirely on its negative impact poses the risk of defining it in terms of lack. Yet, 
overemphasising ability may lead to the ignoring impairment-specific needs. Kulick and 
Rydström (2015) caution that “without simultaneously acknowledging and documenting the 
fact that certain physical and intellectual impairments also entail dependency can lead to an 
emphasis on independence and privacy at the expense of a careful consideration of 
engagement and responsibility” (p. 269). 
An emergent body of literature on vulnerability and the politics of care advances this 
conversation by asking how vulnerability could be reconceptualised as constitutive instead of 
antithetical to one’s ability to exert agency. Judith Butler (2016) makes this point when she 
observes that in protest and resistance, often it is the deployment of vulnerability that enables 
political mobilisation. Butler argues that when protesters expose their bodies to police 
brutality, subject themselves to imprisonment, or make visible the embodied effects of 
austerity, they also expose the violence that power inflicts on their bodies, deploy exposure to 
violence to mobilise, and assert their right to not be exposed to that violence. In this sense, 
vulnerability is not oppositional to political agency; it is constitutive of it (Butler, 2016).  
Butler’s interest lies in organised political mobilisation and resistance, neither of which 
are practices in which the majority of people with significant learning disabilities engage. Her 
work still offers guidance on how vulnerability – or learning impairment in this case – can 
enable different forms of agency. Learning disabilities-related works in this genre seek to 
reconceptualise care and (inter)dependence as not undesirable situations to overcome, but as 
part of the human condition.  
There is a body of literature that borrows from the feminist scholarship to rearticulate 
autonomy – understood as the capacity to self-determination and live a life according to 
reason and rationality – as a relational concept (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000). For instance, 
philosopher Davy (2015) seeks to formulate a more inclusive form of autonomy specifically 
for people with learning disabilities when she argues that support and advocacy are 
“conceptually necessary” conditions of autonomy (p. 133). Davy argues that liberal 
philosophical formulations of autonomy have been traditionally exclusive and stigmatising of 
people with learning disabilities (which I discussed in depth in my first chapter). She proposes 
that by foregrounding support relationships as a necessary condition to enabling autonomy, 
the philosophical concept can be made more inclusive of people with learning disabilities. 
As a philosopher, Davy does not linger on how exactly learning impairment may impact 
on one’s autonomy, and what relational autonomy looks like for people with significant 
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impairments in practice. Empirical works that apply Davy’s framework have been limited to 
studies examining how support staff enabled or hindered the choice-making of people with 
high support needs. However, other than observing that rigid environments limited people and 
body language facilitated communication of preferences, these studies did not quite 
contextualise nor questioned the seemingly taken-for-granted value of autonomy (Björnsdóttir 
et al., 2015; Stefánsdóttir et al., 2018; Wehmeyer and Bolding, 2001).  
More helpful are the works of those writing in the ethics of care whose specific concern 
is the inequalities and injustices surrounding care work (e.g. Kittay, 1999; Lister, 1997; 
Sevenhuijsen, 1998). These works highlight that the care work upon which many people with 
disabilities rely are mostly done by women in low paid, part-time, precarious work conditions, 
or predominantly female family members (Christensen, 2010, 2012). These care workers are 
often rendered invisible by the social model of disability – itself critiqued for its masculine 
ethos by feminist disability studies scholars (Crow, 1996; Morris, 1991; Thomas, 1999) – for 
regarding personal support as an emotionless economic exchange between support worker 
and the disabled person (Shakespeare, 2013). When the gendered injustices are recognised, it 
becomes clear that the independence of disabled people cannot be truly emancipatory if it is 
conditional to the precarity of care workers. The politicisation of care work in the context of 
disability studies takes us one step closer to reconciling impairment (i.e. the nature of 
impairment, its limitations, and its support needs) with the politics of disablement (i.e. the 
recognition of people with disabilities as agentive persons in order to improve their quality of 
life).  
Far from being simply an economic exchange, the act of caregiving and receiving 
entails a process of cultivating personal relationship and emotional connection. For instance, 
anthropologist McKearney (2018a, 2018b) shows in his ethnography how carers of people 
with significant learning disabilities tell each other stories in which they imbue the care 
recipients with a sense of agency, and train themselves receptive and vulnerable of their 
charisma and eccentricity. This recognition reconceptualises the idea of care itself. The act of 
giving care ceases to be paternalistic; instead, it highlights the care-giver’s vulnerability and 
emotional labour. Similarly, the act of receiving care stop being passive but becomes be an 
act of agency. 
Philosopher Eva Kittay – who is also mother and carer to Sesha, a daughter with 
significant disabilities – reflects on what such a recognition would mean for the way 
engagement with people with learning disabilities is understood. Kittay (1999, 2005) argues 
that even though Sesha may never be able to be self-sufficient, she is undeniably responsive 
to people in her environment. Sesha may never be autonomous, but she is just as deserving of 
justice and dignity, as she is capable of love and social relations – what would development 
and growth mean for someone like her? Although environmental modification is crucial to 
enhance Sesha’s capabilities, Kittay comes to the conclusion that no amount of support could 
make Sesha independent. Instead, a novel vision for social participation may prove more 
productive: “when we think of mothering a disabled child as enabling and fostering 
development, we must also reconceive development, not only toward independence, but 
toward whatever capacities are there to be developed. Development for Sesha means the 
enhancement of her capacities to experience joy” (p. 173). Kittay’s vision is a good starting 
point in thinking of alternative capacities people with significant disabilities have, the type of 
engagement these capacities generate, and the support they require.  
One limitation to Kittay’s framework is that in focusing on the capacity to love and 
have social relations, she restricts the productive potential of disability to the realm of the 
private and personal, dependent on kindness and generosity. This may divert attention away 
from the fact some people with learning disabilities are systematically denied agency and 
engagement. Continuous funding cuts to public services, inadequate support, and an 
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increasingly shrinking social care sector subject many people with learning disabilities to 
undignified, isolated lives. Engagement is not simply a personal obligation but also a matter 
of social justice. 
Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, which I discussed in my introduction, 
provides some theoretical directions in this regard. For Nussbaum, a just society provides 
circumstances that enable and nourish individuals’ ability to develop, engage with others, and 
partake in activities they deem valuable to the best of their capacity. In her more recent work, 
Nussbaum (2009) makes a compelling case for, first of all, systematically examining the 
diverse forms of capabilities people with learning disabilities have the potential to possess. 
Secondly, she urges scholars to document the extent to which the social circumstances that 
enable these capacities are met or hindered in practice.  
A recent examination of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach in relation to significant 
learning disabilities is Kulick and Rydström’s (2015) ethnography on the sexual lives of 
people with significant impairments in Denmark and Sweden. Drawing on Nussbaum’s 
framework, Kulick and Rydström systematically examine where Danish and Swedish 
disability policy and advocacy facilitates or hinders the sexual lives of people with significant 
disabilities. Drawing on ethnographic material from several care homes, they make the case 
that even for people with significant disabilities, sexual lives – along with preferences, 
relationships, sensoriality – can be explored and developed, and that such facilitation is a 




The works I cited in this section all sought to rethink relationship between learning 
disabilities, vulnerability, and capacity/agency. Specifically, they sought to reconceptualise 
the relationship between vulnerability and agency not as oppositional to but constitutive of 
each other. In the process, these frame disability not as passive state that disempowers and 
should be avoided or overcome, but as what Kulick and Rydström (2015) call a productive 
condition, which produces creates new relations, responsibilities, practices, and ethics of 
engagement. This provides guidance in thinking about learning disabilities and impairment: it 
demands the recognition of the limits posed by impairment while simultaneously recognising 





In this chapter, I asked how we can think about learning disabilities in a way that 
simultaneously acknowledges people’s capabilities and inherent limitations posed by their 
learning impairment. To answer this question, I provided an overview of the theoretical 
frameworks on the social position of people with learning disabilities: normalisation, the 
social model, critical learning disabilities, and the more recent scholarship on vulnerability 
and the ethics of care. I did this in order to reflect on the ways these bodies of scholarship can 
provide alternative frameworks to describing learning disabilities as a lack or deficit. 
Finding a way to describe the social position of people with learning disabilities is 
crucial for exploring alternative forms of citizenship. Citizenship is, in essence, concerned 
with how individuals can engage with each other as a community; to make this community 
more accepting of people with learning disabilities, it is crucial to reflect on how to engage 
with them in an ethical manner. 
Normalisation sought to redress the institutional unequal treatment by advocating for 
equal (“normal”) living conditions. Subsequently, it addressed the perceived lesser worth of 
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people with learning disabilities by promoting their engagement in socially valued roles. 
However, normalisation’s emphasis on integration leaves little space to acknowledge the 
differences in the needs, capabilities, and desires of people with learning disabilities. The 
social model of disability, primarily formulated by people with physical impairments, argued 
that people with disabilities were equally capable – therefore, implicitly, equally worthy – as 
their non-disabled peers, given that the social barriers are removed. However, little thought 
has been given to the different impairments and capabilities of people with learning 
disabilities.  
More recent discussions on the material reality of disability, such as Shakespeare’s 
impairment-as-predicament model, opened the venue for acknowledging the intrinsic 
limitations and needs of people with disabilities. From this acknowledgement grew a body of 
literature on vulnerability and ethics of care, which asked how exploring the different 
capabilities of people with learning disabilities could contribute to novel understandings of 
dignity and justice. Approaching learning disabilities as a productive condition avoids the 
pitfalls of describing disability in terms of lack, deficit, and a passive state. Instead, it asks, 
what kind of relationships, obligations, and forms of ethical engagement does it produce? 




Chapter three:  





So far, I discussed past works on citizenship and learning disabilities firstly with the aim 
of finding an approach that can helps us understand what citizenship means in the everyday 
lives of people with learning disabilities; and secondly, to engage with the concept with 
learning disabilities as a productive condition (as opposed to describing it as a deficit or lack).  
In the following, I will explore how the anthropological methodological approach that I 
undertook meets the needs of people with learning disabilities. These include the particular 
requirements related to participants’ learning impairment, such as building rapport, capacity 
to consent, confidence to express views, and limited speech (Nind, 2008). However, like 
many researchers working with people with learning disabilities (notably: Bigby et al., 2014; 
Goodley, 1996; Nind, 2008; Stalker, 1998; Walmsley and Johnson, 2003a), an underlying 
question I encountered was: how can we engage people with learning disabilities in social 
research in an ethical manner? This is partly an epistemological question about how the 
limitations posed by learning impairment can be overcome or addressed by researchers. It is 
also a broader question of how research can work with people with learning disabilities 
collaboratively and inclusively. 
For this thesis, I undertook a long-term ethnography. Ethnography – meaning a detailed 
description of people’s lives based on participant observation – has always been the primary 
anthropological method. As someone trained in anthropology, l followed tradition, and spent 
twelve months as a volunteer and researcher at Project Ability’s art workshops, conducting 
participant observation combined with semi-structured interviews with the staff members, 
participants, and their carer providers. 
My methods were not inclusive by the standards of inclusive research, meaning that I 
did not involve people with learning disabilities in formal advisory or co-researcher roles. 
However, in this chapter, I argue that long-term ethnography, and participant observation in 
particular, is inclusive in a broader sense of the word, and makes a valuable and ethical 
addition to the methodological toolkit of social research with people with learning disabilities. 
I discuss two reasons for this: firstly, participant observation provides insights into 
participants’ experiences without solely relying on their capacity to verbal self-expression. 
Therefore, it is considerate of the needs of people with significant learning disabilities. 
Secondly, participant observation is ethical because it requires researchers to adapt to the 
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world of people with learning disabilities and engage with them on their own terms, rather 
than the other way around. 
I start by outlining the ongoing methodological challenges of social research with 
people with learning disabilities. I do so by discussing the epistemological and ethical debates 
in inclusive research, the current gold standard methodological approach to research with 
people with learning disabilities. Then, I provide an overview of the anthropological literature 
on learning disabilities and discuss what anthropology can bring to the study of learning 
disabilities. I will focus how participant observation contribute to these debates: I draw on 
Tim Ingold’s propositions (2014, 2017a, 2017b) and elaborate on the epistemological and 
ethical implications of participant observation on doing research with people with learning 
disabilities. In the second part of my chapter, I will discuss my fieldwork: the site, my 
activities, the data analysis, and research ethics. 
I focus my discussion on people with significant learning disabilities because they are 
the group who poses the biggest challenge any form of inclusive research. However, 
addressing their barriers to participation and accommodating their needs are relevant for all 
people with learning disabilities. 
 
 
Inclusive research and significant learning disabilities 
 
Social research with people with learning disabilities is not only an academic project. 
Treating people with learning disabilities as active agents whose experiences are a valuable 
subject of study is a political act (Nind, 2008). To live up to this ethos, there are two types of 
barriers that need to be addressed. One concerns the practical and methodological difficulties 
that relate to the learning impairment-specific needs. The second comprises a philosophical 
and political question of how to engage people with learning disabilities in research without 
exploiting them. 
Prominent learning disability scholars responded to these challenges by applying the 
principles of inclusive research to their methods. In the following, I argue that while inclusive 
research made significant ethical and methodological contributions to social research with 
people with learning disabilities, due to its lack of engagement with the nature of learning 
impairment, it struggles to apply its principles to people with significant learning disabilities.  
Inclusive research is a term coined by Jan Walmsley (2001; further developed in 
Walmsley and Johnson, 2003a) in reference to work that includes people with learning 
disabilities as more than just participants. Inclusive research can refer to a broad range of 
approaches, including participatory research, which involves people with learning disabilities 
in advisory or co-researcher roles; and emancipatory research, which gives people with 
learning disabilities full control over the research process, from formulating the research 
questions to data analysis and dissemination. In learning disability social research, inclusive 
research became the most widely used term due to the simplicity with which its core 
principles could be conveyed to people who are not familiar with the academic language 
(Walmsley, 2001). 
The fundamental idea behind inclusive research – namely, listening to the voices of 
marginalised communities – gained prominence in the middle of the 20th century with the 
emergence of the civil rights, post-colonial, feminist, and disability rights movements. On the 
one hand, the inclusion of marginalised groups in research was partly a political act to counter 
their social disadvantage. On the other, it was thought to provide research an epistemic 
advantage (Harding, 2004): as experts of their own experience, marginalised groups were 
perceived as the “authority on their own lives, experiences, feelings and views” (Tuffrey-
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Wijne and Butler, 2010: 175), and were hence seen to be in best position to lead the research 
agenda on any topic that related to their social circumstances. 
Taking seriously the experiences of people with learning disabilities was not an evident 
methodological approach: up until anthropologist Robert Edgerton (1967) published his 
ethnographic study on the experiences of former residents of a long-stay hospital, there had 
been no studies being interested in the voices of people with learning disabilities at all 
(Walmsley, 2001). All research prior to this was based on the perspectives and beliefs of 
medical and social care professionals and, occasionally, parents and guardians. 
At the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, Bank-Mikkelsen (1969) and Wolfensberger 
(1972) articulated the principles of normalisation and social role valorisation (SRV), which 
laid the foundations for including people with learning disabilities in research (Walmsley and 
Johnson, 2003a). People with learning disabilities taking up the role of the co-researcher 
aligned well with the ethos of promoting “ordinary life”, albeit it was valued more as a 
service user activity rather than as a legitimate mode of knowledge production (Walmsley, 
2001; Walmsley and Johnson, 2003a).  
It was the growing popularity of emancipatory research that raised the stakes for those 
involved in inclusive research. In the field of disability studies, disabled academics started to 
demand that disabled people took full control over research on disability (Oliver, 1992). 
These demands filtered into inclusive research: the previous aim of promoting an “ordinary 
life” did not satisfy people with learning disabilities, who now demanded more control and 
accountability from academic researchers (Walmsley and Johnson, 2003a).  
Inclusive research is an ecumenical approach in that it does not prescribe the extent to 
which people with learning disabilities should be involved in research. Studies that follow the 
inclusive paradigm range from participatory approaches that build on the principles of 
normalisation/SRC; and emancipatory approaches, which render all aspects of the research 
process under the control of people with learning disabilities (Bigby et al., 2014; Frankena et 
al., 2015). Inclusive research projects have involved people with learning disabilities in 
deciding on the research questions (Bentley et al., 2011; Williams, 1999), setting up the 
research (Burke et al., 2003), conducting literature reviews (Burke et al., 2003; Flood et al., 
2012), obtaining consent (Cameron and Murphy, 2007), data collection (Bentley et al., 2011; 
Chapman, 2014; Flood et al., 2012), data analysis (Kramer et al., 2011; Tuffrey-Wijne and 
Butler, 2010; Williams, 1999), ending research (Northway, 2000), writing, editing, and 
reviewing papers (Blunt et al., 2012), and disseminating findings (O’Brien et al., 2013). 
Since it was first conceived, inclusive research has become not only widely accepted 
but is now a basic requirement for social research with people with learning disabilities. The 
United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities specifies that people 
with disabilities should be included in decision-making processes on matters related to 
disability (United Nations, 2015 Article 4, paragraph 3). In the UK, inclusion in research 
forms part of learning disability policy (Department of Health, 2001; Scottish Government, 
2013b). Most funding bodies require some form of involvement of people with learning 
disabilities (Gilbert, 2004) such as the 2014 NIHR guidelines that include a mandatory public 
and patient involvement component for all social research applications (Di Lorito et al., 
2017).  
Despite its well-established position, the extent to which its principles are applicable to 
people with significant learning disabilities has not been discussed in-depth. This is partly 
because the nature of learning impairment– such as limitation to self-expression and abstract 
thinking – and its implications on academic activities has not received as much attention 
among learning disability scholars as it deserves.  
Perhaps the most in-depth discussion on the subject comes from learning disability 
scholars Walmsley and Johnson’s (2003a) reflections on the relationship between 
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emancipatory research and learning disabilities. On the one hand, they endorse the political 
importance of taking seriously people’s views and putting research into the service of positive 
social change. However, their stance on the emancipatory paradigm remains ambivalent 
because of the little attention emancipatory researchers pays to the specific barriers posed by 
learning impairment. Walmsley and Johnson (2003a) argue that because the emancipatory 
paradigm was articulated by physically disabled academics, it has not considered the unique 
needs and challenges that people with learning disabilities faced in research. Amongst these 
are the need for support when engaging with complex and abstract theories, accessing higher 
education and research training, conducting literature reviews, or even mundane tasks like 
filling out forms.  
These barriers are not limited to emancipatory research alone, but are relevant for any 
inclusive studies that seeks to involve people with learning disabilities in any co-researcher 
capacity. To substantiate this point, Walmsley’s cites an example from her own project, which 
she conducted with a group of women with learning disabilities. The project took them five 
years to finish; at the end, Walmsley decided to forego theorisation and connecting common 
themes with broader discourses, in fear that it would exclude her co-researchers (Walmsley 
and Johnson, 2003b).  
In their more recent work, Walmsley and her colleagues (2017) further developed these 
observations in response to the debate surrounding the so-called second generation of 
inclusive research (Nind, 2016). The debate, in short, comprises two positions. One position – 
represented by prominent inclusive researcher Melanie Nind – argues that the first generation 
of inclusive research has achieved its aim in outlining how research could include people with 
learning disabilities. She subsequently advocates for ushering in a second generation of 
research, which focuses more on producing high quality outcomes with broader social impact, 
and less on the inclusive research process. The other camp – which includes Walmsley, 
Strnadová and Johnson (2017) – contests that the process of research should still take primacy 
over outcome. Specifically, Walmsley and her colleagues take issue with academic 
researchers trying to apply rigid academic approaches to inclusive projects, and make co-
researchers do what “real researchers” do. What would do better justice to the co-researchers, 
they argue, is to recognise their unique contributions to research, which entails a deeper level 
of insight and authenticity about the lives of people with learning disabilities.  
This debate represents one of the most comprehensive discussions on the implications 
of learning impairment on research. Previously, such conversation has been limited to issues 
of accessible language and the ways in which assistive technologies can aid communication. 
These include photographic memory aids (Chapman, 2014), visual aids (Aldridge, 2007; 
Boxall and Ralph, 2011), one-on-one mentoring and consultations (Bigby and Frawley, 2010; 
Tuffrey-Wijne and Butler, 2010), digital storytelling (Manning, 2010). While these works are 
significant, in focusing on accessible language as the main barrier to inclusive research, there 
is a danger that the people with mild learning disabilities will always be favoured as co-
researchers at the expense of engagement with people with significant learning disabilities, 
who face more complex limitations due to their impairment (Fyson et al., 2004; Mencap, 
2004).  
Visual methods and accessible language may help people with significant learning 
disabilities express preferences, but learning disability scholar Melanie Nind (2008) warns 
against conflating the ability to express preferences with the ability to express views. “Views 
are different from reactions, they are opinions, beliefs, standpoints, notions, ideas and they 
require the person to be an intentional communicator rather than at a pre-intentional stage in 
which communicative intent is inferred by others,” Nind (2008) writes. “With research 
participants who have profound learning difficulties, the whole process relies on other 
communication partners who are emotionally and communicatively involved” (p.11). Note 
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that Nind, Walmsley, and their colleagues address more than language accessibility: they 
speak about the issues around capacity to partaking in research activities, which favour those 
who can express themselves with verbal language or assistive technologies. If becoming 
quasi-researchers is the only venue through which people with learning disabilities can be 
included in research, this will inevitably lead to tensions between the making the research 
process inclusive and producing impactful research outcomes (Fyson and Fox, 2014). 
These scholars’ expansive and decades-long engagement with the subject attests to their 
commitment to inclusive research. It is notable however that they represent two of the very 
few voices to engage with the limits of learning impairment in research. Neither Nind nor 
Walmsley and her colleagues suggest solutions outside the principles of inclusive research. 
Nind (2008) recommends that researchers continuously review their interpretations by 
consulting with care providers and guardians who act as proxy for people with learning 
disabilities. Walmsley and her colleagues (2017) raise the question of whether a study on the 
experiences of people with significant learning disabilities "needs to be inclusive research 
rather than in-depth qualitative study" (p. 5), but they do not elaborate further. 
Without addressing the implications of learning impairment on conducting research, 
there is a risk that social research with people with learning disabilities becomes 
methodologically stagnant. There are recurring concerns among learning disability scholars 
that in the absence of a conversation about the nature of learning impairment, inclusive 
research may become dogmatic and can stifle a methodological debate and the diversification 
in learning disability studies (Nind, 2011, 2011; Stalker, 1998; Strnadová and Cumming, 
2014; Walmsley, 2001; Walmsley and Johnson, 2003b). Walmsley (2001) writes that 
although inclusive research has led to some empowering projects, it also “acted as a 
straitjacket, hindering researchers in the inclusive camp from crossing words with others, for 
fear of ‘speaking for’ people with learning difficulties without their consent” (p. 189). Her 
and Johnson later argue that “the need to translate research questions and findings has in itself 
been a barrier to clarifying and theorizing”, which “has inhibited the vigorous growth of 
inclusive methodologies” (Walmsley and Johnson, 2003a: 15).  
Although I did not apply inclusive research in my thesis, I felt the need to engage with it 
because its conundrums highlight important lessons regarding the nature of experiential 
knowledge and the ethics of engagement that I seek to further develop in this chapter. First of 
all, I recognise the methodological contributions of inclusive research to social research: the 
idea that people with learning disabilities possess unique knowledge and can therefore make 
significant contributions to research is central to this thesis. The challenge is to find a 
methodological approach in which this knowledge can be articulated while simultaneously 
taking into account participants’ learning impairment, most notably the limit to verbal self-
expression. Secondly, I aim to further broaden the ethical imperative to engage with people 
with learning disabilities in a way that recognises their interests above all else. Inclusive 
research does so by enabling people with learning disabilities to take on the role of the 
researcher; I, on the contrary, seek to engage them on their own terms. Instead of asking them 
to conform to the world of academia, I set out to immerse myself in their world of – in this 
case – artmaking by conducting ethnography and participant observation. 
 
 
Participant observation and people with learning disabilities 
 
Anthropology offers a different methodological take on recognising, discussing, and 
sharing experiential knowledge. In this section, I provide a brief overview of anthropology’s 
primary methods, ethnography and participant observation. Then, I discuss how an these 
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methods can address the challenges of doing research with people with significant learning 
disabilities.  
The body of anthropological works on learning disabilities is rather slim, despite a rich 
scholarship in related fields examining mental illness, dementia, and autism (Biehl, 2005; 
Estroff, 1985; Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1997; Luhrmann, 2000; Martin, 2009; Nakamura, 
2013). One of the earliest examples of anthropological writing on learning disabilities is 
Robert Edgerton’s (1967) ethnography on former residents of a long-stay hospital, which I 
discussed in my previous chapters. This sort of biographical approach to mild learning 
disabilities (along with, for instance, Langness and Levine, 1986) emphasised the social and 
learnt aspects disablement. Subsequent works (e.g. Dexter, 1962) combined the social model 
of disability with the cultural, set out to examine disablement through a cultural lens of 
anthropology, study disablement in “non-Western” societies, and contextualise the meaning 
and experiences of – primarily physical – disability in their local worlds (see edited volume 
by Ingstad and Whyte, 2007). 
In their overview on the anthropology of learning disabilities, McKearney and Zoanni 
(2018) suggest that learning disabilities challenged anthropologists the same way it 
challenged the social model of disability: the constructivist basis on which anthropology 
resisted the stigmatisation of biological determinacy (in the same way they challenged racism 
and sexism) led anthropologists to describe learning disabilities in terms of difference rather 
than a deficit. However, such framing did not – and could not – take into account the very real 
and material difficulties posed by learning impairment. More recent anthropological studies 
take note of this tension, and draw on philosophical works on vulnerability and the ethics of 
care (discussed in chapter two) to study learning disabilities from the perspective of ethical 
engagement and selfhood (e.g. Ginsburg and Rapp, 2018; Kulick and Rydström, 2015; 
McKearney, 2018a). These works ask how learning impairment shapes one’s engagement 
with the world, and how we can engage with people with learning disabilities in an ethnical 
manner.  
The anthropological method is central to this enquiry.  
Ethnography and participant observation emerged as anthropology’s distinctive strategy 
when the emerging field’s interests centred on the study of native peoples who usually lived 
in small, preindustrial societies. Early pioneering fieldwork by anthropologists like 
Malinowski (1922) and Evans-Pritchard (1940) – both of whom spent years living with the 
communities they studied – represented a distinct break from prior traditions of “armchair 
anthropology”, where anthropologists used data collected by fieldworkers. 
Ethnography and participant observation are often used interchangeably, as they often 
go hand in hand. For the purposes of this thesis, I define ethnography as a method of 
describing knowledge within its local socio-cultural context. Ethnography often combines a 
variety of field techniques like interviews, focus groups, life histories, genealogical research 
(Kottak, 2014). However, the basis of ethnographic fieldwork has always been participant 
observation, a technique whereby anthropologists enter the field as outsiders, establish rapport 
with insiders in the field, and through a process of cultural learning, they take note of the 
social and cultural particularities of local practices, knowledges, and meanings. The 
anthropologists’ epistemic advantage derives from them being outsiders (etic) and thus being 
able to observe particularities that insiders (emic) take for granted (Harris, 1976). But rather 
than “objectively” observing and describing that knowledge from a realist epistemological 
stance, the anthropologist views knowledge “as a matter of acquiring habits of action for 
coping with reality” (Rorty, 1991: 1). When starting fieldwork, anthropologists carry with 
them a set of assumptions and categories about the field they are about to enter. During the 
fieldwork process, anthropologists have to work to actively bring into consciousness and 
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systematically undo these assumptions, while at the same time gain understanding of the ones 
carried by the people in the field.  
Participant observation thus can be – and has been – characterised as a form of 
apprenticeship, whereby anthropologists gain culturally specific skills and habits that enables 
them to respond to the fieldwork environment in the way insiders to that community do. As 
anthropologist Jenkins (1994) puts it, “fieldwork is an apprenticeship of signs, a process of 
entry into a particular world, governed by a variety of factors, including the situation and 
previous experience of the anthropologist. During an apprenticeship, as well as skills and 
perceptions, memories and desires are altered, so that every actor, indigenous or 
ethnographer, is engaged in a personal and experiential capacity” (p. 445). 
The relationships established with the people in the field (often referred to as key 
informants or interlocutors) are central to this process. In anthropological research, it is this 
relationship that validates and legitimates the ethnographic accounts, analysis, and 
conclusions. The fact that anthropologists engaged in these relationships in an immersive, 
long-term, and intimate manner is what imbues them with the agency to know, and endows 
them with the authority to write about that knowledge (Blasco and Wardle, 2006). 
The nature of anthropological fieldwork has changed over the past century. Early 
anthropological interest often aligned with European imperial powers in establishing and 
reproducing ideas of racialised cultural difference. Contemporary anthropology is deeply 
critical of this history and has been examining the impact and legacy of colonialism, and 
challenge  assumptions of Western cultural superiority. The diversification of ethnographic 
fieldwork reflects these changes. As opposed to early focus on small, native, pre-industrial 
societies, contemporary anthropology has widened its scope to investigate practices in the 
anthropologist’s “home” community (Peirano, 1998), online (Buccitelli, 2016; Pink et al., 




Participant observation addresses some of the issues I discussed in relation to inclusive 
research, which is why I consider it a methodologically and ethically valuable alternative 
method for this thesis. Although it does not involve participants as co-researchers, it takes 
seriously the assertion that people with learning disabilities can contribute to research with 
their unique knowledge. Similar to inclusive research, it builds on the collaborative 
relationship between researchers and people with learning disabilities. However, it is better 
suited to address needs that are specific to learning impairment for two reasons. Firstly, unlike 
in inclusive research where people with learning disabilities learn to do research, participant 
observation reverses that dynamic by making the researcher into the apprentice to the world 
of people with learning disabilities. Secondly, participant observation is practice-based and 
embodied, therefore relies less one’s the capacity for verbal self-expression. 
In conceptualising participant observation with people with learning disabilities, I found 
the works of anthropologist Tim Ingold particularly helpful. Ingold’s (2017b) basic 
proposition is to think about anthropological research as an inherently collaborative and 
embodied mode of producing knowledge. Ingold is not the first one to make this argument. 
However, I focus on him partly because I do not have the scope to review the rich body of 
literature on the subject, and partly because Ingold transforms the theoretical tenets of 
prominent thinkers into both practical suggestions and ethical insights. 
The first of these observations is an epistemological suggestion to rethink the nature of 
experience, and regard it as constituted through bodily sensations rather than through 
cognitive representations. Drawing on prominent phenomenologists, Ingold’s framework 
postulates that perception begins not by external objects eliciting sensory information, but the 
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other way around, by the body registering objects through a collage of bodily sensations 
(Csordas, 1990; Merleau-Ponty, 1945). According to this, experience does not come into 
existence as a single, coherent unit; instead, it is indeterminate and emergent, subject to the 
one’s shifting attention.  
The second observation is that embodied knowledge is inherently social and is co-
constitutive of collective practice. Here, Ingold’s works resonates with the scholarship on 
habitus and the sensoriality of ritual (e.g. Bourdieu, 1980; Csordas, 1990; Howes, 2010). 
Although embodied and sensorial experiences as subjects of empirical enquiry have been 
discussed in disability studies (Paterson and Hughes, 1999), their methodological implications 
for involving people with learning disabilities in research are yet to be explored. 
Ingold (2014, 2017b) takes these propositions to make the case for participant 
observation as a research method and a principle for ethically engaging with research 
participants by acknowledging the collaborative, embodied, and emergent nature of 
knowledge production in research. Experiential knowledge, he argues, resides in 
“participatory practice: not in the ways persons and things are symbolically represented in 
their absence, but in the ways they are made present, and above all, answerable to one 
another” (Ingold, 2017a: 17). What he means by this is that “authentic” knowledge does not 
arise from the researcher’s ability to help participants accurately describe what they know; 
rather, it comes from the researcher learning what the participants know through attending to 
people, and learn from them how to perceive their environment. Participant observation, 
Ingold (2014) writes, is thus best understood as the researcher undergoing education, or an 
apprenticeship: learning through such apprenticeship produces knowledge that cannot be 
attained by simple observation. Participant observation demands that the ethnographer 
empathetically engages with what is important for the participants: it is not collecting data 
that can be analysed at a later stage, but producing meaning through shared activity 1(see also 
Pink, 2011).   
There are a few reasons participant observation could be an appealing addition to the 
methodological arsenal of social research with people with learning disabilities. First of all, it 
circumvents the problem of solely relying on participants’ capacity for verbal self-expression. 
Instead, it forces researchers to turn their attention to other forms of knowledge, in particular, 
to embodied, emotive, and sensorial modes of perception. Secondly, it formulates an ethics of 
engaging with participants: instead of including them in research on academia’s terms and 
forcing them to do what academic researchers do, participant observation requires the 
researcher to engage with activities that the participants find valuable. Finally, participant 
observation does away with the awkward distinction between the academic researcher and the 
co-researcher; instead, it elevates and emancipates non-academic modes of knowledge 
production. 
 
1 It has to be noted here that Ingold (2014, 2017b) wrote all this as a provocative way to 
rebuke the dominance of ethnography in anthropology, which subsequently injected new 
energy into the methodological debate (e.g. Hammersley, 2018; Howell, 2017; Parker-
Jenkins, 2018; Shah, 2017). My take on the debate is that Ingold employs a narrow definition 
of ethnography, i.e.  an “objective” description of social practices from a “neutral” 
ethnographer. In this sense, Ingold is right to dismiss ethnography as a static, positivist, and 
objectivist method. On the other hand, many anthropologists conducting ethnographic 
fieldwork have understood ethnography as a reflexive practice of describing the process of 
participant observation. It is the latter that I mean when I describe my primary method as 
ethnography and participant observation. 
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Participant observation has broader political implications regarding the politics of 
inclusivity in inclusive research. It may not employ co-researchers, but it is inclusive because 
it obliges researchers to immerse themselves in the stakes of people’s everyday lives; it  
ethically and politically commits to its subjects and their wellbeing; and it is built on a 
collaborative research relationship. 
There is a long tradition among anthropologists who uphold this commitment in their 
research by entering their field of study as activists, practitioners, and advocates. Scheper-
Hughes (1995) uses the term “militant ethnography” to outline the principles of a “politically 
committed and morally engaged anthropology” (p. 409, also see Juris, 2007). Ginsburg and 
Rapp’s (2013) “entangled ethnography” describes the authors becoming active participants 
and activists in the field they studied. In their work on transition for children with learning 
disabilities, their “ethnographic entanglements” as parents and researchers granted them 
insights which enabled both their activism and research. 
There are strikingly few examples of participant observation with people with learning 
disabilities (Angrosino, 2004). This is surprising because one of the earliest examples of a 
researcher demonstrating interest in the voices of people with learning disabilities was an 
ethnography: anthropologist Robert Edgerton (1967) spent more than a year with former 
residents of a long-stay hospital to understand after institutionalisation. Yet, apart from early 
examples ethnographic work on the subject falls within the objectivist framework with an aim 
to “describe behaviour in its natural settings” (McCarthy, 1999: 80). These works maintain 
the underlying assumption that knowledge exists “out there”, and it is the researcher’s 
responsibility to access and decode that knowledge – this is the approach to ethnography 
Ingold (2014, 2017b) ardently critiqued.  
There is a small number of studies in learning disability research that conceives of the 
involvement of people with learning disabilities in a more fluid manner (Davis, 2000; 
Goodley, 1999). Although these are not ethnographies, their conceptualisation of the 
researcher-participant relationship aligns well with the ethos of inclusive research on 
collaborative knowledge production and the ethical position of taking seriously people’s lived 
experiences.  
Recent anthropological work on learning disabilities involved anthropologists entering 
the world of people with learning disabilities: Kulick (in Kulick and Rydström, 2015) spent 
nearly three months living in three different care homes, where he socialised with residents 
and carers. McKearney (2018a) spent a year living with care home residents and carers while 
learning to be a care-giver himself. Rapp and Ginsburg (2013) have had a longstanding 
involvement in the field as researchers and parents of children with learning disabilities. What 
participant observation allowed these anthropologists to do is observe the particularities of 
interacting with, caring for, and advocating on the behalf of people with learning disabilities, 
especially with those who had little verbal language. By doing so, they were also able to 
examine taken-for-granted ideas of ethical engagement, selfhood, and justice upheld by those 
without learning disabilities.  
For instance, Kulick and Rydström’s (2015) ethnography focuses on people with 
significant learning disabilities and their right to sex. The trust and rapport they built with the 
residents and carers during their ethnographic fieldwork allowed them explore private and 
sensitive issues related to the sexuality, and observe how institutional attitudes and practices 
facilitated or hindered people’s sexuality. The immersive nature of their fieldwork contributed 
to the richness of their data. McKearney’s (2018a) took immersion a step further. His study 
focused on the question of what made engagement with people with significant learning 
disabilities valuable. By learning to be a care-giver, McKearney (2018a) not only observed 
how other carers related to the residents of the care home; he also took notes of the process by 
which he himself learnt to interact with the residents, and came to see them as moral agents. 
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Arguably, the practices that carers deployed to recognise and sensitise themselves to the 
residents’ agency is something they would take for granted, therefore they may find it 
difficult to articulate formally, for instance, in an interview. However, by undergoing the 
learning process, McKearney (2018a) was able to document and analyse it with rich detail 
and complexity. 
Finally, Ginsburg and Rapp’s (2013) “entangled ethnography” demonstrates how long-
term immersive participant observation blurred the line between their roles as researchers and 
advocates, thus providing them with a particular epistemic advantage. During the course of 
their research, the Ginsburg and Rapp – parents of disabled children themselves – faced the 
lack of prospects for people with more significant learning disabilities in transition to 
adulthood. They subsequently found themselves involved in expanding training programmes 
and working with parent groups with children in special education, advocates, teachers, 
lawyers, and health professionals. They write that their entanglements in the field was 
simultaneously an ethical commitment to the people they worked with and an epistemological 
resource that helped them shed light on the invisibility of young people with learning 
disabilities in transition who were not able to attend college, and thus did not fit into the 
success narrative. They argue that full immersion helped them remain open and responsive to 
unexpected events and “envision alternative politics and institutions” (p. 216) that would not 




These examples illustrate how ethnographic fieldwork with participant observation can 
yield rich data that contribute to theoretically, ethically, and politically complex and nuanced 
work.  
In my thesis, I approach participant observation as an embodied method and as an ethics 
of engagement, framed by Ingold and the anthropologists discussed above. In my 
introduction, I argued that the question of citizenship is not relegated to abstract philosophical 
questions about the principles of justice, but are ideas that guide what people do and how they 
are engaged with in their everyday lives. As Ingold and the phenomenological scholarship has 
highlighted, practice is embodied and social – it follows that citizenship, which in the 
anthropological framework is studied as an everyday practice, can be examined as an 
embodied and social phenomenon. This means that the meaning of citizenship can be derived 
ethnographically by undertaking everyday activities together with participants, and learning to 
attend to them and the way they perceive their environment and activities. The learning 
process also involves unlearning taken-for-granted assumptions of liberal citizenship by 
contrasting those ideals to the way they materialise in everyday practice. 
I also decided to undertake participant observation because it presented an ethical way 
of involving people in research. As my study is interested everyday activities, it seemed more 
appropriate and congruent for me to enter their world, as an alternative to employing them as 
co-researchers and trying to mould them according to the expectations and standard of 
academia.  
Having discussed the methodological basis of inclusive research and participant 
observation, I will now turn to describing my methods: the site of the fieldwork, my activities 
as a participant observer and ethnographer, the data analysis, and ethics. 
 
 
Project Ability: the site of fieldwork 
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I spent the majority of my fieldwork at Project Ability, a Glasgow-based charity 
organisation that provides artmaking opportunities for people with learning disabilities and 
mental illness. I initially chose this organisation because I intended to examine citizenship 
practices outside of the employability and skills building programmes, which has tended to be 
the focus of such studies. My aim when entering fieldwork was not only to seek examples 
where people’s citizenship was hindered: anyone who is vaguely aware of the treatment of 
people with learning disabilities in the UK could probably recite headlines from scandals 
from past long-stay hospitals and ongoing campaigns like Justice for Laughing Boy. What is 
less well known are exemplary practices of facilitating citizenship. I wanted to know what it 
looks like in practice when the ideals of citizenship are taken seriously. Project Ability 
seemed an appropriate choice because as an organisation it is well known in the Scottish art 
scene for having prestigious awards, unique artists, high quality artworks, and strong 
community presence. Project Ability was also a practical choice: it is a well-respected arts 
organisation in Scotland, and is known for being open to collaborating with various 
organisation, including university researchers. I presented my research plan to the director, 
and visited the workshops a couple of times to introduce myself to the tutors and the 
participants. After gaining ethical approval from the ethics committee of the University of 





The workshops reserved for adults with learning disabilities run from morning till 
afternoon, Monday to Friday. Participants attend the workshops one or two days a week. With 
the exception of the Friday workshop that runs the whole year around, each block of 
workshops are eight-weeks long, with by five weeks of break in-between. Project Ability 
studio also hosts a range of other activities, such as performance art projects, talks and 
seminars by guest artists from the UK and Europe, outreach programmes around Scotland, 
and artist collaborations with the Glasgow School of Art and various arts organisations. There 
are weekly walk-in workshops open to anyone for a small fee, walking groups, and film 
screenings. Every once in a while, typically around festive seasons, the studio hosts a party 
for its participants, staff, family members, and support workers. 
The organisation is run by the art director and a handful of permanent staff who fulfil 
various managerial and administrative roles. The workshops are led by professional artist 
tutors contracted as freelancers. Additional support is provided by volunteers, most of whom 
are art school students or recent graduates. The tutors and the volunteers help participants 
make art: this involves preparing art materials, giving technical and aesthetic advice, or 
providing step-by-step, hands-on support. Some participants enjoy additional help from their 
support workers, many of whom are art enthusiasts, artists, art school graduates, and former 
volunteers. With the exception of Fridays, which comprises a five-hour long session, each day 
hosts two sessions, a morning and an afternoon workshop, each of which are attended by 
different participants (sixteen at most).  
There are several pathways through which one can sign up to the classes. Some 
participants were referred by their social workers or by their care organisation. Others found 
the organisation by chance or through word of mouth. There were a few participants who had 
known the tutors for years, through the hospital where had been treated or institutionalised. 
There is a fee to attend to the workshops, which is covered by the financial support most 
participants receive in form of cash payment or through their care organisation.  
Project Ability has well-maintained connections with the local art world. It frequently 
exhibits the participants’ artworks in local cafes, music venues, and art galleries. Project 
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Ability also has its own small gallery space and shop, located next to the administrative 
offices, two floors below its art studio space. Thanks to its community presence, many of the 
participants’ artworks are relatively well-known and appreciated within the city’s art life. 
Because of the visibility of some Project Ability artists, Lesley, the art director said that 
visitors of the studio space often assume the participants have mild learning disabilities and 
low support needs. It subsequently takes them by surprise when they first meet the 
participants in person, and realise that in fact most of them have significant learning 
disabilities and high support needs.  
The most visible artists of Project Ability – the ones whom, according to Lesley, most 
visitors expect to see – are participants of the Friday art classes. These classes are attended by 
twelve people who have lower support needs. They are individuals with more verbal language 
in comparison to those attending the Monday to Thursday groups. They live in self-supported, 
council-subsidised housing. Most (but not all of them) are independent travellers, which 
means they can use public transport as long as they are familiar with the route.  
Most of them are well-known in the scene of Scottish artists with learning disabilities. 
Their works are frequently exhibited in the UK and Europe, and their art sells well. When 
Project Ability organises outreach programmes, participants from the Friday group are asked 
to go along as peer tutors. One of them, Colin is one of the six British artists with disabilities 
who was awarded a lifetime fellowship at the Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, 
Manufactures and Commerce. This makes Colin part of a very select group, whose past and 
present members include Charles Dickens, Karl Marx, and David Attenborough.  
Participants that attend the groups that run from Mondays to Thursdays do not hold 
such accolades. With a few exceptions, these individuals live in supported housing or with 
their parents. They require support to carry out many activities of daily living such as 
shopping, cooking and personal care.  Most of them need help to safely move about in their 
community or commute to the studio. Many of them also have physical disabilities: restricted 
mobility, and limited vision and hearing were common. Some of these were due to their age, 
as many of them were elderly people. At the time of my fieldwork, the majority of 
participants were older than fifty; the oldest participant was eighty-three.  
Many of these participants have very little verbal language. At first glance, many of 
them gave me the impression of being completely disengaged from their environment because 
their responses were quiet and incomprehensible for those who did not know them well, 
myself included. Some of them were verbal, but not in a conventional manner: they 
communicated with sounds or non-sequiturs. These are the people that my thesis focuses on. 
 
 
The ethnographic fieldwork and the empirical material 
 
I partook in four blocks of workshops for people with learning disabilities. During that 
time, I offered help with facilitating the workshops. Becoming a volunteer was partly a way 
for me to acknowledge the time and resources I took as a researcher, and partly served as an 
inroad for me to learn about artmaking with the participants. 
Besides spending time with them in the studio space, I also accompanied participants on 
outreach programmes, seminars and presentations, guest workshops, exhibition openings, 
field trips, residencies, and social events. Occasionally, I spent time with them (and their 
support workers, if they had one) outside the workshops: I went on walks with them, travelled 
with them on public transport, and met them for coffee, food and drinks. I also spent time 
socialising with tutors, support workers, and participants from the mental health workshops. I 
attended art events that were linked to Project Ability, such as the participants’ exhibitions at 
various local galleries. The most notable of these was the Glasgow International Art Festival, 
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a three-week-long contemporary art festival that takes place over several locations across the 
city, the Project Ability studios being one of them. 
I formally interviewed very few people: seven participants, one parent, three support 
workers, one volunteer, one person who was both support worker and volunteer, and finally, 
the director. I did not formally interview any of the tutors: by the time I started arranging 
interviews three months into the fieldwork, I had spent so much time working with them, 
shadowing them, conversing with them about the workshops, art, and life in general that I felt 
there was little that formal interviews could add to what I had learnt from and about them 
already. I had similar feelings about interviewing many of the support workers and 
volunteers, whom I got to know over the year and with whom I spent a considerable time in 
the workshop and outside socialising.  
I audio-recorded the interviews. I removed all the names from the transcripts, returned 
the de-identified versions to the participants, and offered to delete any details or responses 
they did not want to include. I kept these transcripts for analysis, and deleted the originals 
along with the recordings. I did not de-identify my fieldnotes, but kept them in password 
protected and encrypted word documents. All the data was stored on my password protected 
laptop that only I had access to. 
Some of the photos of participants’ artwork that I included in this thesis are from the 
Project Ability website, others are mine. I always sought participants’ verbal consent to 
photograph their work, unless I took photos of their works at exhibitions.  
At the workshops, I took short notes on my phone. Occasionally, I asked participants if 
I could write down what they had said. However, I refrained from taking notes in front of 
people when I felt it impinged on my ability to be fully present and engaging in the 
interaction. Instead, I sought out quiet corners to write short notes about my conversations and 
observations. I wrote longer and more detailed fieldnotes with a summary and analysis every 
evening after returning from the workshop or a fieldwork-related event. 
Part of the quotes and dialogues that I present in this thesis are paraphrased from my 
short notes and fieldnotes. My decision to not take notes in front of participants meant that I 
missed out on rich quotes to illustrate my point because I could not remember what people 
had told me in detail in the evenings when I was writing up my fieldnotes. Although some 
anthropologists carry a recorder to tape their interactions, I have opted to not do so in order to 
allow conversations to remain spontaneous.  
It is a valid question whether presenting paraphrased quotes co-opts participants’ 
voices. I partly addressed this question by only including quotes that I had taken notes of and 
thus could represent as accurately as possible. However, because the anthropological 
fieldwork is relies upon the ethnographer’s etic and emic positionality, all the empirical I 
present here reflect my interpretations and perspectives on the encounters, rather than aiming 
at representing speech in its most objective form. For the same reason, I did not transcribe 
regional accents and speech impediments. Instead, in my writing, I follow the ethnographic 
tradition of “deliberately emphasised [researcher] position” (Blasco and Wardle, 2006: 149), 
and focus on the knowledge I derived from my relationship with the people I met during 





Because I do not have a training in visual art, at the beginning, I spent most of my time 
observing participants make art. To make myself useful initially, I sought to do all the menial 
tasks: I fetched and prepared art materials, cleaned palettes and brushes. After a couple of 
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weeks, people at the workshops started to relate to me as a volunteer: participants sought my 
advice, and tutors trusted me to help participants on my own.  
Much of the participant observation was thus a process of me learning about artmaking 
and about the people attending the workshops. The first thing I started picking up on was the 
basics about techniques, colours, and materials. I understood – experienced – their sensorial 
qualities: the thickness of different paints, the resistance of various pens and papers, the 
diverse textures of clay and textile. I developed preferences for colours, framing, and 
combinations of materials. Although by no means could I achieve the skills of someone who 
had years of training and practice, I was able to help participants with smaller technicalities, 
such as priming canvases, preparing clay materials, or picking the right type of paint for 
drypoint etching. 
These basic skills enabled me to work more closely with participants. After a couple of 
occasions on which I suggested art making techniques that did not suit them (for instance, I 
handed a big brush with thick paint to someone who liked to work with small, meticulous 
patterns), I slowly got to know them well enough (and expanded my own knowledge of the 
different art making techniques) to be able to suggest ideas that were novel, but not 
completely out of their comfort zone. 
Becoming more familiar with artmaking allowed me to get to know the participants 
better. The first thing I learnt was that there were a lot of ways of spending time with people 
in addition to having a conversation with them. Despite my initial discomfort at feeling like I 
could not engage with people who had little to no verbal language and inscrutable facial 
expressions, I grew increasingly comfortable with and perhaps more knowledgeable about 
interacting with gestures and touch. I also understood that interaction sometimes comprised 
sitting with someone in silence.  
From the beginning, I was committed to making myself useful to the organisation and 
the people around it. For that, I had to learn ways to be useful as a volunteer who could be 
trusted with the art. Increasingly, people asked me for help with other things: I helped them 
with filling out forms, provided them with company outside the workshops, and shared their 
everyday concerns. 
During this year, I went from someone who had very little clue about art and learning 
disabilities to someone who had a little bit more. The process of cultivating this knowledge 
has become the epistemological foundation to this thesis. 
 
 
The data analysis 
 
I organised all the interview material, fieldnotes, and photographs in NVivo. After I 
concluded my fieldwork, I conducted a thematic analysis of my fieldnotes and interviews.  
Three of the main themes on which I based my ethnographic chapters (choice, 
independence, and sociality) emerged from the literature review on citizenship and learning 
disabilities, which had I undertaken prior to fieldwork. These three themes were recurring, 
key concepts in the policy documents, political philosophy, and the learning disability 
scholarship.  
The thematic analysis was preceded by a more fluid, collaborative, and iterative 
analytical process I undertook while being in the field. As part of this process, I had ongoing 
the conversations with the participants, support workers, and staff members about my 
observations and my initial research questions. I often had long, informal discussions – over 
lunch, tea, or breaks – during which I shared my ideas and interpretations. These 
conversations reinforced the centrality of the themes of choice, independence, and sociality. 
This process further helped me refine my research questions by drawing my attention to the 
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everyday conundrums and practices that comprised the central occupation of those attending 
the workshops. The overarching questions around of cultivation, sensoriality, and materiality 
that my ethnographic chapters explore with regards to choice, independence, and sociality all 
emerged as a result of this iterative analytical process. I can confidently say I would not have 
been able to identify these themes solely by reviewing the literature and policy publications.  
Partly to ensure that my observations were reliable and relevant, and partly to be 
transparent about my research activities, six months into my fieldwork I wrote a short 
summary of my preliminary analysis, including the themes, observations, and interpretations, 
which I presented to staff members, support workers, and participants. I incorporated the 
feedback into my analysis.  
The fourth major theme that serves as the basis for my fourth empirical chapter on the 
value of engaging with people with learning disabilities emerged after I finished my 
fieldwork, as I was trying to make sense of my changing perception of the participants’ 
artworks. Over the year I spent at Project Ability, I did not only become more familiar with 
the art and the community at the workshops; I also developed full appreciation for and 
investment in their artistry. This was reflected in my fieldnotes, much of which I spent 
describing the intricacies of artworks people produced at the workshops or exhibited at 
various exhibitions. The theme of value emerged a few months into writing up, after having 
immersed myself in the philosophical literature on the ethics of engagement with people with 





Apart from the broader questions about ethical engagement with people with learning 
disabilities in research, which I discussed in relation to inclusive research and participant 
observation, the issues I encountered regarding consent and confidentiality required me to 
carefully consider general research ethics.  
Prior to the fieldwork, I received ethical approval from the ethics committee of the 
College of Social Sciences, the University of Glasgow. In addition to the University 
procedures2, I consulted the ethics guidelines of the American Anthropological Association 
(2012) and the Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and the Commonwealth 
(2011). I further familiarised myself with the ethics of engaging people with learning 
disabilities in research by reviewing the literature on inclusive research. 
During fieldwork, I negotiated consent with the people I encountered on an ongoing 
basis. I received written consent from the organisation as a gatekeeper to conduct my 
ethnographic research at the workshops after having met with them and presented them with 
my proposal. However, I did not seek individual written consent from the participants for the 
participant observation because I had perceived that to be impractical, disruptive, and 
intrusive to the workshops and the participant observation. Instead, I opted for obtaining 
people’s verbal consent. I sought explicit verbal consent from everyone I spoke to informally. 
I did so by introducing and identifying myself as a researcher, and concisely explaining my 
research aims, questions, and methods. Additionally, I maintained consent by repeatedly 
asking for people’s permission to sit with them and observe their artmaking.  
The issue of  confidentiality posed ongoing challenges. The decision to name the site of 
fieldwork – Project Ability – was a result of ongoing discussions with the organisation and 
was made with the agreement of the staff. At the start of my research, I set out to highlight 
exemplary practice and positive participatory experiences in service provision. I approached 
 
2 See https://www.gla.ac.uk/colleges/socialsciences/students/ethics/informationforapplicants/ 
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the Project Ability having made this intention clear. My focus corresponded with the needs of 
the organisation: I was informed in conversations with the director that any research 
documenting best practice served the organisation well in the context of funding cuts, as it 
helped them prepare for the eventuality of having to justify their operations. Since Project 
Ability had limited funding to commission their own research, my project provided them with 
an opportunity to document exemplary provision and gain feedback on their practices. 
Naming Project Ability in my thesis thus allows the organisation and its staff members to take 
ownership of and be recognised for the positive interventions cited in this thesis. 
I recognise that this decision comes at the expense of guaranteeing confidentiality and 
anonymity, with a particular risk to internal confidentiality (Kaiser, 2009; Tolich, 2004), 
meaning that participants may be identifiable from the descriptions. I further recognise that I 
displayed participants’ artworks in my thesis, some of which I photographed at public 
exhibitions, and some of which I took from the Project Ability website; all of which makes 
participants’ more easily identifiable, especially by those who attend the workshops. Finally, I 
acknowledge that staff members may be recognised from my decision to name their position 
within the organisation (e.g. director, tutor, technician). 
To address issues around internal confidentiality in an ethical manner, I drew on 
ethnographers and anthropologists who have grappled with the same questions during their 
fieldwork. The risk of participants being identified poses an pertinent and ongoing conundrum 
in ethnographic research, where the rich and detailed descriptions reveal particularities about 
the subject of research that can involuntarily disclose their identity. An often-cited example 
for the breach of internal confidentiality is sociologist Carolyn Ellis’s (1995) ethnography of a 
small fishing community. Despite not using real names, Ellis’s participants were able to 
identify themselves in her book. Having read what she wrote about them made them feel 
angry and betrayed by Ellis, whose book – contrary to her explicitly stated intention to “write 
a paper about fishing” (p. 71) – in fact revealed intimate details about their lives, including 
stories about illness, sex, and poverty. The village residents felt that by disclosing these 
details, she embarrassed, humiliated, and disrespected them. 
To avoid instances like this, the dominant approach in social research is to issue 
confidentiality statements in the consent form, and to clean the data for analysis and 
dissemination (i.e. removing names and other identifiers). However, there are no standardised 
guidelines, and nor can these practices guarantee full confidentiality (Kaiser, 2009). The 
alternative, anthropological approach to these issues rests upon two principles: sharing the 
work with the participants during the process of the research process to grant them control 
over disclosures and interpretations; and practicing researcher discretion in accordance with 
the principle of “do no harm” (Tolich, 2004). 
I addressed the risk of breaching internal confidentiality and anonymity by, first of all, 
making people aware that complete concealment of their identity was not possible. In 
addition, in line with the anthropological guidance, I aimed to grant participants control over 
disclosures by continuously sharing my observations and interpretations with the staff 
members, support workers, and participants in the workshops. I also returned the interview 
transcripts to the participants, and removed any information that they were concerned about 
sharing. To stay in line with the “do no harm” principle, I continuously reflected on the 
impact that my findings and ethnographic material would have on people, were they identified 
from the details. This involved considering the following questions: 1) Do my descriptions 
depict the research subjects in a fair and dignified manner? 2) Can the information about them 
be potentially damaging for their occupation, relationships, and reputation? 3) How would 
people feel if they recognised themselves while reading my work?  
Ultimately, I decided against sharing any material that I thought would make them feel 
in any way embarrassed, betrayed, ridiculed, or would do them harm. Over the course of my 
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fieldwork, staff members and participants sometimes confided in me by sharing deeply 
personal and potentially sensitive information. I have also observed tensions among those 
present in the workshops. Although all of this may have better contextualised my arguments 
and enriched my ethnographic descriptions, I decided to exclude this data from my analysis 
and writing up. This decision corresponded well with my decision to focus on documenting 
best practice and positive examples in service provision, which enabled me to substantiate my 
arguments without discussing sensitive material around interpersonal tensions an discontent. 





In this chapter, I discussed how research can engage with people with learning 
disabilities in an ethical manner. I provided a brief overview of inclusive research, and 
examined the conundrums of employing people with learning disabilities as co-researchers, 
especially those with significant impairments. I then examined how the anthropological 
method, namely ethnography and participant observation could provide an alternative way of 
engaging people. Specifically, I argued that the anthropological method meets the aims of 
inclusive research because it is inherently collaborative, ethical, and produces rich and valid 
knowledge. However, unlike inclusive research, it is immersive and embodied, and does not 
fully rely on the participants’ capacity to express themselves with verbal language or assistive 
technologies. Anthropology achieves this by requiring the ethnographer to build rapport and 
undertake a sort of apprenticeship in the world of people with learning disabilities in order to 
learn to interact the subjects on their own terms, and to engage with them in the activities that 
they deem valuable. In the second part of the chapter, I elaborated on how I approached 
ethnography and participant observation in my own fieldwork: after describing the site of 
Project Ability, I discussed my activities as a researcher, my data analysis, and addressed 
ethical conundrums with regards to consent and confidentiality I encountered during my 
fieldwork. 













I had been quietly watching James pick dried acrylic paint off plastic palettes with a 
scalpel for half an hour when I walked up to him. I had been preparing drawing materials for 
workshop participants when I noticed that James was not making art. I was hesitant about 
approaching him at first, as he seemed preoccupied with the stack of palettes on his desk. 
“What would you like to do?” I asked him eventually. 
No response.  
I decided to take a different approach. “Would you like to draw?” I asked. James started 
rocking back and forth, making a muffled noise that sounded like a “Yes”.  
“Shall I get you some paper?” I tried again.  
“Yes,” James replied, this time clearly, but without looking up. 
That I received a response at all made me feel emboldened. “Shall I get you a picture?”  
“Yes.”  
“Would you like to come and have a look with me?”  
“Stay.” 
I went. I fetched some felt tip pens, paper, and a pile of pictures of animals. Felt tip pens 
and paper are convenient materials: they are not too messy, they are easy to set up, and 
participants know how to use them. I placed everything in a pile on James’s desk, and he took 
the first picture on top of the pile and started drawing it. Being new and eager, I wanted to 
make sure he was aware of his options, so I started sorting out the pictures to show him the 
different ones I had brought.  
 “No!” he shouted and grabbed my hand. This sudden outburst caught me by surprise. I 
scurried away and left him alone.  
I spent the rest of the workshop assisting other participants. Not long after my 
interaction with him, Eilidh, one of the tutors, approached James. Without saying a word, 
Eilidh placed a ceramic bowl in front of him, laid out several brushes, decanted different 
colours of earthenware glazes, and left to attend other participants. James took a couple of 
glances at the materials on his desk. He picked up a brush and dipped it into the glaze.  





This episode happened during my second week of volunteering at the studio, and I was 
taken by James’s artwork, which I thought was beautiful – like illustrations out of a children’s 
book. James had been attending the workshop for several years. He is easy to spot in the 
studio: he is a handsome and tall man in his late twenties who always wears a dark blue 
jumpsuit. James is one of the studio’s more “visible artists”, Lesley, the director told me. He 
boasts numerous international exhibitions, well-selling artworks, and a recognisable artistic 
style. He also has autism and learning disabilities. He lives in supported housing and needs to 
be accompanied whenever he leaves the house. He barely speaks, and when he does, it is 
always a one-word response. His words have a sharp and agitated edge, as if he had to press 
the sounds out of his lungs.  
Helping people like James, who have significant learning disabilities, make artistic 
choices is not as simple as asking them what they want to do. Nor does it involve simply 
presenting them with different options and leaving it at that. The difficulties I ran into as a 
volunteer speak to broader challenges of conceptualising the capacity to choose for people 
with significant disabilities, who are limited in their ability to express themselves verbally or 
with assistive technologies.  
I initially approached James because even though picking paint might have been what 
James wanted to do at the time, I felt that he was not really presented with options to engage 
in other forms of art; hence, I wanted to offer him a choice between picking paint and making 
art. My attempt at helping him was unsuccessful for a couple of reasons. My first mistake was 
asking him what he wanted to do without offering him any options. By doing so, I expected 
him to (verbally) articulate a plan and vision for an artwork on the spot, without taking into 
account the James’s limits to verbal self-expression. My second mistake was offering James 
too many options, which I had thought would aide his choice-making. I did so without 
knowing (or asking him about) the types of animals he liked, or the artistic technique he 
preferred. Note that Eilidh avoided all these pitfalls. She did not make James make a decision 
on the spot, nor did she bombard him with endless options. By preparing the glazing materials 
for him, she kept James’s options limited and did not pressure him into articulating what he 
wanted on the spot; instead, she left him to make his decision at his own pace.   
Choice is a key component of citizenship. In liberal theories, the process of individuals 
becoming citizens is framed as a choice between remaining in the state of nature in which 
they are only answerable to their own morality; or joining the social contract, whereby they 
give up some of their freedom in return for protection. Choice has been central to British 
social policy and advocacy efforts to promote the citizenship for people who have been 
historically segregated, institutionalised, and denied choices their whole lives. However, to 
help people make meaningful choices, the impact of learning impairment on the process of 
choice-making needs to be addressed.  
In this chapter, I argue that the Project Ability workshops demonstrate an understanding 
of choice-making that takes into account the limitations and support needs related to learning 
impairment. To substantiate my arguments, I draw on examples from the workshops to 
explore how participants are helped or hindered in their choice-making. First, I briefly outline 
the importance of choice in social policy and service provision. Then, I explore the difficulties 
people with learning disabilities and their carers face when trying to help people make 
decisions. In the second half of the chapter, I examine how supported choice-making is 
practiced in the Project Ability art workshops. Throughout, I will highlight the conceptual 
differences between two understandings of choice, and explore their practical implications 




The conundrums of choice 
 
Choice occupies a central position in the current efforts of learning disability social 
policy and service provision. Yet, promoting the choice-making of people with learning 
disabilities in practice runs into a range of problems. In this section, I briefly examine the 
context of the choice-agenda in social policy and service provision. Then, I juxtapose the 
rhetoric of these policies with the experiences of participants at the workshop to highlight the 
conundrums of supported choice-making in practice. I highlight three themes through 
ethnographic examples: lack of support for choice-making regarding larger existential 
questions, lack of help with navigating the service system, and difficulties with finding out 
what people really want. In exploring these examples, I argue that these conundrums emanate 
from the way social policy and service provision conceptualise choice. 
The prominence of the choice-agenda can only be understood in the context of the 
recent history of segregation and institutionalisation of people with learning disabilities. 
Promoting choice-making has been an effort to rectify the unjust and abusive treatment 
people were subjected to in long-stay hospitals (Department of Health and Social Security, 
1969). Historical accounts of life in institutions describe the lack of choice people with 
learning disabilities had over the most mundane aspects of their lives – to get up, what 
activities they wanted to engage in, who they wanted to spend time with – let alone in larger 
questions, like where they wanted to live, what they wanted to do for a living, how they 
wanted to nourish their aspirations for the future (Atkinson et al., 2000; Bartlett and Wright, 
1999; Edgerton, 1967; Walmsley and Welshman, 2006; Wright, 1997, 2001). Ex-residents 
gave account of “batch living” practices in the hospital (Jones and Fowles, 2008: 104), 
wherein residents underwent a collective routine. These living conditions were reinforced by 
surveillance and bureaucratic management systems, strict regulations that allowed no free 
time, and little respite or personal time (Jones and Fowles, 2008). 
On paper, there could not be a starker contrast with the present ethos of service 
provision: today, choice is intertwined with the language of citizenship. For instance, the 
Scottish Government outlines a direction for learning disability policy which “empowers 
individuals to have greater choice and control over the support they receive” so that “as 
citizens can become actively involved in selecting and shaping the support they receive” 
(Scottish Government, 2013b: 17). Choice is a major part of the Scottish Government’s 
commitment to independent living, meaning “all disabled people having the same freedom, 
choice, dignity and control as other citizens at home, at work and in the community” (Scottish 
Government, 2017: 27). Choice constitutes a similarly central theme in the support provider 
mission statements, third sector provision (including Project Ability), and self-advocacy 
groups. Amongst them are People First, a major self-advocacy group, whose aim is to 
“establish and protect the same freedom, choice, dignity and control as other citizens across 
all areas of life” (People First, 2017). 
Fyson and Cromby (2013) identify three key elements that are necessary for an 
individual to make a meaningful choice: 1) the individual must have options, 2) they must 
understand  both the short- and long-term consequences of their choices, and 3) the choice can 
be reversed without significant harm. In the personalised care approach, care organisations 
help choice-making by working together with care-recipients, their families, and occasionally 
their social workers to identify their aspirations, and devise the type of care and support plan 
that helps them achieve their immediate and long-term goals. The process purportedly 
increases care-recipients’ options and control over the type of support they wanted, and who 
they wanted to get support from (FAQ - Self-directed Support, 2018).  
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However, research has questioned the impact of these policies on improving the lives of 
people with learning disabilities. While people with mild learning disabilities somewhat 
benefitted from increased choice and control over their lives, the extent to which people with 
significant learning disabilities could make use of these opportunities remains questionable: 
although they may have been offered an increased range of options, they have not been given 





Choice emerged as a central theme of my fieldwork; the question of how much choice 
to give people, and how to support them to make choices permeated every interaction 
between participants and the people working with them. All the staff I spoke to agreed that it 
was important to offer participants choices; this was always followed by a remark on the lack 
of choices participants were given outside the workshops. “The tutors are really good, but 
choice-making is really quite complex,” Lesley, the director responded to my question on 
how much artistic freedom participants had in the workshop. “They spent a lifetime being 
denied choices over their lives, so it’s important that they get to exert some choices in the 
workshop,” she said. Lesley was referring to the fact that most participants who had high 
support needs had tight weekly schedules which were predominantly structured by their care 
providers. These schedules usually covered a broad range of activities, from social 
programmes, to sports, to leisure.  
Notably, these schedules did not include much unstructured free time.   
Connor is a 32-year-old support worker and English literature graduate who often wears 
purple sweaters with bright mustard socks and a small hat that only covers the tip of his ears. 
Connor has been working with Kenny, a participant who has significant learning disabilities 
and autism. In an interview, I asked Connor what supporting Kenny entailed. 
“Do you want me to describe a day at work?” He asked me with a hint of surprise. “I 
can do that very quickly.”  
 “I go in at half past eight”, he began, launching in. “I say ‘Good morning’ and he says, 
‘Good morning’. I say, ‘What are you up to?’ and he says, ‘Can I have a long lie?’. I say, ‘Of 
course you can,’ because I don’t care when you get up. Obviously I care, but with a capital 
‘C’. With a small ‘C’,” meaning small things like when Kenny gets up, “I don’t care”.  
“And then I say, ‘I’m just going to leave your door ajar’. He says, ‘Grand’ – well, he 
doesn’t say ‘Grand’. But then I go in and make myself a cup of tea, and I catch up on 
paperwork from the day before. I see if there are any appointments that need to be done, and 
then go and see if there is enough food. By that stage he’s up, and he makes his own 
breakfast, does his own dishes, does his own laundry, runs his own bath, washes himself. He 
does his own mopping, does his own hoovering, and makes his own morning cup of tea. He 
reminds me that I need to give his medication. I then dispense his medication. I sign that I 
have dispensed his medication.” 
Connor’s quick-talking Belfast accent became more pronounced as he continued. 
“So that’s 10AM. From 10AM until 8PM we have a different day. He does hundreds of 
things. He’s recently got a job. He goes to art class. He goes to the cinema, he goes to the 
gym, he goes to the bank, and does the shopping like every normal person would. We go to 
the pub and he goes out with his friend another night. So that’s five things immediately that I 
can think of that he does at night. Once every fortnight, he spends a day at his father’s house. 
At Christmas, he spends over three days going back and forth to his dad’s. And his brother 
has recently got married, so he goes to his brother’s house.” 
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Connor took a breath for what it seemed like the first time since he had started speaking. 
“Anyway that’s his life, and that’s what I facilitate.” 
“Is this all in the care plan?” I asked Connor. “Do you get a schedule of what you have 
to do?” 
“I wrote his schedule. I’ve written every little detail of what happens in his life from a 
Monday to a Sunday,” Connor said.  
Since Kenny has multiple support workers, the care plan is there to ensure consistency 
in his support. This also means that there is little space for Kenny and his support workers to 
divert from the prescribed schedule. Ironically, this often ends up leaving Kenny little say in 
their everyday activities.  
The absurdity of the situation did not escape Connor. He told me that because 
personalised support schemes leave people with little say in what they want to do, small and 
tokenistic choices were often framed as successfully improving people’s control over their 
lives. “You’ve got this thing,” he said, “if you ask your client, ‘What would you like to 
drink?’ and they say ‘I will have a milkshake’, well you are promoting independence because 
you are allowing him to have a milkshake. Well, fucking hell. Come on. I mean, it’s low 
standards.”  
Connors’s account reveals a discrepancy between the discourse and the practice of 
choice. Kenny is allowed to pick what he wants to eat, but he is not offered the opportunity to 
structure his day. From my conversation with Connor, I further gathered that Kenny also does 
not have a say in questions like which organisation he would like to provide his care (his 
family made this decision for him), how he spends the money that he receives from the state 
(his care organisation deals with his budget), or where he wants to live (this is decided by the 
state).  
Connor was aware of the discrepancy between the rhetoric and practice of supported 
choice-making. However, he pointed out that giving Kenny a say in all aspects of his life was 
not trivial. “If I wanted to live in a flat, I would walk down to the estate agent and say, ‘I am 
looking at this flat’. And if they’d say no because I can’t afford it, I could just offer to pay 
more in order to reach an agreement. I am able to stand up for myself and get something that I 
want,” Connor said. “Someone with a learning disability might not be able to do that. Even 
worse, people may take advantage of an individual with a learning disability.” 
What Connor was implying here is that granting people with learning disabilities the 
freedom to make a choice about existential questions like where they want to live does not 
guarantee an automatic improvement in their living conditions. On the contrary, without 
someone to protect their interests and advocate on their behalf, they may be exposed to being 
mistreated and exploited. Navigating the landscape of service provision, the housing market, 
and the banking system is complicated even for people without learning disabilities, who 
often have to draw on other people’s expertise and advice. Someone with significant learning 
impairment may not have the social network they can draw on the seek out such advice 
(Duggan and Linehan, 2013; Verdonschot et al., 2009); even if they do, they may have 
difficulties understanding the complex information they are given. 
People with significant learning disabilities need extensive support to make choices in 
the important questions about their lives. Kenny’s care organisation recognises this; this is 
why they have day-to-day control over Kenny’s housing and bank account. They do not, 
however, provide Kenny with support to take charge of his housing and finances. Connor and 
the other support workers do not have the power and space to advocate for Kenny in these 
matters. For this reason, to maintain some illusion of “choice”, support workers feel that the 
most they can do is to allow Kenny to make a decision over whether he wants to drink a 





The lack of support with choice-making presents problems for the families and 
guardians of people with learning disabilities, who are often tasked with arranging the care. 
This involves making a decision about how they want to structure the care, what kind of 
activities they would like to spend their support on, and which organisations that provide 
those activities they would like to subscribe to. Although the privatised service structure 
nominally offers them plenty of options regarding providers and types of activities, families 
receive little guidance to help them pick between these options. 
Margaret is a woman in her late fifties who sports an elegant pixie haircut. Since 
Margaret retired, she has been spending her time supporting her daughter and workshop 
participant, Deoiridh. “We put a lot of effort into finding services. It was pure luck that we 
found out about Project Ability,” Margaret said. She told me that they met one of the tutors at 
the hospital where Deoiridh was being treated at the time. It was the tutor who suggested the 
art workshop. That was more than eight years ago – Deoiridh has been attending ever since. 
However, had it not been to the tutor, Margaret thought she would have never found out about 
Project Ability. 
Deoiridh, thanks to Margaret’s efforts, has a busy schedule: together, they volunteer at 
the shop and gallery, go on the studio’s walking tours, and they attend all the socials, 
exhibition openings, and specialist workshops. When not at the studio, Margaret arranges for 
Deoiridh to go out for social events specifically for people with learning disabilities. On 
Fridays, they walk the dog of Deoiridh’s elderly neighbour.  
“She’s got a busy social life,” I said.  
“She does,” Margaret responded. “But I’m worried that without me, she won’t be able 
to find these services.” 
Margaret’s concerns reflect the same issues that Connor referred to, namely that being 
free to pick between options does not equate with having more choice. Margaret is a well-
educated woman, who has reasonable social networks, financial resources, and time to find 
out about service options. However, even she finds it hard to choose the right services; this 
may give an indication of how difficult this may be for someone who does not have similar 
resources. This is sad and ironic, considering that the past governments encouraged the 
privatisation of social care in order to provide people with more choice. What they did, 
however, was providing people with more options, but little support for people to choose 
between the options. 
Even if people with learning disabilities, their families, and their support workers were 
given all the information and time about available services, there was an additional obstacle 
they would have to overcome: several parents and support workers I spoke to told me that the 
person they supported had difficulties with formulating what they wanted, due to their 
learning impairment. This meant that some of them could not verbally articulate their desires 
to the people who worked with them; however, just as often, the individuals with learning 
disabilities did not know what they wanted. A consequence of this was that letting them make 
decisions resulted in them never leaving the house. Margaret, Deoiridh’s mother said, 
“Deoiridh would just stay in bed. She wouldn’t be able to formulate what she wanted to do, 
and then search for ways in which she could do them.”  
 In the art workshop, this conundrum reflected in the difficulty of asking people like 
Kenny what they wanted to do. Kenny would always say, “paint”. I know this because I asked 
him every single time for several consecutive weeks. Each time I got the same answer: 
“paint”. Connor, his support worker eventually took pity on me and explained that when 
Kenny said “paint”, he was not referring to the act of painting. He meant just generally being 
at the workshop. Other participants would say yes to everything, like Angus, whose answer 
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was always followed by a soft smile. Angus seemed keen on trying everything that was 
suggested to him. However, I have never heard him say anything other than the word ‘yes’, so 
it was hard for me to discern whether he would tell me if he there was something he did not 
want to do. Another participant who said yes to everything was Paul. Unlike Angus, Paul’s 
‘yes’ was always uttered with a rushed, muffled tone, which gave me the impression that he 
just wanted me to stop asking him questions. 
It quickly became obvious to me that in most cases, simply asking participants what 
they wanted to do was not an effective way of helping them make a choice. When I did so, I 
would make the mistake of taking their verbal responses too literally, not realising that I was 
not equipped to decipher what they really meant. But sometimes, participants simply did not 




I used this section to illustrate that despite heightened policy and service provision 
efforts to provide people with learning disabilities with choice, in practice, supporting choice-
making is riddled with practical and ethical dilemmas. For instance, people with learning 
disabilities were allowed to make small choices about what they wanted to eat or wear, yet 
they were not offered the chance to deliberate on larger questions about their care or their 
finances. In other instances, supporting their choice-making was difficult because they were 
not aware of their options, or did not know which option they preferred. 
What becomes apparent from these examples is that there is a discrepancy between 
social policy’s choice rhetoric, and the practice of supporting people with learning disabilities 
making meaningful choices. The practical difficulties entail lack of support for people with 
learning disabilities to make decisions regarding larger issues about their lives, lack of support 
for families to navigate the different options provided by the social care system, and finding 
out what people really want. All this highlights that choice-making entails more than having 
options and the freedom to pick between said options.  
Choice, understood as the freedom from interference to pick between options, echoes 
the assumptions of liberal citizenship – namely that individuals are equally capable of making 
choices. Liberal citizenship assumes that all individuals have clear preferences, have the 
capacity to weigh up all information available to them, and decide on what is best for them 
based on their self-interest. In reality, choice requires additional interventions: information, 
time, and advocacy.  
More importantly, choice is a capacity that entails the ability to develop and articulate 
preferences. Currently, people with learning disabilities are not provided with the support to 
cultivate their preferences and develop their capacity to choose; instead, the way in which 
service provision is structured assumes that they already have preferences. Furthermore, 
whereas people with learning disabilities are expected to have an equal capacity to choose as 
those without learning disabilities, in practice, they are often outright denied that capacity 
instead of being offered support to develop it.  
The conflict between the rhetoric and practice of choice did not escape the staff at the 
workshops. Lesley, the director, described the levels of choice-making participants were 
expected to go through to attend the workshop. Participants have to decide on the hours of 
support they would like to purchase from their budget. Then they have to decide whether they 
would like to attend. If so, they have to choose how many hours of support they would like to 
allocate to attending. Some people only get support with transport, so they get dropped off 
and picked up. Others have their support stay with them in the studio. 
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“It’s a huge number of decisions to make,” Lesley sighed. “And if you never got to 
decide when you’re going to bed, when you are going to get up, what you are going to have 
for breakfast, or what your clothes are going to be that day...” She trailed off. 
I asked her how people make the choice about attending the workshops. 




On trying new things 
 
Given these challenges around helping people with significant disabilities to make 
meaningful choices, I now turn to discuss how tutors approach choice-making in the 
workshop. In particular, I focus on the practice of helping participants trying out new things 
and the role it plays in understanding what choice looks like for people with learning 
disabilities. 
Deoiridh’s mother, Margaret, told me about a theatre performance she attended with her 
daughter. The show was put on by an organisation that provides dance classes for people with 
disabilities, and included disabled and non-disabled performers. Margaret spoke about an act 
where one of the performers, a wheelchair user, was holstered up in the air as an aerial dancer. 
“I wonder how that came about,” Margaret said, “Someone must have suggested it somehow. 
And this performer was so extremely agile.” She paused. “I mean, as a wheelchair user, how 
do you know that you can dance, that you like dancing?”  
Margaret captured the essence – and one of the ongoing challenges – of the art 
workshops related to choice-making, namely, how to help people with learning disabilities 
find out about their preferences and work towards what they want? In this section, by 
examining the ways in which staff members at the workshops help participants make art and 
artistic choices, I argue that Project Ability demonstrates an alternative approach to choice-
making, one which takes into account people’s learning impairment-specific needs. 
At the beginning of each workshop, one of the first things the tutors do is trying to find 
out what participants would like to do; however, as I discussed above, this is not always as 
simple as just asking them. Granted, there are some participants who come with specific 
ideas. Take Graham, a young man with Down Syndrome always has a piece of paper at hand 
with what he wants to draw on that specific day. This mostly falls into two categories: 
brutalist architecture and superheroes. Or Aila, indie music connoisseur, who knows exactly 
which 1990s pop-cultural icon’s portrait she will paint at the start of each workshop. Or 
Ewan, Scottish Paralympics youth champion, who does not seem to hesitate when it comes to 
choosing colours, framing, and art materials.  
The majority of participants, however, look to the tutors to give them suggestions about 
various aspects of art making. They have plenty of options regarding technique (e.g. painting, 
clay, printing, collage), technical advice (e.g. how to make sure the clay does not crack in the 
kiln), material (e.g. would a painting work best with oil, acrylics, ink, or watercolour), picture 
for reference (e.g. portrait, landscape, animal), colours (e.g. how to mix grey, or what priming 
colour would make the painting pop). The availability of these options is conditional to the 
budget that Project Ability can spend on professional-quality art materials.  
The generosity and variety of materials at Project Ability does not go unnoticed by 
attendants. I asked Helen, artist and part-time support worker, what she thought about the 
other art workshop Anthony – a participant that she supports – attended. “I don’t want to say 
anything negative about the other art group,” she said, “but I don’t find that the other place 
gives him the opportunity to try different things.” Helen explained, “Staff at the other art 
group are quite happy to leave him alone with his picture and his pencils. They seem to think, 
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‘This is what Anthony does, and we’re not going to change it, or ask him to try anything else’. 
He seems quite happy about it, but I think it would be good if he was challenged to try 
something new.” 
 Helen continued, “Project Ability got so much more different materials, and the 
possibility to try new things. They have glass making they have got kiln they have got a 
printing press, they have everything and the staff know exactly how to use it all. The other art 
workshop gives Anthony crayons, and they are happy to leave him to it. I don’t think that is 
good.” Helen’s description of the way the other art workshop approaches Anthony’s artistic 
choices reflects a liberal understanding of choice, i.e. no one interferes with Anthony making 
pencil drawings every single week. However, it is not choice, understood as a capability that 
requires positive intervention: leaving Anthony to his devices does not help him improve his 
creative capacity, develop his preferences, and thereby, in the long run, expand his artistic 
choices. Project Ability offers the latter kind of choice: not only are there numerous 
possibilities for materials and techniques, but also professional tutoring to help participants 
grow as artists.  
Given the broad range of options for creative activities, I asked tutors Rory and Joanna 
how they helped participants decide what they wanted to do at the workshop. “Choice is a 
moment-by-moment thing,” Rory told me. He emphasised that although choice was an 
important part of people’s work, there was no prescription on how people made choices, so it 
was important for tutors to be flexible. He brought up the example of a participant who just 
wanted Rory to tell him what to do. “He wanted instructions, and then carry them out really 
well,” Rory said, “And at first I thought, that was not how we did things here. It took me a 
while to understand this.”  
Joanna jumped in. “But then some people tend to be stuck on certain things, especially 
if they get a compliment on it. It then becomes ‘their thing’”, she said. “Remember the 
dolphins?” Rory gave her a knowing look. Joanna told me that one participant would only 
make dolphin-related art for years. “And after a year, you think, not another dolphin,” Rory 
laughed. 
Rory’s and Joanna’s accounts exemplify participants whose preferences do not quite fit 
with conventional understandings of choice, but could be construed as one nonetheless: 
participants wanting someone to tell them what to do, or doing the same thing despite the 
range of available options. But Rory and Joanna were not satisfied with simply giving 
participants instructions or leaving them to do the same thing for years. Doing so does not 
cultivate participants’ capacity for (artistic) preferences; it is not different from allowing 
participants to have a milkshake as a form of choice instead of supporting them to make larger 
decisions about where they want to live.  
For one, leaving participants to do what they say they wanted to do can impede their 
enjoyment of artmaking. As Joanna explained, “There’s a trajectory. The sensory pleasure 
people derive from certain types of art making can turn laborious.” She drew a bell-shaped 
curve in the air with her finger. A painter by training, Joanna always had an air of academic 
eloquence around her, accentuated by thick framed glasses, perfectly applied lipstick, and 
well-tailored clothes. “To keep people in the pleasant zone of art-making,” Joanna pointed at 
the left side of the imaginary curve, “we try to get people to do new things when their 
enthusiasm goes down, but without pushing them out of their comfort zone.”  
Helping participants trying out new things is thus seen as crucial to maintaining the joy 
of artmaking. However, the changes need to be introduced in incremental steps, especially 
when supporting participants on the autistic spectrum for whom diversion from their routine 
can be a source of anxiety. Helen, Anthony’s support worker explained, “Anthony doesn’t 
like change. If there is change, it has to be with warning of maybe months to work up to it.” 
Yet, Helen said that Anthony needed a challenge from time to time, otherwise he would get 
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bored. I asked her about the kind of changes she introduced to their schedule. “Just small 
things, I guess,” she said. “When I started supporting him, he was just baking simple things 
like muffins and fairy cakes. Every week the same the cake. But now we have got quite a few 
more recipe books, so we’re quite ambitious. Now we do quite complicated things, like Great 
British Bake-Off type of cakes,” referring to a television baking competition, known for its 
elaborate and extravagant cake designs. 
In the art workshop, changes can be as small as using a different kind of paint and 
paper, or drawing while standing up instead of sitting down. As tutor Joanna touched upon, 
different techniques have a different sensory nature. For instance, acrylic paint has a different 
tactile sensation than gouache because the former is thicker than the latter. Switching art 
material changes the rhythm of the art making: whereas colouring with felt tip pens require 
small repetitive movements, pastels allow participants to work with faster and broader 
strokes. Finally, standing up readjusts participants’ focus from small details to the whole 
picture. 
Dhillon exemplifies how a small change introduced the material ripples through his 
whole artmaking practice. Dhillon, a 48-year-old, Indian-Scottish man, is a prolific painter. 
He is tall, soft-spoken, gentle, and a gregarious person. His brushwork is confident, bold, and 
tends to get rougher as the workshop draws closer to an end. I sat next to Dhillon, watching 
tutor Joanna quietly observing him scraping the A1 sized canvas with a brush he held with his 
fist. Joanna must have interpreted the way Dhillon handled the brush as slight agitation, and 
she thus decided to suggest Dhillon switched technique. She approached him with a pack of 
Staedtler fine liners – a generous donation from Margaret to the studio – and a stack of 
postcard-sized white cardboard paper. She showed Dhillon the fine markers, and asked him if 
he wanted to try them. She told him that they would make really nice “tiny drawings”. 
Dhillon hesitated. Joanna put the pens and papers on his desk, and left to attend to someone 
else. Dhillon contemplated for a few minutes. He then picked up the fine liners and continued 
with those for the last half an hour of the workshop. 
 
 
Doing something new can be as incremental as that: going from a big scale painting to a 
small drawing. This is not only a matter of switching technique. It is also the readjustment of 
the whole body: posture, sensations, and attention. The size of the paper makes the hand 
movements narrower. The light pens change the pressure applied to the drawing. In contrast 
On the left: Dhillon’s painting, acrylic on canvas. On the right: Dhillon’s drawing, ink on paper. 
Photos by TTP. 
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to the smooth sensation of layering thick acrylic on paper, fine felt tips pick up the smallest 
unevenness of the surface texture. Attention is also readjusted, going from broader overall 
impressions to smaller details. There is a distinctive difference between Dhillon’s artwork, 
once he changed from thick paint brushes to thin pens. While his personality radiates through 
both, the one he made with thin pens demonstrate fine attention to detail as opposed to the 
bold impressionism. 
Supporting participant engagement in novel artmaking techniques takes attention, 
patience, and sensitivity from the tutors. As I discussed: suggesting a technique that is out of 
the participants’ comfort zone may cause them anxiety and impede on their enjoyment. 
Take the following example of tutor Eilidh helping participant James. 
James was picking dried paint as usual, when Eilidh sat down next to him with a piece 
of laminated cardboard and a picture of elephants. I did not catch what she said to him, but 
after a few minutes, James put away the palettes, and with the same scalpel in hand, started 
scraping the cardboard. He was etching a plate for drypoint print. 
Drypoint etching is a printmaking technique, where a needle is used to make engravings 
into a plate. This plate could be plexiglass, or cardboard for a low-budget alternative. The 
plate then needs to be rubbed with thick printmaking ink or oil paint, making sure that the 
engravings are thoroughly covered, but that the rest of the plate is otherwise clean. The plate 
is then pressed against prepped, usually soaked heavyweight paper. The pressure from the 
pressing will transfer the ink from the plate onto the paper. The same plate can produce 
several prints. 
Eilidh checked on James about an hour later. She held James’s plate against the sun, 
checking the incisions to make sure they were deep enough and that the printmaking ink 
sufficiently covered the figures. It was a picture of a mother and a baby elephant. The baby 
elephant missed an eye – James had scraped it off. Eilidh took a piece of the cardboard and 
cut a small circle. “Does he have an eye?” She asked James. “Where does his eye go?” James 
pointed at the plate. Eilidh glued the circle to where James pointed, and then they went off to 
the print station. 
 
 
Eilidh later explained to me that James seemed to enjoy drypoint etching because it was 
a sensation similar to picking paint. The glazing, she said, must have been frustrating for him 
because of all the dripping paint. James’s go-to art technique is felt tip on paper. One of his 
exhibited drawings of a swimming pool was of A0 size (841 x 1189 mm) – all covered with 
thin felt tip markers. Eilidh said that the original reference picture was of divers lining up at a 
On the left: A palette, scraped clean by James. On the right: James’s drawing of a swimming 




board. The silhouettes would go well with James’s style, Eilidh had thought. But instead, 
what he decided to focus on was one corner of the pool.  
Eilidh noticed the singular attention James paid to minute details and the meticulous, 
repetitive movements underlay most of James’s activities in the workshop: picking paint, 
drypoint etching, and colouring with thin felt tip pens. She surmised that James would enjoy 
artmaking techniques that demonstrate similar sensoriality, i.e. small, repetitive, focused 
movements. I noticed that James would paint, if he had paint and canvas set up in front of 
him. However, on those occasions, he would spend less time making art, and more time 
picking dried paint. At the end of my fieldwork, the tutors would sometimes set up his work 
station such that he would draw standing up. Using soft pastels on paper still shared some of 
the sensory experiences akin to scraping, but it changed James’s posture, and the size of paper 






I cited these examples in search for an answer to Margaret’s initial question, namely 
how a wheelchair user comes to learn that they like dancing? By the same logic, one could 
similarly ask, how do participants at the workshop know that they like drypoint etching? Or 
that they prefer acrylic to felt pens? Or that they prefer animal portraits to landscapes?  
 On the surface, the answer appears deceptively simple: it is by engaging in new 
activities and trying out new things. However, if the ethnographic examples should illustrate 
one thing, it is that there is nothing trivial about supporting people with learning disabilities to 
explore new forms of artmaking and develop their preferences accordingly. As I have 
emphasised throughout, it is because understanding choice as a capability that requires 
affirmative measures stands in contrast with the dominant, liberal conceptualisation of choice 
as a negative freedom. 
Framing choice as a positive freedom foregrounds the extensive material, personal, and 
institutional provisions that enable it. Project Ability has the budget to provide participants 
with diverse and high quality facilities and art materials; that is not the case with many service 
programmes. More importantly, Project Ability provides professional tutors who have 
extensive knowledge and experience of visual art, thus can provide guidance to build creative 
capacity at all levels. Secondly, effective support demands that the people working with 
participants infer preferences without relying on participants’ capacity for verbal self-
expression. The tutors attend to participants’ sensorial preferences and extrapolate 
participants’ likes, suggest artistic activities accordingly, and adjust their suggestions if the 
participants do not seem to be engaged by the initial activity.  
Lesley, the director used the term “art literacy” to refer to the capacity to have aesthetic 
and sensory preferences for particular artistic techniques, colours, textures, and style. Art 
literacy is central to artistic choice: it enables participants to become aware of, understand, 
and imagine different options for artistic activities. All this is conditional to supporting 
participants’ capacity to choose. Without trying out new activities, participants may continue 
to rely on others to make choices for them, or they may stick with the same option they know; 
neither of which helps participants to make choices to the best of their capacity.  
 
 
Art literacy: developing the capacity to choose 
 
Here is an example of how art literacy contributes to one’s choice-making capacities. 
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For two months, once a week I accompanied tutor Rory and participant Joshua – an 
internationally exhibited artist and comic-book aficionado – on their outreach programme to a 
community centre in Dundee, a city located two-and-a-half-hour drive from Glasgow. Project 
Ability received funding to send a pair of tutors and participants from the Friday group to 
deliver art workshops for groups of people with learning disabilities who did not have local 
access to art-making facilities locally. Unlike participants of the Glasgow workshops, many of 
whom had been making art with Project Ability for years, attendants of the outreach 
programme had few opportunities to engage in art-making; hence, they did not have the high 
levels of art literacy compared to their Glaswegian counterparts. Over the course of the 
outreach programme, I observed how the participants in Dundee were supported to expand 
their artistic vocabulary, which then enabled them to make artistic choices by the end of the 
eighth week.  
The community centre is situated in the outskirts of Dundee. As opposed to the bustle of 
the art galleries in the district of Glasgow where Project Ability is located, the Dundee 
community centre is wrapped in the concrete sea of a car park, mountains of high rises in the 
background, and 1960s-style suburban houses. The room we were allocated in the community 
centre was light and spacious. Unlike Glasgow’s purpose-built studio, this space was not 
made for art-making. To begin with, there was no sink in the proximity, which complicated 
the logistics of painting or clay work. Since the room was also used for other purposes, we 
had to be mindful of cleaning up the stains left by the paint and clay.  
The centre had a limited range of art materials: mostly crayon, print paper, colour 
pencils, and some small tubes of acrylic paint. Therefore, each time we drove to Dundee, we 
also brought three boxes of materials from the Glasgow studio, including bricks of raw clay 
weighing around 20 kg each. Each week, Rory and Joshua demonstrated a new technique 
participant could try. (If someone had an idea they were set on, there was space for them to do 
that too. For instance, one participant spent eight weeks painting a chair.) 
Blair is a young woman with long blonde hair and an eyebrow piercing. As one of the 
participants, Blair had been working on the same art piece over the past four weeks, 
incorporating the novel techniques each week as the workshops progressed. What started out 
as a demo drawing of an anchor on tracing paper was then followed by acrylic sgraffito 
motifs, ink background, freehand starfish, block printed fish and stencil printed fish scales.  
The sgraffito workshop took place in week three, and it was Joshua’s idea. He said that 
he was inspired by “this crazy guy” whom Joshua described as a Bob Ross3-like YouTube 
artist who painted by flailing knives around. Sgraffito, on a basic level, does not require more 
than two colours of acrylic paint and some pointy sticks – we used hardwood tools for clay 
modelling. Joshua explained to the participants that it was best to pair complementary 
colours, as they would make the artwork “pop”. Rory quickly demonstrated the process. The 
first layer of paint serves as a primer. Once that dries, the second colour goes on top of that. 
While the second coat of paint is wet, one can scrape figures into it – the figures will reveal 
the colour of the first coat of paint.  
Joshua gave each participant a piece of paper on which they could experiment with 
colour combinations and various tools. Blair chose a burgundy for a base coat and a cobalt 
and ultramarine blue second. However, her scraped figures did not quite show up the way she 
expected them to. “It’s not working,” she said, handing me back the clay tools with 
frustration. Joshua suggested she tried lighter colours with a thicker layer of paint. “Just slap 
it on,” he smiled when Blair hesitated. “Yeah, that’s it!” The thicker the second layer was, the 
slower it dried, leaving more time for scraping in motives.  
 
 
3 A painter who hosted a popular art instruction television show in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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The yellow-ochre-burgundy colour combination inspired the colours of Blair’s anchor. 
The motifs created with a plastic fork reminiscent of waves seemed to suit the theme. 
Although she was tentative at the beginning, by the penultimate workshop, Blair had a clear 
idea of what she wanted for the last session: a starfish and a yellow fish with a golden eye, all 
under the anchor. 
Over the course of the eight-week programme, Blair’s short experiments with different 
techniques helped her explore some of her preferences for colour, motifs, and textures. Each 
new technique broadened her field of possibilities. By the end of the programme, she was able 
to make choices about the subject of her painting, the techniques she wanted to utilise, the 
combination of colours that she found striking. Lesley described the trajectory that Blair 
underwent as a process of acquiring not only a cognitive understanding of art but also an 
intuition regarding various aspects of artmaking, like colour combinations that looked 
striking, or materials that worked well together. The process also comprised a confidence with 
which participants made art without being hindered by the fear of making “mistakes”.  
Blair’s example highlights a few themes I discussed previously: the material conditions 
of choice-making (facilities and materials), the importance of trying out new things, the 
process of becoming acquainted with the sensoriality of art techniques. A new theme that this 
episode illustrates is this: all this takes time. Rory noted that a challenge of these outreach 
programmes working within the time constraint. At the beginning, everyone tends to do the 
same thing to get acquainted with different techniques. It is only towards the end of the eight 
weeks that most participants acquire art literacy and confidence to make their own choices – 
and by that time, the programme is over. At the end of the Dundee outreach, Rory took note 
of the fact that all participants were working on different things; to him, this was an 
achievement because it meant that everyone developed some basic preferences. 
The Glasgow workshops are fortunate in that they do not have to work with such time 
constraints. “We measure things in years, years and years.” Lesley told me. “We do see 
changes in people over the years, you know, some people will not be obviously engaging. 
And then three years later you realise that they’ve actually started choosing their colours, they 
have shown preference for different materials,” she said. “It’s the mechanism by which 
On the left: Blair’s trial sheet of sgraffito, acrylic on paper. On the right: Blair’s anchor, mixed 
media on paper. Photo by TTP. 
 
 77 
people can start making decisions about things. And it can take a lot of time for people to 





In this chapter, I examined the ways in which participants at Project Ability are 
supported to make choices. By analysing ethnographic examples of people making art, I 
argued that the art workshops provided an approach to choice that differed from choice as 
understood by social policy and service provision; one that better explains what choice means 
for people like James, Kenny, or Blair.  
As I discussed, the concept of choice in social policy and service provision aligns with 
the ideals of liberal citizenship, which assumes individuals are equal, rational, and fully 
capable of exercising choice-making if they are granted freedom from interference to do so. 
Choice-making, by this logic, is a product of rational deliberation, which results from 
individual’s taking into account all information on options of available services, making a 
cost-benefit analysis of said options, and deciding on the option that they see most beneficial. 
By this logic, people with learning disabilities, especially those with significant impairments, 
are often denied the capacity to make important decisions about their lives, and are only 
allowed small, tokenistic choices.  
This is apparent in the personalisation framework, which has increased the number of 
options people could pick from, but which offers little guidance on how people can be 
supported to develop the capacity to choose. It is not sufficient to state that people with 
learning disabilities have the same freedom to choose as other citizens in all areas of life (as, 
for instance, in Scottish Government, 2017: 27) because that does not take into account the 
practical difficulties posed by learning impairment. It does not outline how people with 
learning disabilities, especially those with significant impairments can go from choosing what 
they want to eat to deciding on where they want to live. Just by stating that people have the 
freedom to deliberate on these matters does not mean that they can miraculously do so, 
without further interventions. 
In the second half of this chapter, I offered a different approach to choice, one which 
does not only enable people with learning disabilities to make small decisions, but can 
provide some guidance on how those small decisions can lead to building up capacity for 
them to have a say in larger questions. In the art workshops, choice is not so much a result of 
rational deliberation, rather an embodied process of individuals exploring and developing 
their preferences by trying out new things. In this framework, people become capable of 
making choice not only by picking between options, but by actively expanding their capacity 
to choose with support and experimentation. Choice, understood so, foregrounds the need of 
positive interventions, as opposed to freedom from interference.  
I highlighted the importance of material conditions. For Project Ability, this 
encompasses the budget for facilities, materials, staff, studio space, and time. Choice also 
necessitates personal support provided by the tutors and support workers are able to attend to 
the participants’ bodily language to infer their preferences, and subsequently draw on their 
professional experience to invest time and effort into seeking out various options that the 
deem suitable for the person they support. 
Approaching choice as an embodied capacity also reframes the debate. Instead of 
entering circular discussions on whether individuals can or cannot make a choice, whether 
they have or do not have a choice, whether what they want and do constitutes a choice – 
choice-making becomes an obligation that demands a response from individuals and 
institutions alike.  
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These findings not only challenge the liberal ideals of citizenship by reiterating how 
emphasis on rational deliberation and freedom from interference excludes people with 
learning disabilities. This chapter expands this debate by, first of all, demonstrating that key 
aspects of liberal citizenship – choice, in this instance – are not out of reach for people with 
learning disabilities. The findings reiterate the centrality of choice to the citizenship of people 
with learning disabilities. Furthermore, by offering an alternative to the cognitivised, 
disembodied, and rationalistic understandings of choice through the foregrounding 
sensoriality, experimentation, and support, this chapter also contributes to understanding how 






Chapter five:  





Allowing people with learning disabilities to have choices about their lives has been 
fundamental to supporting their independence – another building block of liberal citizenship. 
Independence as a liberal virtue is apparent in the way social contract theories treat citizens 
primarily as individuals without caring duties and responsibilities who have basic freedoms to 
deliberate about their lives (Young, 1995). On paper, the right for people with learning 
disabilities to be independent is upheld by the UNCRPD (United Nations, 2006), and is 
supported by policy measures, which encourage economic self-sufficiency through 
employment, and the exercise of responsibility on various issues, such as healthcare and 
education (Redley and Weinberg, 2007). In practice, the people exercising this right is 
surrounded by social anxieties. Stephen’s case, which I will discuss throughout this chapter, 
perfectly highlights the nature of these anxieties. 
Aged 25, Stephen was one of the youngest participants at the workshops. His closely 
shaven head, steel-toe Martens boots, and black band t-shirts all accentuated his youth. 
Stephen entered each workshop with an energetic, purposeful stride. He would go straight for 
the trolley on which the materials were laid out, grab whatever he could carry in his hands, 
and walk to the far end of the studio – usually reserved for temporary specialist workshops – 
so he could be alone. Stephen’s ability and willingness to focus on one task would usually last 
about ten minutes, after which he would fetch a bulk of different materials, start something 
new, just to leave that unfinished as well. Tutor Ruby recalled taking half an hour to set up 
clay materials for Stephen, just to have him get bored after three minutes.  
Unlike most participants at the workshop, whose support was provided by private care 
organisations, Stephen was under hospital supervision. He was considered a high-risk person: 
he was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder [ADHD], schizoaffective 
disorder, depression, and mild learning disabilities. He had been in and out of the hospital in 
the past years. 
In the workshops, Stephen often struck me as reckless, impulsive, and moody. He 
would leave the spray paint machine unattended, or stack his wet paintings on top of each 
other, leaving them to stick to one another when dry. On occasion, he would place his clay on 
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top of others’ works, potentially damaging them. Stephen’s presence always left a trail of 
unfinished art that transpired an abandoned vision whose pieces never quite fit together. 
I spent much of my time at the workshop working with Stephen. I did so initially at 
tutor Ruby’s request: although she did not specify why or what she expected me to do, I 
interpreted my task as making sure that Stephen did not wreak havoc. When I spent time with 
him, Stephen would occasionally turn to me and ask me for advice, which he would consider 
for a few seconds, just to shrug it off, tell me he could not be bothered, and continue doing the 
art in what seemed to me the quickest and arguably most haphazard way.  
Midway through the last block of workshops that I attended, Stephen came 
accompanied by a young blonde woman: his occupational therapist [OT], assigned by the 
hospital. Stephen’s OT attended two other workshop sessions with him. They left halfway 
through the third one. 
Stephen never came back.  
I learnt that the hospital thought Stephen was not provided with adequate supervision at 
the studio. They were particularly concerned that Stephen was allowed to work unattended 
around knives, scissors, and other sharp objects. Thus, in order to protect Stephen’s safety, 




Supporting people with learning disabilities to be independent is one of the major 
commitments of social policy and service provision (Department of Health, 2001). Based on 
the definition of independent living, this means that all disabled people have equal rights and 
freedoms to make choices, exercise control, and participate in society – a basic principle of 
treating them as citizens (Scottish Government, 2017: 27). However, giving Stephen complete 
freedom at the workshop meant that he could disrupt other people’s work, do damage to the 
equipment, and even put himself in harm’s way, for instance, by cutting himself with sharp 
objects. Both the workshop and the hospital recognised these risks. Subsequently, they 
offered two, distinct responses to the question of how Stephen could be supported to be 
independent without risking him causing damage or getting injured.  
My aim with this chapter is to develop the ideas about independence by exploring how 
risk management in service provision simultaneously supports and hinders it. I open with a 
brief overview of the learning disability policy and academic literature on independence and 
risk, before moving on to comparing and contrasting the hospital’s and the workshops’ 
approaches to risk and independence.  
 
 
Independence in the context of responsibilisation and risk management 
 
When it comes to supporting the independence of people like Stephen, one of the major 
concerns is that it may encourage their disruptive behaviour, while making them vulnerable to 
abuse and harm. I use this section to unpack these concerns: I examine the policy discourse on 
independence, specifically in relation to individual and social responsibilities towards real and 
perceived risks around people with learning disabilities. 
Concerns about the risks surrounding people with learning disabilities contain a double 
imperative. Historically, on the one hand, they were seen as a threat to the moral fabric of 
society, documented by the elaborate measures that sought to control their reproduction, and 
to prevent them from exhibiting anti-social behaviour (Manthrope et al., 1997; Walmsley, 
2000). Simultaneously, part of the rationale behind some of the controlling interventions was 
to protect them from harm and exploitation (Walmsley and Welshman, 2006). 
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This double obligation is apparent in present policies. The protection of people with 
learning disabilities from external abuse and self-injury is a government priority (Department 
of Health and Social Care, 2000). At the same time, addressing what the contemporary 
medical literature refers to as “challenging behaviours” been an ongoing preoccupation of 
service providers. Challenging behaviours include “aggression, self-injury, destructiveness, 
overactivity, inappropriate social or sexual conduct, bizarre mannerisms and the eating of 
inappropriate objects” (Emerson and Einfeld, 2011: 1). It is important to note here that 
definitions of challenging behaviour are socially and culturally contingent, depending on 
conventions, beliefs, and expectations on what counts as appropriate and deviant conduct, and 
reflect medical staff’s ability (or inability) to interact with individuals with learning 
disabilities. However, there is a legitimate concern that challenging behaviours may lead to 
harm and self-injury (Fyson and Kitson, 2010; McClintock et al., 2003).  
Protecting people with learning disabilities from harm thus poses a conundrum for those 
advocating for their citizenship. This kind of protection is a fundamental part of ensuring that 
their human rights are respected. Yet, it can clash with the principles of independence 
(Mackay, 2017). In the previous chapter, I discussed support workers’ and family members’ 
anxieties about people with learning disabilities being exploited or neglected if they were left 
to make their own decisions. These anxieties are amplified if choices and control are 
expanded to all areas of life. Fyson and Kitson’s (2010) research sadly confirms some of these 
anxieties. They observe that in the name of independence, some people with mild learning 
disabilities are put in complete charge of their own lives, and thus becoming victims of abuse; 
on the other end, people with more significant disabilities are completely denied freedom in 
an effort to protect them from harm (Fyson and Kitson, 2010).  
Social policy has sought to address this tension between independence and protection in 
two ways. On the one hand, as I discussed in my first chapter, the personalisation framework 
introduced services and interventions that aimed to improve individuals’ self-management 
skills and encouraged them to improve their own “challenging behaviour”. There is a vast 
body of medical literature on interventions to improve social skills and reduce disruptive or 
risky conduct (NICE, 2015). These include education programmes, leisure activities, and 
support with day-to-day activities, all of which are geared towards helping individuals 
recognise and tackle their inappropriate behaviours, and improve their ability to manage their 
health, emotions, and development.  
Concurrently, systems of accountability and safeguarding practices have been put in 
place in social care services to protect individuals with learning disabilities from harm, abuse, 
and mistreatment, much of which have come from care staff in the past (Tuffrey-Wijne et al., 
2013). The history of learning disability services is full of malpractice, which did not end with 
the closure of long-stay hospitals (Department of Health and Social Security, 1969). More 
recently, a confidential inquiry found that within a two-year period between 2010-2012, 
almost half of the deaths could have been avoided, had people with learning disabilities 
received appropriate care and support. Therefore, increased staff accountability and 
discussions about safeguarding have been much welcome in light of past and ongoing cases of 
mistreatment. 
Yet, increased responsibilisation and accountability are part of a larger trend, wherein 
social obligations are shifted from states and collectives onto individuals and markets (Shore 
and Wright, 1999). As a result, health and wellbeing becomes the individual’s responsibility 
towards the self, rather than as an outcome of a complex interplay of societal factors (Rose et 
al., 2006). Problems arise when these trends amalgamate in care practices that limit 
individuals’ engagement with activities that they hold valuable in order to minimise risk, like 
in the case of Stephen. Subsequently, Fyson and Kitson (2010) observe that those who work 
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with people with learning disabilities have to face the “unanswerable” questions of how much 
independence is worth the cost of potential abuse (p. 312). 
The art workshops provide some guidance for answering this question. Project Ability 
makes a compelling case study because, on the one hand, they also operate within the 
framework of increased responsibilisation and accountability. They too have undergone 
funding cuts, as a result of which the number of participants doubled while the number of 
tutors remained the same, meaning each participant has been receiving less individual support 
and attention. Considering that the workshops hosts vulnerable adults – some of whom have 
had issues in the past with exhibiting challenging behaviour – may raise concerns. However, I 
argue that the workshops demonstrate a different approach to independence and risk than the 
one exhibited by the hospital that removed Stephen from the workshops. Therefore, by 
discussing how independence, responsibility, and risk is enacted within the workshops, I 
examine the lessons one can learn about engaging with vulnerable adults. 
 
 
Independence and responsibility without support 
 
Let us examine Stephen’s removal from the workshops from the perspective of 
responsibilisation and risk management, and see what its underlying logic says about service 
provision’s approach to the independence of people with high support needs, especially in the 
context of spending cuts in social care.  
I learnt from the Project Ability staff that Stephen had been under hospital care for a 
few months prior to being pulled out of the workshops. Consequently, Project Ability had to 
start working closely with the hospital-assigned care staff to address how Stephen’s support 
needs could be met.  
It became apparent early on that the workshops and hospital staff had different 
approaches to supporting Stephen. On the one hand, Lesley, the director openly voiced her 
concerns about the hospital staff speaking about Stephen and his needs in a heavily 
medicalised language, where everything was framed in terms of diagnoses and treatment risk. 
“What does this do to someone’s sense of self?” she asked. On the other hand, the hospital 
seemed unhappy with what they saw as a lax attitude that Project Ability demonstrated 
towards risk management. After a meeting between Lesley and hospital staff, the hospital 
decided to send an occupational therapist [OT] to the studio to accompany Stephen and 
conduct a risk assessment. 
The OT was a young woman with perfectly manicured nails and coiffed hair who 
carried a cloud of sweet perfume around her. The first time Stephen attended the workshop 
with her, they sat down in the corner of the main workshop area. This was unusual, 
considering Stephen’s preference for the empty far-end of the studio. Stephen was quiet, 
which was a stark contrast to his usual, hyperactive self. While I showed the OT how to mix a 
black colour acrylic, Stephen was staring out of the windows, looking out at a sunny 
Glasgow. 
The OT accompanied Stephen to the workshops three times. The third time I watched 
from a distance as the OT pulled tutor Ruby aside and spoke to her in a hushed tone. Then the 
OT packed up Stephen’s works, carefully rolled up and wrapped in newsprint by tutor Eilidh. 
She left the studio in a hurry, Stephen dragging himself two metres behind her.  
We all learnt that the studio had pulled Stephen out of the workshops from Lesley, who 
sent an email around in the following morning. There was a sense of grief in the air among 
the staff in response to the news because no one got to say goodbye to Stephen, and there was 
nothing that the studio could have done to appeal the hospital’s decision. In fact, Project 
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Ability was instructed to contact the hospital if Stephen still tried to show up at the 
workshops. 
Later, Lesley told me that the hospital thought the workshops were a high risk 
environment for Stephen. “It was high risk in that they couldn’t support him,” she clarified. 
“We got into a sort of tussle about that. They said we couldn’t address his needs, and we said, 
‘You’ve got to be joking, you can’t address his needs!’ In the end, there was no way they 
were going to give him the support that he needed, so it was high risk. He was put into a high 
risk situation towards himself. He was starting to really take risks, he started doing things that 
he knew he shouldn’t be doing,” Lesley summarised Stephen’s situation. 
What transpires from these events are two different, but related understandings of what 
constitutes a risk. The hospital found the workshops a high risk environment. What they 
meant by that was that the among the art materials, there were sharp objects (scissors, box 
cutters, and knives), heavy machinery (press print), and materials toxic to human ingestion 
(basically all paint materials). All these posed a potential danger of Stephen injuring himself 
or causing damage in the equipment. Lesley did not deny that the studio environment carried 
risks, but for her, the risk emanated from a lack of support Stephen received. If Stephen had a 
support worker accompany him to the workshops, there would have been a lower chance of 
him being injured by inappropriate use of equipment. Lesley suggested that the mere presence 
of a support worker would have made Stephen less likely to do something that could 
potentially hurt him. Yet, it was clear from the beginning that the hospital could not provide 
Stephen with a support worker because he did not qualify for the level of support bracket that 




The tutors and the support workers often raised concerns about not having the time and 
resources to provide adequate support for the participants. A reason many of them mentioned 
was the increase in their workload. Like the staff at Project Ability, many support workers felt 
that while the number of their clients increased, the number of staff did not. Subsequently, 
individual support workers became responsible for an increasing number of clients, while the 
length of time they could spend with each client grew shorter. At the studio, some participants 
shared a support worker with one or two other people. On top of that, support workers often 
spoke about the intensification and increased precarity of their work: their complaints about 
the long, unsociable, unpaid hours of work, low wages, endless paperwork, and little training, 
reflecting the general experiences of support workers in the UK (Cunningham and James, 
2014).  
These experiences speak to the two trends in social care provision I discussed earlier: an 
increased shift from social to individual accountability, and the responsibilisation of care built 
into the personalisation framework. Social care provision has been undergoing this shift from 
the early 1990s, when services were privatised in order to improve the competitiveness, 
efficiency, and accountability under the new public management agenda (Baines and 
Cunningham, 2015). New bureaucratic procedures were introduced: afterwards, support 
workers were expected to account for every single minute of their time on support, including 
all the activities, the money spent, the medication dispensed, the appointments made.  
Increased individual accountability and responsibility, coupled with the underfunding of 
support work can produce unsettling care practices: Kenny’s example clearly demonstrates 
this. Kenny, whom I have written about in previous chapters, is a quiet and tall man with 
significant learning disabilities and autism. I learnt from Connor, Kenny’s support worker that 
although Kenny lived in supported accommodation, there was no one staying with him 
overnight. Instead, Kenny’s support organisation equipped Kenny’s flat with a camera that 
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watched his stairwell and his front door, and his garden with a geofence. In addition, Kenny 
wore an electronic tag with a GPS tracker. This meant that the staff knew at all times whether 
Kenny is in his flat. 
“It’s sold as his independence has been improved, because he’s spending time on his 
own,” Connor said, “But never once have they ever asked him. I have asked him, ‘Would you 
prefer me to go home, or to stay?’. And he said he would prefer me to stay because he likes 
company.” 
Kenny’s overnight support (or the lack thereof) operates on the same logic as Stephen’s 
removal from the workshops. Kenny is considered to be vulnerable to harm and injury if left 
unattended. Because Kenny requires help with navigating the streets safely, one of the biggest 
concerns is that he would – for some reason – leave his flat unaccompanied. There are two 
potential solutions to this problem: either pay for a support worker to stay with Kenny 
overnight, or put a technology-assisted surveillance system in place. From what Connor said, 
Kenny preferred a person staying with him because he liked company, and he got along well 
with his support workers. However, Kenny’s support organisation opted for the surveillance 
system, which was arguably a more cost-effective solution.  
Although this likely contributed to Kenny’s experiences of isolation and loneliness, as 
well as to the devaluing of the care relationship he had with his support workers, it was 
portrayed by the care organisation as enabling Kenny’s “independence”. The extent to which 
this decision fit with the independent living agenda is questionable: Kenny was never offered 
choice and control over how he preferred his safety was ensured. Instead, his independence 
was framed as him being on his own, without taking into account his preferences and 
wellbeing. All this demonstrates that ideals of independence and responsibility are coupled 
with a lack of support, the impetus to minimise risk to the individual leads to care practices 





Ideals of independence and responsibility are not just top-down processes that 
policymakers “force” onto people with learning disabilities and their care providers; they 
were introduced at the demand of the disabled peoples’ organisation to begin with. Although 
a recent study with representatives of these organisations expressed a sense of frustration and 
loss of ownership because they were not adequately consulted in the development of the 
related policies (Pearson et al., 2020), many of the support workers and participants I met 
continued to endorse them. 
Participant Anna, a woman in her late thirties with long black hair, made her goals very 
clear to me, as I was helping her to set up the projector, so she could trace the outlines of a 
photo of a tiger. Anna was new at the workshops. She told me that her support worker had 
signed her up so that she could spend time with people.  
“I need to talk to people if I want a job,” Anna said. 
“And do you want to have a job?” I asked her. 
“Yes, of course,” she replied. 
Before joining the workshops, Anna had worked in several in charity shops as a 
volunteer. She had been offered to work at the tills, but she had to decline because she was 
“bad with numbers”. She was not sure what paid employment opportunities were there for 
her, if any, but she knew that having voluntary work experience and social skills were 
essential – or so she was told by her support worker.  
“What’s your dream job?” I asked her. 
“Pottery, or something creative,” she said after some thought. 
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Anna was not sure if she was coming to be back for another series of workshops. She 
told me that one of her acquaintances was trying to get her an unpaid position at a shop, 
which would change her schedule and available support hours. She told me that she would not 
be able to work a full time job anyway because any extra income would interfere with the 
financial support she received. Nonetheless, Anna tried to rely on her support workers as little 
as possible. She was proud of being able to travel to the workshops independently. “I told my 
support I didn’t need her,” she told me.  
I spent much time with Anna during the block of workshops she attended. She 
continued working on her tiger drawing. We also made a lavender glazed pot, which was fired 
in the kiln after the block had ended. The pot came out of the kiln in an excellent condition: a 
finely detailed work with a smooth and well-saturated layer of glaze. Anna never came back 
to pick it up – I gathered, she was offered that volunteer position she told me about. 
Initially, I was puzzled by Anna’s aspirations. I thought that the workshops offered her 
free materials and professional help with pursuing her self-professed passion, pottery. Yet, 
Anna was ready to prioritise an unpaid, menial job because it propelled her sense of 
independence. Similar to Anna, some of those with mild learning disabilities had experiences 
of unpaid employment. These work placements usually ranged from helping out in charity 
shops, to making tea at food banks, to stacking shelves in the supermarket.   
These participants were aware that they were not being paid for their work. Some also 
had little illusion of what they could do. “These are the only jobs that I can really do, packing 
up shelves,” participant Colin said while smoothing the edges of his clay gargoyle with his 
thumb. His half-moon glasses slipped down to the tip of his nose. “I’m no good at computer 
works. If push came to shove, well, packing shelves is the only job I can do. And sweeping 
the roads.” Colin paused to check on his clay figure he had been commissioned by the studio. 
His artworks were among the best selling items in the shop. Indeed, Colin was well-known 
among the Glaswegian art scene as well as learning disability scholars. The staff at the 
workshops all thought, had Colin been given appropriate support, he could have gone to art 
school.  
What I aimed to highlight with Anna’s and Colin’s example is that ideals of 
independence and responsibility are not forcefully imposed on people. The drive to gain 
employment, social skills, and independence are not simply levied onto participants at the 
workshop. Quite the contrary, they are constitutive of participants’ desires, as they are 
endorsed, internalised, and inhabited through the everyday activities (Rose, 2001; Rose et al., 
2006). But again, it bears repeating that without support, participants are left to pursue these 
aspirations through unpaid menial jobs that are not necessarily fulfilling, instead of spending 




So far, I have discussed the idea of independence in relation to the impetus to protect 
individuals with learning disabilities from harm and exploitation, especially when service 
provision is strapped of resources, yet are made responsible for participants’ safety. I 
demonstrated that without adequate funding for personal support, supporting people’s 
independence while simultaneously minimising risks around them often meant that they were 
denied engagement with people an in activities they found valuable. Although policies around 
independent living caused disillusionment among many of their early proponents, these ideals 
continued to shape their aspirations many people with learning disabilities. 
In the upcoming section, I will contrast this framing of independence with the 
workshops’ approach to independence. I discuss how Project Ability strikes the balance 




Independence and the obligation to engage 
 
Recall Stephen, whom the hospital withdrew from the workshop because it perceived 
the studio to be a high risk environment for him. I will now examine how support can 
minimise the risks of harm and injury while simultaneously enabling his engagement with his 
environment. I will further the expand on this approach by examining how framing 
independence and risk as an obligation to engage manifests in the studio environment. 
The first time I worked with Stephen, he wanted to redecorate an old wall clock he got 
from a charity shop. He had already asked Luke, the receptionist, to print him a round Costa 
Café logo to use as the new face of the clock. When I sat down next to Stephen, he handed me 
a small scalpel, and asked me to remove the old face – thin paper glued onto plastic – so he 
could reuse it.  
I was just getting started with peeling off the paper with the scalpel when Stephen 
snatched it out of my hands. His hands shook from impatience as he jammed the scalpel 
underneath the paper. “No, no, no, don’t do that,” I said to him in a rush of panic. I tried to 
suggest that he held the scalpel closer to plastic surface and work his way from the outside in. 
He shrugged me off. I watched as the paper face shred to pieces under Stephen’s scalpel.  
Stephen looked at the shreds in front of him for a couple of seconds, as if to evaluate 
whether any of it was salvageable. He seemed to have decided that it was not, as he brushed 
the shreds aside, stood up, and headed towards the clay room. By the time I caught up with 
him, he had already rolled out the clay: he was going to make a clock. I pointed out that the 
clay was too thick, which meant that it ran the risk of splitting when fired. Stephen did not let 
me finish the sentence. He waved in dismissal, and told me it was fine. He then proceeded to 
scrape out the clay from the centre of the plate to fit in a square plastic dial he took out from a 
charity shop clock. Instead of measuring the size of dial and calculating the potential 
shrinkage of the clay, Stephen drew a square shape that resembled a tired trapezoid. 
Exhausted from following Stephen around, I was not quite sure how to convey these 
complications to him. “Just, hold on a minute,” I said, trying to make him slow down, so I 
could catch up with his pace. 
That was when Bruce, the studio technician entered the clay room. Bruce, a tall lean 
man in his 40s, always carried an air of quiet sternness around him that felt daunting for most 
volunteers, but did not seem to register with the participants. Bruce noticed that Stephen was 
working with clay, and sat down next to him. He pointed at the square hole Stephen scraped 
out, and said that it would shrink in the kiln. Stephen considered it for a moment, and then 
asked Bruce what he could do about it. Bruce pulled out a ruler, and explained the proportions 
to Stephen while measuring the dial and outlining the space it needed. He then gave Stephen 
an encouraging smile, stood up, and walked out of the room, leaving Stephen to work on it at 
his own pace. 
The difference between the way Bruce and I supported Stephen was that, unlike Bruce, 
I saw Stephen’s haphazard behaviour as a risk, and my first instinct was to focus on telling 
him what not to do in order to minimise potential damage to the artwork and material. Bruce, 
on the other hand, engaged with the artwork by giving Stephen suggestions that encouraged 
rather than further suppressed his artmaking. Whereas my attempt to help Stephen resulted in 
me trying to prevent him from certain actions and behaviours, Bruce’s approach encouraged 
Stephen’s engagement with the material. 
As someone who has had his behaviour restrained and suppressed in hospital care, 
Stephen would sometimes misread the tutors offering him help as an attempt to control him. 
Later that day, tutor Eilidh said that she had had a minor fall out with Stephen who had tried 
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to use the print station alone, and was told off by Bruce, the technician. Apparently, when 
Eilidh raised the issue of using the print station unattended with Stephen, he snapped at her, 
saying that Bruce had already scolded him, and that he did not need Eilidh to do the same. 
However, Eilidh was not concerned about him doing damage to the equipment. Her concern 
was that he might use the wrong paint and his picture would not come out right. “I told him 
that he should have just come and get me and I would have come and helped him,” she said. 
“Maybe we should tell Stephen to work in the main studio space,” Eilidh said to tutor Ruby, 
who just shook her head at the suggestion: they had done it many times, and he had never 
listened. “Yeah, but it’s kind of our responsibility to know where he’s at and what he’s 
doing,” Eilidh replied.  
Approaching participants in ways that encourages them to engage with the environment 
does not eliminate risks, nor am I suggesting that it erases potentially disruptive behaviour. 
One may catch a particularly gruesome reminder of that by glancing at older participants’ 
missing fingertips, which they lost during the time they stayed at long-stay hospitals where 
they worked with hacksaws, knives, and axes without support. Although no one has lost a 
limb in the studio, some participants acted in ways that would be considered disruptive 
outside the workshop. For instance, some disperse their energy by running up and down the 
studio space. Some find it hard to sit in one place for two hours, and may wander off and out 
of sight of their support workers. The workshop staff emphasised that it was important to 
provide the space and freedom for participants where they can do that, as a way to 
counterbalance other areas of life where participants were being constantly told what they 
could not do.  
However, things happen, especially when the workshop is busy and the tutors’ attention 
is spread thin. For example, on one occasion, participant Gregor left the building without 
anyone realising. Although the door to the studio requires the receptionist to buzz people in 
and out, and everyone is required to sign a registry, it may be difficult to keep track of it when 
there are a lot of people entering and leaving at the same time. 
Gregor is a mild-mannered, elderly participant. On the day of the incident, to give 
Gregor space, his support worker decided to wait for him in the tearoom and to leave him to 
work alone at the desk – a decision that the tutors supported. It was an unusually hectic day at 
the workshop – meaning that there were a lot of participants with high support needs who 
demanded the tutors’ assistance and attention – and the staff only noticed Gregor’s absence at 
the end of the workshop. That participants are not always at their desk is normal – people are 
free to wander around the studio floor. Gregor’s coat was still hanging on his chair, which 
probably led the tutors to think that he was still in the room. 
The anxiety among staff members and support workers grew steadily as they searched 
the floor and the building for Gregor. Eventually, the building security was notified: the 
CCTV footage showed Gregor leaving the building and heading towards the central train 
station, from where he usually took the train home. Since he left his wallet in the studio, he 
was not going to be able to get too far, and indeed, it was on his usual platform where the 
support worker caught up with him. After the incident, Gregor did not attend the workshops 
for several months: his care provider decided to pause his attendance, due to the shock Gregor 
had experienced. 
This incident illustrates the difficult dilemma of whether to prioritise participants’ safety 
with close surveillance, or grant them freedom and accept an element of risk. Because the 
tutors had to attend to multiple participants at once, they could not pay constant attention to 
Gregor’s whereabouts. One way of ensuring Gregor’s safety would have been for the support 
worker to sit next to Gregor during the workshop. Note that the support worker’s presence 
would have only served to keep an eye on Gregor, not to assist him in making art, as Gregor 
usually worked independently. Both the support worker and the tutors felt that having 
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someone watch over Gregor would have made him feel restricted; all parties felt that Gregor 
would have appreciated some space. The tutors decided to take the risk and allow Gregor to 
fully enjoy his time at the workshop, which marks the difference between the workshop’s 
attitude to risk, as opposed to a hospital’s or a care organisation’s approach, which I discussed 
in the first half of this chapter. It was fortunate that Gregor did not get hurt; sadly, however, 
the incident resulted in Gregor not being able to attend the workshops. The ideal solution 
would have been addressing the staffing shortage at the workshops. The actual solution was 
withdrawing Gregor’s attendance and denying him engagement with the activities he liked. 
The workshop’s approach to allowing participants’ space is evident in the way they let 
participants use art materials. More minor incidents occur on a more regular basis, most of 
them art-related, such as participants spilling paint, breaking a needle in the sewing machine, 
breaking brushes, and generally, damaging various tools and equipment. In particular, pens do 
not have a long life expectancy in the workshops – the staff’s reaction is that these materials 
are there to be used. 
Lesley, the director made it clear to me that the studio was not going to change its 
approach to risk. “People are not stupid. They are not going to do stupid things,” she said, 
implying that accepting an element of risk was part of treating participants as capable human 
beings. “We are fully aware that things do happen, but you cannot control everything, and I 
think there’s an expectation that there will be paint, and there will be materials,” she 
continued. We watched Dermott, an elderly participant slap paint over a collage that was 
made out of so many layers of crunched up paper that it resembled a statue more than a 
painting.  
“We have not had anybody eat paint for years,” Lesley said eventually. “It has been a 




So far, I examined the workshop’s approach to independence, and argued that the staff 
preferred to take on an element of risk and allow participants to engage with their 
environment as freely as possible. I argued that because of staff shortages, it was not always 
possible to provide participant with the support necessary to minimise risk. In the following 
section, I will describe what promoting someone’s independence and managing risk looks like 
if there is adequate support.  
The subsequent episode occurred during the annual festival of the Highlands Games, 
which I attended with participant Colin and tutor Ruby. Colin is a man in his early fifties who 
has grey but lush curly hair, and attends the Friday workshops. Colin has mild learning 
disabilities: he can travel alone, but only if he is familiar with the route. Project Ability 
arranged for Colin to visit Ruby’s studio, which was located in a coastal town in the West of 
Scotland. Their art collaboration happened to coincide with the Highland Games, which took 
place next to Ruby’s town. The Games are essentially a festival celebrating everything 
associated with the Scottish and Celtic heritage: it is a day filled with the most unapologetic 
indulgence in tartan, bagpipes, haggis, Highland dance, continuous daytime alcohol 
consumption, and a game in which Scottish people compete at throwing a variety of things, 
including a six metres long caber weighing 80 kilograms.  
I was greeted by Colin and Ruby’s husband, Malcolm at the end of my two-and-a-half-
hour journey from Glasgow. Colin was out of his general painting gear and high-visibility 
vest I was used to seeing him in the studio: this time he seemed to melt into the crowd with 
his suspenders, tweed trousers, and bushy hair and beard. The main street of an otherwise 
quiet fishing village was bustling with the carnival crowd. While Colin seemed exuberant 
walking down the sunny main street, proudly wearing banners of the Scottish St. Andrews’ 
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Cross, Malcolm, a generally laid-back jazz musician who sported a flat cap and a goatee, 
seemed tense. He explained to me that tutor Ruby was going to join later, and until then, he 
was responsible to keep an eye on Colin. Malcolm’s concern was that Colin could not read, 
write, and was so averse to technology that he did not own a mobile phone – this meant that if 
Colin got lost, it would have been very difficult to find him. Although Malcolm did not tell 
Colin to not wander off, neither did he encourage Colin to go and explore. 
Malcolm only relaxed once we set camp on the grass and tutor Ruby joined us. Ruby 
was not particularly fazed by the crowd. “Colin must be loving this,” she whispered to me, 
and handed him her tablet – an expensive piece of technology – so he could go around and 
take pictures that could serve as inspiration for their artistic collaboration. Before setting 
Colin loose, Ruby explained to him how to use the tablet to contact her, and she also showed 
him all landmarks by which he could orient himself and find his way back to our location: 
opposite the Highland dance stage, behind the tent with the home baked cakes, left of the food 
trucks, right next to the green family tent. Colin took in Ruby’s words and took off. 
The way Ruby approached Colin’s activities reveals an ethics of engagement that 
enabled Colin to explore the Highland Games, without a phone or a map, amidst a large 
crowd. Instead of deciding on whether an activity was too risky for Colin to engage in or not, 
Ruby asked, what support did Colin need to enable his free interactions with his environment? 
This approach requires time, attention, trust, and resources. Ruby could do this at the 
Highland Games because she did not have other participants to attend to and could solely 
focus on helping Colin orient himself. She also had the material resources to provide him with 
a piece of technology he could use to contact her. Ultimately, she treated Colin as an 
individual who had the capacity to understand and follow her instructions. Of course, there 
was an element of risk in her approach: Colin could have lost the tablet, or he could have got 
lost in the crowd. Ruby did not eliminate these risks, but minimised them in ways that 
encouraged Colin’s engagement and provided him support. 
It was a productive approach: it enabled Colin to experience the Games, exercise 
independence, follow his interests, which then generated further engagement with artmaking. 
The Highland Games inspired Colin to paint a series of prints for coasters and plates, using 




The tutors’ obligation to engage with participants does not equate with saying yes to 
everything. In the workshops, this means facilitating participants’ desires, and negotiate a way 
in which these desires can be carried out to the highest technical and aesthetic standards given 
the practical constraint, may that be the participants’ physical capabilities, enjoyment, safety, 
and available materials. Sometimes it entails saying no to some ideas and finding alternatives. 
This can be a particular kind of challenge when working with someone like Stephen, whose 
has a short attention span and can be highly impulsive.  
Here is an example of tutor Joanna negotiating with Stephen.  
Stephen was rummaging through a box looking for a grey acrylic, flinging tubes of 
paint he did not need onto his desk. I suggested he mixed the grey paint instead of using one 
straight from the tube, but he did not pay attention to me. I felt a sense of relief when Joanna – 
a painter by training – walked up to Stephen and made the same suggestion. Some blue, 
brown, red would make the grey more interesting and vibrant, Joanna told Stephen. Stephen 
considered it for a split second, then shrugged us off. 
“Nah, I can’t be bothered,” he said and delved back into the paint box. 
Joanna glanced at the unstretched piece of scrap canvas Stephen had fetched from the 
recycling station. She asked Stephen if he was going to prime the canvas; her voice was slow 
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and hesitant. Priming entails adding a layer of primer – usually gesso – over the canvas before 
painting. The primer protects the canvas from disintegrating with time. It also preserves the 
colour of the paint and prevents the canvas from soaking up the acrylic. It is an essential, if 
tedious process. 
Joanna explained this much, but Stephen did not respond. Some PVA (water-soluble, 
transparent glue) would do, Joanna told him, in way of a concession.  
“I don’t need to prime the canvas,” Stephen snapped.  
“No, you do,” Joanna did not budge. 
“I can’t be bothered,” Stephen said again. 
Joanna insisted that it would make his painting better. After a few seconds, Stephen 
gave in, and Joanna fetched the bucket of PVA with a satisfied smile.  
The exchange sparked my interest; many people, perhaps me included, would have 
given up and let Stephen get on with his work as he pleased. After all, one may have thought, 
Stephen had made his choice – letting him use pre-mixed grey paint on unprepped canvas 
counts as promoting his independence. Someone else may have emphasised Stephen’s self-
determination, and left them him to his own device. Alternatively, they would have prevented 
Stephen from painting, if it was seen disruptive or undesirable, such as using up too much 
paint by painting on unprepped canvas.  
Not Joanna though.  
Her interaction with Stephen reflects the crux of what is meant by supporting 
independence in the workshops. It is an obligation to engage with participants, the creative 
process, and the artwork. This approach necessitates an ethics of engagement in which any 
potential undesirable behaviour is neither ignored nor suppressed; instead, it is addressed 




In this section, I examined Project Ability’s approach to risk and independence. I argued 
that the primary aim of the workshop was to encourage participant engagement with the 
creative activities and with their social environment. The studio’s starting point is that people 
are capable individuals whose space should be respected, instead of limited and surveilled. I 
argued that this approach was productive in that it enabled enjoyment and exploration, but it 
also carried the risks to participant safety. Project Ability minimised this risk by increasing 





The concept of independence permeates provision for people with learning disabilities. 
In this chapter, I examined what was meant by independence in the context of risk 
management and care responsibilities, and how it was supported or hindered. 
I contrasted two approaches to promoting the independence of individuals who are 
considered vulnerable: one in which the risk was seen as inherent features of the environment, 
and the primary way of managing it was by removing individuals from that environment. I 
argued that this approach often relied on control and surveillance, and ultimately denied 
individuals engagement. The second approach understood risk as a function of support, which 
carried an obligation to engage. I discussed the diverse ways in which this obligation 
manifested in the way tutors granted participants space in the studio and demonstrated care 
for participants’ artwork and the art making process.  
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At the beginning of the chapter, I cited Fyson and Kitson’s (2010) “unanswerable” 
question on how much granting people independence was worth the risk of exposing people 
to harm, injury, and abuse. Having discussed the ways in which tutors supported participants, 
I suggest to reframe this question as: what kind of support is needed to enable people’s 
independence without exposing them to harm, injury, and abuse? As I have argued throughout 
the chapter: increased independence does not necessitate increased risk, given that individuals 
are provided with adequate assistance.  
From the examples I cited in this chapter, this comprises, first of all, personal support: 
support workers and tutors, who can assist individuals with difficult tasks, and identify and 
address potential risks to their wellbeing. The nature of the personal support is also important: 
instead of approaching participants as incapable individuals who must be surveilled, they 
need to be treated as capable people whose personal space need to be respected as much as 
possible. This means respecting their desires and facilitating their pursuit to the best of one’s 
means. In the context of artmaking, this entails taking seriously the participants’ creative 
vision, and helping them realise that to the highest possible standard.  
This can be challenging for tutors and support workers in the context of shrinking 
resources. Project Ability seemed to have adjusted by taking on more risk. For other service 
providers, limited support, coupled with and enabled by an individualised understanding of 
personal responsibility often resulted in participants being denied engagement altogether, in 
the name of risk management.  
Western liberal ideals of citizenship operate under the assumption that citizens are 
independent individuals who have the freedom and agency to deliberate over their lives. 
However, ongoing social anxieties surrounding independence indicate that in practice, people 
with learning disabilities are not quite regarded or treated as equal citizens yet. Furthermore, 
there is a danger that unless these tensions are resolved, this remains the case. 
In my second chapter, I discussed the works of prominent learning disability scholars 
who, writing from an ethics of care perspective, have been making the case for independence 
as an ideal to be put to rest, and for citizenship theories to elevate relationality as the 
fundamental organising principle of society (Carey, 2009a; Mol, 2008; Pols, 2016; 
Sevenhuijsen, 1998). While these works are important in reframing the debate around the 
citizenship of people with learning disabilities, independence continues to occupy centre stage 
in social policy, service provision, and disability activism; hence it is constitutive of the 
aspirations of people with learning disabilities, and shapes the way their support is framed and 
organised. Exploring how Project Ability navigates the tensions around independence 
demonstrates that people with learning disabilities are capable of being independent. 
Additionally, by examining good practice and promoting an alternative conceptualisation of 
what independence means, it contributes to addressing some of the social anxieties that 




So far, I have discussed choice and independence. These are primary virtues of liberal 
citizenship, which assumes that all individuals are inherently rational beings capable of self-
deliberation. My aim has been not only to negate these assumptions, but to show that although 
in theory these ideals are exclusive of people with learning disabilities because they were 
conceived without considering their interests, in practice, they guide what people do and 
desire. Instead of simply arguing that these ideals are exclusive, my focus was on how 
individuals with learning disabilities and those who worked with them interpreted and 
negotiated these ideals. Additionally, I have shown that both choice and independence are can 
 92 
be seen as capacities that people with learning disabilities can develop, given that the material 
conditions are satisfied and they are provided with adequate personal support. 
In the next two chapters, I will examine the relational aspects of citizenship; after all, 
theories of citizenship are propositions of how individuals can (and should) live together as a 
society. This requires examining how and why people engage with each other. Although 
relationships are an important and often discussed topic in learning disability policy and 
within the scholarship, what they mean for people with learning disabilities, especially for 
those with significant impairments, is still little understood. 











Jamie was in a good mood. While I was sorting out the fabric marker pens, Jamie told 
me about the time he first came to Project Ability at the age of nineteen – that was fifteen 
years ago. Before Project Ability, he had attended a day care centre.  
“That’s where I met Mr Reid,” Jamie said. 
“Anthony Reid?” I asked, and pointed at the far end of the studio where Anthony, 
another participant, was sitting. 
“Yes,” Jamie nodded. 
“Are you friends?” I asked. I was surprised; I had been volunteering at the studio for 
almost a year, and I had never seen Jamie and Anthony interact with each other. 
“Yes, Mr Reid is a pal,” Jamie said without taking his eyes off the concentric circles he 
was painting with ink on fabric. “Isn’t that right, Mr Reid?” Jamie shouted across the room, in 
Anthony’s direction. 
Anthony looked up, smiled, gave Jamie a thumbs up, and continued drawing. 
Jamie told me that he and Anthony used to live together in a group home. He said that 
they used to put on music and dance in the living room. “We had a good time together,” Jamie 
said and turned towards Anthony. “Isn’t that right? We used to dance!” Jamie asked Anthony.  
Again, Anthony smiled and nodded, and returned to his art. 
Jamie now lives with his mother in the west end of Glasgow. It is easy to spot him on 
the busy street leading up to the studio from his long strides and slightly hunched posture. 
Generally, Jamie is in a foul mood when he arrives at the workshop. He paces around the 
studio, complains to Luke, the receptionist about the commuters on the train, calls the female 
tutors and volunteers “witches”, and then he goes and sits at a desk behind the drying racks, 
which is out of sight of the main workshop area.  
“Jamie takes an hour and a half to settle,” Lesley, the director noted, “And when he 
leaves, he’s got to prepare himself.” 
Jamie’s former roommate and apparent friend Anthony, on the other hand, is a very 
quiet man in his early thirties. He is always accompanied by a support worker. Anthony does 
not talk, unless someone asks him a question, and his replies are usually short, blunt, and 
muffled. He always sits at a single desk in the corner, and makes art with his headphones on. 
Unlike Jamie, who is loquacious, Anthony rarely speaks to anyone at the workshop. 
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“So do you and Anthony ever hang out outside the studio?” I asked Jamie. 




Jamie’s friendship with Anthony surprised me because neither of them appeared 
particularly sociable at first. Anthony rarely seemed to acknowledge anyone’s presence in the 
workshops. I had never seen other participants approach him or speak to him, nor had I seen 
him engage with other participants. Jamie mostly interacted with staff members and support 
workers; because I did not see him converse with other participants, I surmised that he was 
not interested in their company. What informed my initial impressions was the assumption 
that people like Jamie and Anthony socialised the way as people without learning disabilities 
did, such as by exchanging pleasantries, having conversations, making plans together, and 
spending time with each other within and outside the workshops. Because I had not seen 
Jamie and Anthony do any of these, I had (wrongly) concluded that they could not be friends. 
However, as I started attending the workshops, it quickly became apparent to me that 
participants interacted with each other in more diverse ways than what I had expected from 
my normative preconceptions. With the exception of a few participants, there was little small 
talk, exchange of pleasantries, or conventional conversations in the workshops. This was 
because, as I have discussed previously, many of the people I spent time with had very little 
verbal language.  
Up until my conversation with Jamie, it had not entered my mind that he and Anthony 
could have a history and friendship. My confusion speaks to a broader issue: to this day, there 
is very little research about what sociality – friendships, relationships, social life – means and 
looks like for people like Jamie and Anthony. The sociality of people with learning 
disabilities has been central to promoting their citizenship. However, the handful of studies 
that exist on the social lives of people with learning disabilities focus on individuals with mild 
impairments (Mason et al., 2013); the literature offers little insight on the social lives of 
people with significant learning disabilities. Therefore, there are plenty of questions that are 
yet to be addressed, such as: what does sociality look like for people who often have very 
little verbal language, who may appear disengaged from their social environment, who need 
extensive support to socialise? What are valuable social interactions for them, and how can 
they be supported to engage in these interactions? 
These are the questions that this chapter examines. I first contextualise these questions 
by discussing the social policy discourse on “social inclusion”. Then, using ethnographic 
examples, I examine the material and personal support that is conditional to the social lives of 
people with learning disabilities. I also highlight the different, non-verbal forms of 
interactions between participants of the art workshops, and discuss the ways in which these 
interactions are supported, cultivated, or hindered by the people working with them.  
 
 
The challenges of social inclusion 
 
Social policy preoccupation with the social lives of people with learning disabilities 
have been defined by the “social inclusion” agenda. In the UK, social inclusion emerged as a 
key issue since the closure of long-stay hospitals, and remains a central concern to social 
policy and service provision to this day. Although the term has multiple meanings, broadly 
speaking, social policy uses the term in reference to access to activities and relationships with 
non-disabled peers (Bates and Davis, 2004). Ideologically, social inclusion policies draw on 
the principles of normalisation (Wolfensberger et al., 1972), which advocates for people with 
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learning disabilities taking up non-segregated, “ordinary” activities to counter the past 
practices of institutionalisation. In this section, I examine the way social inclusion policies 
envision valuable social interactions, and I discuss their impact on the social lives of people 
with learning disabilities. 
One of the main drivers of social policies are studies that consistently show that people 
with learning disabilities – compared to their non-learning impaired peers – have fewer 
friends, are more likely to experience loneliness and social isolation (Department of Health, 
2001). One survey revealed that only one third of people with learning disabilities was able to 
name a close friend (Scottish Government, 2013b). Other studies concluded that most people 
with learning disabilities only have regular contact with their family and staff (Forrester‐
Jones et al., 2006; Robertson et al., 2007), but lack a sense of belonging to the local 
community (Clement and Bigby, 2009; Verdonschot et al., 2009).  
The 2001 governmental white paper Valuing People (Department of Health, 2001) has 
been particularly influential in setting the social inclusion agenda and in introducing 
subsequent changes to services. The solution that Valuing People proposed was to put 
forward services that encouraged people with learning disabilities to participate in the 
“community”, i.e. social life outside of care services. The underlying logic behind this 
proposition was that people with learning disabilities had poor social lives because they 
lacked the skills to enable their inclusion. To foster these skills, people with learning 
disabilities were encouraged and supported to partake in “ordinary” activities and interact 
with the so-called mainstream society. Policy and service provision set out to achieve this by 
increasing people’s choice and control over their housing within the community, skills 
development, and employability. “[B]eing around people encourages people with learning 
disabilities to develop their social skills,” the Scottish Government (2013b) proclaimed, 
“Developing social skills helps them make friends and to integrate into the community” 
(p.72). Social inclusion, both as a concept and as a policy driver has been extensively 
critiqued (Bates and Davis, 2004; Bigby and Wiesel, 2011, 2018; Burton and Kagan, 2006; 
Clegg et al., 2007; Hall, 2005). For the purposes of this dissertation, I focus on the critique 
about its assumptions on what comprises valuable social interactions for people with learning 
disabilities.  
These policies operate on a kind of default principle that people with learning 
disabilities prefer to conduct their social lives the same way people without learning 
disabilities do. This assumption has led to the closure of day care centres, eliminated safe 
havens that protected people with learning disabilities from bullying, and the closures 
curtailed, rather than expanded, their social networks (Clegg and Bigby, 2017). Many of the 
services that were introduced under the social inclusion agenda prioritised individual-focused 
activities aimed at helping people improve their skills to aide their participation in the 
mainstream, primarily through independent living and employment.  
On the other hand, it has been clear that mainstream society was not ready for including 
people with learning disabilities. To this day, very few of them have achieved employment 
and independent living. In fact, many parents and guardians see these as aspirations rather 
than realistic goals (Clegg et al., 2007). The push to move people from specialist provision 
into mainstream services did not reduce the higher rates of taunting, aggression, and hate 
crime people with learning disabilities are subjected to (Emerson and Roulstone, 2014). 
People with learning disabilities often report feeling intimidated and unwelcome, which 
causes them to avoid public spaces altogether (Hall, 2005: 200). 
Prioritising goal-setting and skills development often comes at the expense of 
supporting people with learning disabilities in developing a sense of belonging because they 
do not foster nor value collective spaces and experiences (Hall, 2011). The activities 
promoted by policies foreground individual achievement instead of seeking to understand and 
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promote meaningful interactions for people with learning disabilities. Johannes et al. (2017) 
cites a government funder, who aptly remarked, “Loading people on the bus and taking them 
to Tim Hortons [coffee shop] at 2 p.m. in the afternoon is not community inclusion” (p. 47).  
These observations point to how social inclusion policies often mistakenly equate 
community presence with community participation (Clement and Bigby, 2009). People with 
learning disabilities have been geographically relocated from segregated institutions into the 
‘community’ (meaning non-segregated spaces). But without examining what meaningful 
interactions look like people with significant disabilities, there is a danger that normative 
assumptions of their sociality will go unchallenged. This risks policies and services ignoring 
and discouraging alternative manifestations of sociality, like the friendship between Jamie and 
Anthony. The task is thus to highlight and document the diverse and non-normative forms of 
social interactions that make up the social lives of people with learning disabilities, and 
examine how these interactions can be encouraged and supported. 
 
 
The material condition of social lives 
 
The social lives of people with learning disabilities rely on extensive personal and 
organisational support. In this section, I describe the material support that needs to be in place 
for people with learning disabilities to socialise.  
Aysha’s example clearly demonstrates the expanse of support needed and the 
consequences of what happens when that support is taken away. Aysha is a woman in her late 
thirties who attends the art workshop on Tuesdays, goes to a day centre on Wednesdays, takes 
a walk in the Kelvingrove park and visits galleries on Thursdays, and once every fortnight she 
spends a weekend at a centre that provides day care. “I’m going on a holiday!” Aysha usually 
announces to me with exuberance.  
Aysha is always accompanied by her support worker, Diana, a Mexican woman in her 
mid-thirties who works part-time while completing her PhD studies. Diana helps Aysha dress 
up and get ready for the day. They then go for lunch, coffee, and walks in the city centre. 
Aysha’s long, thick, dark hair is always perfectly coiffed into a smooth pony tail, and her 
long-sleeved dresses that follow the rules of modest fashion often have an unexpected pop of 
colour, all of which showcases Diana’s attention to detail.  
I learnt from Diana that before they started working together, Aysha had had a bad 
experience with support workers, as a result of which her social life suffered. Although Diana 
was not aware of the full details, she knew that Aysha did not have any support for two years 
following her bad experience. This meant that Aysha was not able to leave her house for two 
years. With her support gone, so were her holidays at the day care, the art workshops, the bus 
rides, the walks in the park, and the coffee outings. She consequently suffered from 
depression, and was put on high doses of anti-depressants. Aysha became isolated and 
confined in her flat with the sole sources of contact limited to her parents and her two 
siblings, who all have significant learning disabilities. 
Aysha’s example highlights the material conditions of social life that people with 
learning disabilities face. To be able to engage in any form of interactions with people outside 
of their households, people with learning disabilities need personal assistance with organising 
their social activities, with getting dressed and ready to leave the house, and with navigating 
the streets and public transport safely. When Aysha’s support was taken away, so was her 
social life.  
Even when people with learning disabilities have a support worker (or they do not need 
one as independent travellers), they need communal spaces where they can safely socialise 
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with others. For many of the participants, the Project Ability fulfils this function. The 
example of participants Colin, Alan, and Simon from the Friday workshops illustrates how. 
Colin’s and Alan’s presence in the workshop is hard to miss. Although their hair has 
gone grey, they both exude a youthful energy. Colin typically enters the studio with long 
strides, his curly hair bouncing on his shoulders. His deep voice with which he says hi to 
everyone carries to the far end of the studio. Alan is more soft-spoken, but his smile gives the 
impression that he has just come back from having caused some sort of mischief. 
Alan’s and Colin’s banter is part of the workshop they attend. When one of them is 
absent, other participants take note of the unusual silence. Their conversations cover a variety 
of topics, from pop-culture (Alan likes new films whereas Colin swears by old John Ford 
westerns), to the weather (Colin’s exclamation of “What a miserable day”, regardless of the 
actual weather, is mostly met by Alan’s shrug), to politics (where they discuss the various 
ways in which humanity will cause its inevitable downfall). Simon, sitting in the background, 
follows their conversations with an occasional giggle, which does not go unacknowledged by 
Colin and Alan. 
“Is that your girlfriend, Alan?” Colin teased Alan, looking at Alan’s work-in-progress 
portrait drawing. 
Alan did not answer. 
In the back of the studio, Simon burst into laughter. 
“Oh, what’s so funny, Mr Simon Adams?” Alan snapped at Simon and threw his brush 
onto the desk with much theatricality. 
Simon continued giggling. 
“You watch yourself there, Simon,” Alan retorted playfully. There was a quiet wave of 
amusement spreading among those witnessing the exchange. 
Simon, Colin, and Alan do not see each other outside the workshops. None of them 
have extensive social networks. They are independent travellers and do not receive round-the-
clock support. Alan was temporarily moved to supported accommodation when his mother 
was hospitalised due to an illness. Simon and Colin live alone in council houses. Outside the 
studio, Alan spends most of his time with his elderly mother and his older brother. Similarly, 
Simon is in most frequent contact with his sister and brother-in-law. Colin, on the other hand, 
is estranged from his siblings and parents, as he grew up in a long-stay hospital. The few 
social events they attend are those reserved for people with learning disabilities. They are not 
employed, do not partake in activities of their local community, and are not part of the 
“mainstream” society. Their interactions with each other are too precarious to be considered a 
long-term, sustainable relationship by social policy standards. Although their friendship goes 
back two decades, it could not be sustained without the workshops. Project Ability enables the 
friendship between them by providing them with an organised and institutional communal 
space where they are shielded from the potentially unpleasant interactions on the outside and 
their interactions can unfold in their own pace. 
As I discussed in my first chapter, many of these communal spaces, including day 
centres, were forced to shut as a result of the significant cutbacks to social care funding 
during austerity. Advocates of personalisation saw the day centre closures as a positive 
outcome for service provision rather than a negative consequence of spending cuts: because 
many of these spaces were perceived by policymakers and proponents of independent living 
to evoke, in spirit, the segregation of long-stay institutions (Needham, 2014). Some of those 
who advocated for these closures envisioned a range of alternatives, such as smaller scale 
collectives and community hubs which would provide both personalised and shared activities 
and where service users were able to make collective choices (Needham, 2014).  
However, no alternatives for socialising were put in place. Social geographer Ed Hall 
(2005) observes that the closure of these communal spaces also broke up friendships and 
 98 
relationships, and erased a sense of belonging that employment and independent living could 
not replace. Although the people with learning disabilities that Hall (2005) spoke to all lived 
in rented accommodation and/or were employed, they continued to experience what Hall 
refers to as the “double-bind” of marginalisation, meaning that they were excluded from and 
discriminated against in the spaces that were supposed to promote their social inclusion. 
All this gives an indication of how precarious people’s ability to attend at the 
workshops is: it depends on them receiving support with the practical tasks that prepare to 
leave the house, with travelling from their home to the workshop, and the existence of the 
workshop, itself dependent on governmental funding. If one element of the support goes 
missing, participants would not be able to make it to the studio.  
 
 
What kind of social interactions should be supported and how? 
 
Given that the material conditions are provided, there remains a question about the kind 
of interactions that people with learning disabilities find valuable and enjoyable. Social policy 
makes it clear that meaningful interactions are fostered through engagement in “ordinary” 
activities, like making art at the workshops (Department of Health, 2001; Scottish 
Government, 2000). This may well be the case; however, it is unclear how exactly 
engagement in these activities would help individuals “sustain friendships”, a goal identified 
as “one of the greatest challenges faced by learning disability services” (Department of 
Health, 2001: 81). In this section, I examine the extent to which participants’ engagement in 
the workshop contributes to their social lives. I do so not with the intention to evaluate 
whether or not the workshops are successful at fostering people’s sociality. Instead, I focus on 
the types of interactions that the workshops encourage, contrast them with normative 
understandings of valuable interaction, and discuss the way they are supported or hindered. 
One of the difficulties of discerning how partaking in the workshops develops and 
sustains relationships arises because many participants do not seem to initiate social activities 
(like attending Project Ability), and once they are at the studio, they do not appear to instigate 
interactions. To an outsider, many of the participants may come across as aloof, which may 
lead the uninitiated to question whether they enjoy being in a social environment at all. 
An example is Dave, a young man with short blonde hair who just wants to sit in the 
corner and listen to Nick Drake. I learnt about Dave’s background from tutor Joanna, who had 
known Dave from the hospital where she led art workshops, prior to either of them joining 
Project Ability. 
During my fieldwork, I perceived Dave as someone who seemed uneasy about 
interacting with anyone but Joanna, which made me feel reluctant about approaching him. In 
the workshops, Dave spent only half an hour working on his art. The rest of the time, he 
wandered around the studio, looked at the DVD shelf, or sat at his desk, located at the corner 
of the studio, and watched the other participants. The first thing Dave usually did upon his 
arrival was to fetch the studio’s old cassette player and put on Nick Drake’ s music. Since he 
did not use headphones, his desk was always surrounded by a cloud of melancholic 
fingerpicking. 
“Dave always sounds exasperated when I talk to him,” Joanna said. “‘You again! Leave 
me alone! Go away!’,” she imitated Dave’s grimace. “But you can actually see a smile in the 
corner of his mouth,” she added.  
Joanna told me that Dave had depression, and barely left the house during the day. She 
felt that he preferred to stay in and away from the bustle of the outside world. In this context, 
the fact that Dave would make the effort to attend the art workshops – to leave the house, get 
on the public transport, and stay among people – meant that he was reaching out. 
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When Joanna left the hospital where she had worked to tutor at Project Ability, Dave’s 
mother contacted her, asking if Dave could join her. “His mum said that he would only join 
the workshops that I held,” Joanna said. “But she also said that Dave would probably not do 
any art.” 
“And then one day,” Joanna continued, “I received a Facebook friend request from 
Dave.” Joanna explained that she usually did not accept friend requests from participants, but 
she took an exception with Dave, partly at his mother’s request. “He posts Nick Drake songs 
on my Facebook wall at Christmas,” Joanna said with fondness.  
It was through Facebook that Dave learnt about an exhibition that Joanna curated, 
which took place during a period when he was taking a yearlong break from the workshops.  
“He came to the opening,” Joanna said simply. “His mother told me that he wouldn’t 
miss it.” 
“That’s really nice,” I said. 
“Yes, it was,” Joanna agreed, “But of course he didn’t say a single word to me during 
the whole event.” 
“But he showed up,” I said. 
“He showed up,” Joanna nodded. 
Like other participants, Dave did not appear particularly social at first; quite the 
contrary, he seemed to prefer not interacting with people. However, Joanna understood that 
just because Dave did not seek to converse with those around him (including Joanna), it did 
not mean that he was antisocial: just the opposite, Joanna recognised that Dave to exerted 
active, ongoing effort just to be in the workshop. Note that she did not push him at any point 
to interact with her; instead, she let him engage with her on his own terms. It is important to 
highlight here that the there are many participants who may never want to interact with 
others; this may be particularly the case with participants who are on the autism spectrum 
(Spain et al., 2018). Like Dave, no one is forced to engage in interactions.  
Many support workers approach the participants’ social activities like this: 
acknowledging that sometimes, just being around people counts as an achievement, which 
needs to be maintained and developed with the support of those working with them. One 
support worker said that the participant she worked with went to the gym once a week to train 
on the cross-trainer for two and a half minutes. This may seem pointless to an outside 
observer, but actually demonstrates tremendous willpower from the participant. From this 




Social policy is rather unclear on the kind of relationships that are supposed to develop 
from social participation. Leaving this unexamined is a significant omission because some of 
the interactions may not be obvious for people who are unfamiliar with the individual with 
learning disabilities. In the following, I describe these unfamiliar, seemingly unintelligible, 
quiet, and fleeting social interactions, which, I argue, constitute a valuable part of the 
participants’ social lives. 
At first glance, the workshops can appear somewhat lacking of social interactions. 
There is usually some light chatter among the support workers, and between tutors and 
participants, but there is very little verbal communication between the participants 
themselves. Although it is easy to mistake their lack of words and conversation for 
disengagement, I learnt that there were many other ways in which they could connect with 
their social environment. 
Helen told me about the ways in which the person she supports, Stewart, exemplifies 
this. Helen is a short, quick-talking woman in her early fifties with a deep, raspy voice and a 
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no-nonsense attitude. Stewart, on the other hand, is a tall, thin man in his early thirties, who 
carries himself with measured steps and a constantly sombre facial expression. Stewart did 
not appear particularly sociable to me at first. He does not talk to anyone at the workshop; he 
is selectively mute. He typically works in silence, and he interacts with the staff inasmuch as 
the interactions concern his art.  
I learnt from Helen that Stewart actually took great pleasure from being around people. 
It turns out, Stewart had a pretty brash sense of humour: he loved rowdy banters and he 
cracked a small smile each time someone around him was being rude. “He had a big laugh 
today on the train because some neds [ill-mannered young men] were swearing at each other,” 
Helen said. “One was going, ‘Fuck sake, big man!’ And Stewart was pissing himself with 
laughter.” 
Had Helen not drawn my attention to Stewart’s quiet amusement, I might have never 
noticed. However, once I understood that there were many ways in which people could 
connect with each other, many of the complex and long-running friendships in the workshops 
revealed themselves.  
Take Jon and Kenny, for example.  
Jon and Kenny both attend the same afternoon workshop, and they usually sit next to 
each other. Kenny rarely talks, and when he does, it is in one-word responses to questions. 
Jon, on the other hand, is happy to strike up a conversation with participants, support workers, 
and volunteers alike. His friendly demeanour is reflected in the wrinkles around his eyes that 
make him look like as if he is always smiling. Jon also demonstrates eloquent enthusiasm 
when it comes to the two topics he likes: Barack Obama and Pope Francis. While Jon talks to 
Kenny and Connor about politics and his volunteer work at a food bank, he occasionally turns 
to Kenny.  
“Isn’t that right?” Jon tapped Kenny on the shoulder after a discussion with Connor 
about Northern Irish border politics.  
Kenny let out a grunt that sounded he agreed with what was being said. 
“Ah, good man,” Jon laughed, delighted at Kenny’s response. 
Jon often talked about his affection for Kenny. “Kenny is a lovely guy. Lovely,” Jon 
said to me on several occasions. “I would love to meet up with him.”  
I learnt from Connor, Kenny’s support worker, that this was usually the dynamic of 
Kenny’s friendships. Kenny has one other friend he meets up with outside the workshop – 
another man with a learning disabilities. Their friendship was initiated by their support 
workers, who noticed that they shook hands, and surmised that they got along. Since then, 
once a week Kenny and his friend are taken to the pub by a support worker, so they could 
have a pint with each other. Their support workers have seen them hug, which was a big deal 
because Kenny does not really touch people. In these encounters, Kenny’s friend does all the 
talking; Kenny never says a word.  
Because of Kenny’s silence, I found it hard to discern how he felt about his friendships 
and about people in the workshop. I tried to find out by asking him who his friends were, to 
which he started naming people in the workshop. Overhearing my query, Connor, his support 
worker laughed. “Kenny’s just listing names,” he said. “He just wants you to stop asking him 
questions.”  
I asked Connor how he knew that Kenny enjoyed the company of other participants. 
“You know,” Connor said after a pause, “I sit with a man who can’t be bothered doing 
art. Kenny usually sits and awaits the inevitable masterpiece that’s going to be achieved by 
the end of the class. Rome wasn’t built in a day, so he’s still working in that direction. And 
I’m generally quite patient watching him trying to not do the art.” 
“But the thing is,” Connor continued, “there are a lot of things there Kenny can be 
bothered with. He can be bothered going to the workshop, he can be bothered seeing people, 
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he can be bothered feeling part of what’s there at the studio. Whether he paints like, I don’t 
know, a fucking priceless work of art, or whether he does something shit like Banksy, that’s 
irrelevant.” 
Connor went on, “Honestly, the shit that he brings home gets flung in the corner. He 
doesn’t give a fuck. What he does give a fuck about is that when he goes in, he’s part of 
something. If you say, ‘Do you want to go?’ he will say, ‘Yes’. I say, ‘Do you want to go, or 
do you want to leave it?’ He always says, ‘I want to go’. Always.” 
Notice that Kenny is not just a passive subject in these social encounters: he is not 
treated as a passive object that his friends talk at. On the contrary, Kenny engages with and 
evokes engagement from the people around him. In return, the people around Kenny 
recognise and appreciate Kenny as quiet companion and as an active participant in the 
relationship. 
Once I started paying attention, I noticed many similar quiet friendships. Some of them 
involved participants sitting in each other’s company without talking at all. Other times, it 
was a quiet person sitting amidst a boisterous banter, seemingly disengaged, apart from a 
small smile that indicates that they are listening. I also witnessed several occasions on which 
the talkative participants included silent individuals as equal parties in the conversation, but 
without expecting them to verbally contribute. Contrary to my first impressions, the 




In this section I used ethnographic examples to examine the policy assertion that 
participating in social activities help people with learning disabilities develop and sustain 
relationships. I discussed the mechanism by which participation can lead to sociality, and 
described non-normative forms of social interactions that contribute to participants’ social 
lives. In doing so, I demonstrated that sociality is cultivated and can manifests by being in the 
company of others. 
I did not do so to evaluate social inclusion policies. Rather, the point I am making is 
that, first of all, participating in social activities, which are often presented as trivial acts, hide 
tremendous work and effort exerted by individuals with learning disabilities and the people 
who work with them. This may be because of participants’ personal circumstances, or due to 
the fact that people with learning disabilities are often not welcome in mainstream spaces, 
which makes them less likely to participate. 
 Secondly, my aim was to document the different, non-normative forms of social 
interactions and relationships that are valuable for people with learning disabilities. In doing 
so, I echo the findings of learning disability scholars Bigby and Wiesel (2011, 2015, 2018), 
who recognised that meaningful interactions may take on various forms that might not 
contribute to conventionally-valued long-lasting relationships. In their studies, they 
specifically focus on “convivial encounters”, meaning fleeting interactions between people 
with and without learning disabilities. They found that people with learning disabilities valued 
these encounters despite not building towards long-lasting friendships. Their research 
highlights that for people with learning disabilities, social life is made up of diverse forms of 
social interactions, which should be acknowledged and supported on their own right.  
 
 
The care relationship as a form of sociality 
 
So far, I have discussed how participants’ social lives are dependent on the provision of 
adequate and appropriate support. However, I have not yet examined the engagement between 
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care recipients and support providers as social relations, i.e. as interactions between 
individuals that are constitutive of participants’ sociality.  
In the following, I make the case that this support relationship is central to participants’ 
social lives, not least because for many of them, apart from their family members, social care 
staff are the only regular source of social contact (Forrester‐Jones et al., 2006; Robertson et 
al., 2007). Participants often listed their support workers as one of their best friends. Several 
parents I spoke to arranged a support worker to hang out with the person with learning 
disabilities in their home. These visits were different from providing support with the 
scheduled programmes: their focus was not the activity per se (which usually included having 
tea or watching television with the participants), but the company that the support workers 
provided them. 
Some participants I spent time with at the workshops demonstrated great emotional 
affection towards their support workers. Recall Aysha, a participant who attends the 
workshops with her support worker, Diana. Aysha is quite verbose. Her thick voice was often 
the only source of sound in the quiet workshops. But Aysha did not have conversations as 
such. She sometimes seemed to be speaking to no one in particular, repeatedly asking the 
same questions: “What’s your name? What are you doing tonight? What are you having for 
lunch?” She did not seem to mind if no one noticed her and responded to her questions. I 
often sat next to Aysha and tried to chat with her while watching her work. On these 
occasions, she would intermittently answer my questions with one-word responses; more 
often, I was the one answering her usual string of questions. 
On the morning of the day I scheduled an interview with Diana, I sat next to Aysha, and 
watched her draw small dots with a paint pen on a large canvas. Normally exuberant and 
gregarious, asking me my name and my plans for the evening, Aysha was oddly quiet. I 
struggled to make sense of her silence: I tried to ask her about her weekend, about her 
upcoming holiday at the respite care, and her plans for the evening. Aysha hardly 
acknowledged my questions. Thinking that my presence might have upset her, I left her to her 
work, and went to get a coffee and record an interview with Diana in the meeting room. 
Halfway through the interview, Aysha burst into the meeting room in tears, with tutor 
Ruby following at her step. 
“Aysha is getting a bit distressed,” Ruby said apologetically. 
Diana looked startled. “Are you okay?” She reached out for Aysha’s hand. “Are you 
still working with Ruby? What are you doing?” 
“I was crying,” Aysha said in a deceptively light tone. 
“Crying? Why?” Diana asked, still holding Aysha’s hand. 
“I was feeling a bit down,” Aysha said. 
“Oh my god, but you love art class!” Diana exclaimed. 
Ruby quietly noted, “She wouldn’t do art.” 
I looked at Ruby. “Shall we go back inside? We will be done in a minute,” I said, 
reaching for the recorder. I was concerned that my decision to conduct an interview during the 
workshop interrupted Aysha’s work. 
“No, no, no,” Ruby said quickly. “She just needed to see that you’re here.” Ruby turned 
to Aysha. “And now that she’s seen you, it’s fine, right?” Ruby gently guided Aysha through 
the door. “I just needed to check with you,” Ruby smiled as she walked out. 
First of all, this episode reveals that I had wrongly assumed that Aysha’s relationship 
with Diana solely centred around the provision practical support. Because Aysha usually 
worked individually, I had thought that she would be okay with sitting alone while I 
interviewed Diana. I had thought that Diana’s presence was important only inasmuch as she 
provided Aysha hands-on assistance with handling art materials. Because Aysha usually did 
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not converse with Diana, it had not occurred to me that for Aysha, Diana’s presence was in 
itself reassuring.   
The second thing this episode highlights is a contrast between Aysha’s interactions with 
Diana, as opposed to the ones she has with people from the so-called mainstream society. 
Aysha is a pretty sociable person. However, I learnt from Diana that her outgoing character 
sometimes got her into trouble. “She’s kind of a popular character around town because even 
when we stop at a store, she’s speaking very loud all the time,” Diana said. “The thing is that, 
when she approaches people on the street, sometimes she annoys them because she speaks too 
much. They will respond to her sometimes in a harsh way and she will start crying.” Diana 
shook her head and continued. “Then she tries to kiss them right away, tries to hug them, and 
then they will just push her away. She will then start crying, and she won’t forget for a long 
time. She will still say, ‘Remember that guy who pushed me away?”  
As much as social policies emphasise the importance of people with learning disabilities 
socialising outside of care services, they do not quite discuss what to do on occasions like 
this: when the person with learning disabilities interacts in a way that makes others feel 
uneasy. This unease does not necessarily stem from malice: research suggests  that people 
without learning disabilities often felt ill-prepared to interact with people with learning 
disabilities, and worried that their interactions may be misconstrued as close friendships 
(Bigby and Wiesel, 2015; Hall, 2011; M. van Alphen et al., 2010). But other than suggesting 
that people with learning disabilities need to learn social skills to be able to interact with 
people outside of service provision (Scottish Government, 2013b), social policies do not 
address the affective value of the social interactions they deem valuable. In this context, 
Aysha’s interactions with Diana are significant not only because Diana helps Aysha as a 
support worker, but because Diana responds to Aysha with attention instead of rejection. 
This attentive and emotional responsiveness is mutual. Take, for instance, Kenny and 
his support worker Connor. I learnt from Connor that Kenny is emotionally sensitive and 
responsive, which admittedly surprised Connor because he had thought that people on the 
autism spectrum – like Kenny – did not have empathy. Kenny proved Connor wrong on 
several occasions, most notably when Connor’s grandmother passed away. “I cried in front of 
Kenny once and he came and put his arm rounds me and said, ‘Can Connor be happy?’” 
Connor remembered. “But he has never asked me how I am,” he added, implying that 
although Kenny may not verbally enquire about Connor’s wellbeing, he does pay attention to 
others’ emotions.  
That care work requires emotional labour is not a new finding. Philosopher Eva Kittay 
(1999) – whose work I discussed in my second chapter – famously argued that care work 
helps people with significant disabilities experience and express love, therefore it contributes 
to alternative understandings of what makes someone human and valuable in the lives of 
others. Kittay (1999) discusses care work in relation to her daughter, Sesha. However, 
focusing on unpaid carers – the majority of whom are family members of the care recipient – 
risks attributing the emotional labour of care work solely to the family relations. 
Anthropologist McKearney (2018a) expands this observation to paid carers. In his 
ethnography, he describes how care workers at a group home imbue the residents – people 
with significant disabilities – with affective sensitivity, and render themselves open to being 
emotionally receptive and vulnerable to the individuals they care for. His work demonstrates 
that caring for people with learning disabilities (who are not family members) comprises 
meaningful, affective, and mutual interactions. 
Social policy and the literature often cite the fact that people with learning disabilities 
consider their paid carers as friends as a sign of ongoing isolation and exclusion (Forrester‐
Jones et al., 2006; Robertson et al., 2007). There are two assumptions behind this sentiment. 
The first one is that these statistics indicate the lack of social networks people with learning 
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disabilities have outside of care services. The second assumptions is that a paid care 
relationships do not count as part of a person’s social life because they are unequal and 
transactional.  
Both of these assumptions are, to a certain extent, true. However, what I aimed to show 
with these examples is that the relationship between paid support workers and care recipient 
are also more than transactional exchanges. In many cases, the care relationship carries 
emotional significance for care provider and care recipient alike. Therefore, it constitutes a 





 “We try to give them a space where they can socialise on their own terms,” Lesley, the 
director of Project Ability said. “But I do think friendship and community means something 
completely different for them,” she said. “And policy wants them to conform to conventional 
social life.” 
Indeed, many of the interactions at the workshop go unacknowledged by social 
inclusion policies. My aim with this chapter was to examine what sociality looks like for 
people with learning disabilities outside of what Lesley referred to as conventional social life. 
I did so by documenting the fleeting and sporadic encounters between Jamie and Anthony; the 
silent, but attentive companionship of people like Stewart; the effort that Dave and makes to 
just be among people; the blink-and-you-miss-it connection by Kenny; or Aysha’s non-verbal 
emotional sensitivity, empathy, and affection. These interactions do not necessarily contribute 
to skills-building, employability, or wider community participation. They are often non-
verbal, or non-conventionally verbal. They require extensive support, financial and personal. 
They probably do not fit any common sense understandings of friendship. 
If anything, the workshops showcase the diverse ways in which people can connect to 
each other that do not fit common-sense understandings of friendships or social networks. 
Yet, the familiarity, affection, and comfort these connections produce for people with learning 
disabilities are valuable. Therefore, they should be valued and supported on their own right. 
My aim with highlighting these unconventional social interactions was not to emphasise the 
differences between the sociality of people with and without learning disabilities. On the 
contrary, my goal was to advocate for the recognition of these often neglected interactions as 
constitutive of people’s social lives, and to outline some of the affirmative measures they 
require. Examining the social lives of people at the workshop serves with broader 
implications with regards to the general assumptions we hold about the nature of human 
communication, connection, and sociality. 
The first lesson is that these forms of sociality need an organised, institutional space 
where they can manifest. The Project Ability studios serve this purpose well: because there is 
no expectation for participants to socialise, they can engage with each other at their own pace. 
It is also a space that is safe of judgement or harassment. With the closure of day centres and 
the funding cuts befalling on service providers, these spaces are becoming increasingly rare. 
Secondly, people connect with their social environment in many different ways: by 
attending to the conversations around them, by emotionally attuning themselves to others, and 
by being in the same physical space with people. For many of the participants, community 
presence can equal community participation, given that they are left to engage on their own 
terms: to reside in the presence of others without pressures to engage in activities. 
Thirdly, for many participants, aspirations to be with others need to be cultivated, which 
requires extensive support due to the nature of their impairment. Many participants rely on 
their family members and support workers to suggest activities to them, where they can 
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interact with other people. They further need support to organise their social lives, and help 
them with the practicalities, such as getting prepared to leave the house and transportation. 
Finally, supporting sociality requires support workers and staff to sensitise themselves 
to, and connect themselves with the emotional worlds of the people they are supporting. 
Helping people with learning disabilities is therefore not a one-way-street, but it holds value 
for everyone involved. 
Sociality is central to citizenship: ultimately, citizenship theories address how 
individuals live together as a community (Lazar, 2013). Contractarian theories of citizenship 
do not say much about the nature of relationships between individuals; interactions between 
individuals are primarily framed in terms of negotiating the social contract. This kind of 
individualism has been extensively critiqued by alternative theories exploring social relations, 
social participation, and the possibilities of democracy in diverse communities (Kymlicka, 
1996; Mouffe, 1992; Young, 1990). However, these works often focus on deliberative action 
in the public domain; even anthropologists examining the multiplicity of citizenship practices 
favour organised political action as an object of their study over interactions that take place in 
what is traditionally conceived as part of the private or domestic sphere.  
In the introduction and the second chapter, I situated this thesis in a growing body of 
literature that locates citizenship in interactions in the private sphere, specifically, in care 
interactions in domestic settings.The ethnographic materials cited in this chapter contributes 
to this emerging body of literature by bringing attention to the small, fleeting, quiet forms of 
sociality that people with significant learning disabilities engage in. Recognising and 
acknowledging the importance of these relationships are a step towards reimagining the 





Chapter seven:  
The value of art  
 
 
Introduction: a puzzle 
 
Tutor Rory’s tan, weathered face and steel blue eyes watched participant Mack trying to 
cut a thin, raw clay tile around a paper stencil he modelled after Her Majesty the Queen’s 
golden carriage. At the age of 85, Mack was one of the oldest participants in the workshops. 
His hands were so shaky that his cuts hardly scratched the surface of clay. 
“I can’t see, my dear,” Mack said to Rory after a few trials, and dropped the wooden 
clay knife. 
“Okay,” Rory said slowly. He then picked up the knife, placed Mack’s hand over his. 
He then asked Mack to control the direction of the knife while Rory applied the pressure to 
cut through the clay. 
“I still can’t see,” Mack repeated after a couple of attempts. 
Rory paused to think. He then turned the clay tile around, placed the knife at a straight 
edge of the stencil, and told Mack to pull the knife towards himself. Thus they began to cut 
out a rudimentary shape that bore no resemblance to the carriage after which it was modelled. 
Mack seemed pleased nonetheless. 
Having cut out the shape of the carriage, Rory asked Mack if he wanted to make clay 
figurines of the Queen, Prince Philip, and the Buckingham guards. He also suggested ways in 
which Mack could position the figures around the clay carriage. Mack did not wait for Rory 
to finish; with great enthusiasm, he grabbed a fistful of raw clay from the bag and started 
kneading it. By the end of the workshop, Mack had gone through 5 kilograms’ worth of 
professional quality clay, and produced a tile that, in essence, comprised a wonky square with 
dumplings stuck on top of it.  
I watched with fascination the care with which Rory checked the thickness of Mack’s 
tile (too thick and it can crack in the kiln when fired). He then placed the work-in-progress in 
a plastic bag to prevent it from drying out, labelled it, and put it in cupboard reserved for wet 
clay, so that Mack could continue working on it the following week. 
Later that evening, when I recounted this episode to my colleague, I was met by her 
puzzled look. “Isn’t that a waste though?” she asked me. “Why would you spend all this effort 





There was something striking in the whole episode, from Rory’s quiet patience when 
working with Mack, to my colleague’s confused reaction. My colleague’s question suggested 
that she saw little value in Mack’s work: she did not understand why so much time and 
expensive material was spent on someone who had, in her view, little artistic competence and 
produced art that was of no value – economic, aesthetic, sentimental, or otherwise. Although 
it would be easy to dismiss her question as ignorant and insensitive, it may be productive to 
examine the reasons behind her confusion, and the broader assumptions that her reaction 
reveals about the value of supporting someone like Mack make art.  
Not least because there was indeed something remarkable about the way Rory worked 
with Mack. Rory could have saved himself time and effort by cutting the tile himself. 
Alternatively, he could have suggested Mack did something else. Rory could have just 
prepared all the materials on Mack’s desk, and leave him to make clay dumplings for two 
hours.  
One may argue that Rory helped Mack because Mack enjoyed the process of making 
art: I have discussed in-depth how artmaking promoted sensorial pleasure, choice-making, 
sociality, and a sense of independence. However, if Rory’s engagement with Mack served 
only to facilitate the process of artmaking and its corollary benefits, one may wonder why the 
workshops went to lengths to provide professional quality materials to all participants, and 
why it made sure that the often tedious technicalities – such as rolling out the clay tile 
sufficiently thin – were completed.  
When I asked the tutors, they said that providing high quality art materials were part of 
recognising the participants as artists. The motto of the workshops was, after all, to treat 
people as “artists first” (as opposed to approaching them primarily as people with learning 
disabilities). The artist first motto recognises the participants’ artistic capabilities and 
foregrounds the importance of professional tutoring and high quality materials. However, it 
raises the question of what exactly treating participants as artists first means in practice. What 
kind of artists can people with learning disabilities be? What is the nature of their artistry? 
And how can their art be appreciated?  
Ultimately, the reason I found my colleague’s initial confusion striking is because it 
spoke to a larger question, which is at the core of the citizenship of people with learning 
disabilities. I have so far discussed the labour, material resources, time, attention, and 
emotional investment spent on the participants to help them make choices, be independent, 
and live a social life. What my colleague was really asking was: why? Why does anyone care 
to make this effort? What makes engaging with people with learning disabilities valuable, if at 
all?  
This chapter explores these questions in order to explore the lessons they serve for 
citizenship and ethical engagement. In the following, I will contextualise my colleague’s 
reaction in relation to the debate about value and (significant) learning disabilities. 
Specifically, I will focus on the notion of rational agency – i.e. the ability to act with 
competence and intention, to reason, to express oneself with verbal language. I situate my 
enquiry between two, contrasting positions. The first position is that of Western liberal 
political philosophy, which makes rational agency a fundamental condition of valuable 
engagement between individuals. The second one is that of prominent philosophers like Eva 
Kittay, who dismissed the relationship between rational agency and value altogether.  
In this chapter, I take a third approach. I follow anthropologist Patrick McKearney 
(2018a), who calls for exploring what valuable engagement might look like if it was not tied 
to the notion of rational agency at all. By asking how tutors regard the artistry of participants, 
I outline a particular type of agency: one that does not solely rely on their capacity for rational 
reasoning, but does not dismiss the importance of agency either. 
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I start by briefly outlining the philosophical debate about rational agency and valuable 
engagement with people with learning disabilities. I use this debate as a framework to 
examine the possible explanations to why the tutors (and Project Ability) help participants 
make art, and what treating participants as artists first means in practice. First, I discuss the 
extent to which technical mastery and artistic competence plays a role in recognising 
participants as artists. Then, I look at the tutors’ engagement with participants from the 
perspective of artmaking as a valuable process. Finally, I examine the question of what kind 
of artists participants with learning disabilities can be, and what that says about the value of 
engaging with them. 
 
 
Rational agency and the value of engaging with people with learning 
disabilities 
 
In this section, I outline the ways in which the concept of rational agency has been 
central in framing the value of engagement with people with learning disabilities. I briefly 
present an overview of the position that denies that people with (significant) learning 
disabilities can be valuable to the lives of others because they lack rational agency. Then, I 
focus on two ways in which advocates and philosophers have argued for the value of such 
engagement: the first position, which contends that people with learning disabilities do have 
rational agency, and are therefore valuable; and a second position, which dismisses the 
relationship between value and agency altogether. 
As I have discussed in my first chapter, liberal citizenship theories conceive of rational 
agency as a condition to an individual’s ability to participate in society. The liberal 
framework sees reason as the characteristic that separates humans from non-human animals. 
Rational agency thus enables individuals to tell right from wrong, to make moral judgements, 
and therefore to pursue what they see as a “good life”.  
In liberal political philosophy, people with learning disabilities have been traditionally 
seen as lacking rational agency, which raised questions about whether they could be valuable 
to the lives of others. While learning disabilities is not discussed in classical philosophical 
texts in any depth, whenever it is mentioned, it is to exemplify exceptions to the principles of 
freedom, justice, and dignity that nominally all persons are entitled to. For instance, Aristotle 
argued that an individual’s ability to deliberate in public affairs was tied to their value for the 
community. He referred to those who did not – could not – partake in public affairs as 
“idiots”, a term denoting not only lack of competence but also selfishness (Beckett, 2006). 
Later, classic reiterations of the social contract excluded people with learning disabilities on 
the grounds that they lacked the capacity to negotiate and consent to the terms of the contract. 
It is telling that John Locke, the father of the social contract theory argued that people with 
learning disabilities – whom he referred to as “Lunaticks” and “Ideots” – could not 
meaningfully participate in society because they lacked the reasoning capabilities of “Free 
Men” (quoted in Carlson and Kittay, 2010: 4). Even the more recent forms of social contract 
theories struggle to imagine how people with learning disabilities could be valuable to the 
lives of others: take philosopher John Rawls (1993), who has provided the most 
comprehensive reworking of the social contract, and who yet famously postponed answering 
this question in lack of a solution. 
From the field of moral philosophy, Singer (2010) and McMahan (2010) argued – rather 
controversially – that significant cognitive impairment posed a substantial obstacle for 
engagement in activities and relationships of value. “The profoundly cognitively impaired are 
incapable, for example, of deep personal and social relations, creativity and achievement, the 
attainment of higher forms of knowledge, aesthetic pleasures, and so on,” McMahan (1996) 
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wrote. Singer (2010) came to a similar conclusion when he examined the relationship between 
moral status and moral worth. Singer originally set out to make a case for attributing moral 
status to non-human animals, a group of beings who have also been denied rational agency, 
and therefore dignified treatment. For him, significant learning disabilities illustrate that lack 
of rational agency can still imbue beings – in the eyes of some – with equal moral status and 
dignity. Yet, instead of dismissing the relevance of rational agency to someone’s worth, he 
concludes that a “more graduated view” should be established in which “moral status depends 
on some aspects of cognitive ability” (p.338). Ultimately, neither McMahan nor Singer think 
that people with significant learning disabilities can be just as valuable to the lives of others as 
non-disabled people. 
A number of learning disability scholars rejected this line of thinking. For the purposes 
of this chapter, I will focus on two ways in which Singer’s and McMahan’s arguments have 
been rejected. First of all, some learning disability scholars sought to extend the liberal 
framework, and contend that with adequate support, people with learning disabilities too can 
be capable of demonstrating rational agency, and thus act with competence, intention, and 
reason. For instance, Francis and Silvers (2010) propose that assistive thinking – i.e. the 
practice of using a trustee’s reasoning and communicating skills acting as a prosthetic to the 
person with learning disabilities – can help people with cognitive impairments meet the 
standards of rational agency. Francis and Silver’s is perhaps the most literal re-imagination of 
what the learning disabilities equivalent of physical prosthetics would look like. However, the 
idea that with support, people with learning disabilities could be just as capable as their non-
disabled peers is present in many of the theories and principles that guide social policy and 
service provision. Independent living, supported employment, and self-advocacy all operate 
on the assumption that people with learning disabilities can achieve social value in the same 
venues as non-disabled individuals (Department of Health, 2001; Scottish Government, 
2013b). 
While these are goals that many people with learning disabilities have attained or aspire 
to, philosopher Eva Kittay (2005, 2010) raises the concern that if the moral and social worth 
of people with learning disabilities is solely determined by the extent to which they can 
demonstrate rational agency, people with significant disabilities will always be denied their 
humanity. Such a view has gained increased popularity in the recent years, in a scholarship 
which asserts that seeks to foreground vulnerability and (inter)dependence (as opposed to 
rational agency) as the primary descriptors of the human condition (Beckett, 2006; Davy, 
2015; Erevelles, 2011; Sevenhuijsen, 1998).  
Although I discussed these positions in depth in my second chapter in relation to 
theoretical approaches to learning disabilities, in the following, I seek to further develop them 
by examining the extent to which they explain why the tutors engage with the participants and 
their art. This debate provides a useful framework to explore why helping people with 
learning disabilities make art is valuable and what treating people as artists first really means. 
Do the tutors approach participants as artists who can develop the same level of competence 
and technical mastery as those without learning impairments? Or is artistry irrelevant, and 




Rational agency and artistic competence 
 
In this section, I will examine how much technical mastery and artistic competence play 
a role in recognising participants as artists within and outside the workshops. I will 
 110 
specifically examine whether the participants artistry is framed in terms of their learning 
impairment. 
Whenever I brought up Project Ability to local academics and artists who were familiar 
with the studio, I was asked if I knew Colin, the studio’s most well-known artist. Colin, is 
gregarious man in his 50s, who lived in a long-stay hospital when he was younger. He joined 
the workshops in the early 1990s, and since became one of their most established artists. 
Colin has collaborated with a wide range of local and national artists, boasts several 
international exhibitions, and is one of the best-selling and most commissioned artists in the 
studio. His artistic achievements were recently recognised by the Royal Society of Arts, 
which offered him a lifetime fellowship.  
Colin demonstrates high levels of artistic competence. He has mastered multiple 
mediums: he is just as comfortable with clay as with oil painting. His style consists of bold 
colours, strong lines, and intricate patterns. He is also prolific: his portfolio is so abundant that 
it could fill multiple solo exhibitions at the Project Ability gallery. Colin is a prime example 
for those who argue that with support, people with learning disabilities could be just as 
capable as their non-disabled peers. 
However, not all participants have the sort of technical competence and recognition 
Colin has. This is partly due to a lack of access and the precarious position that learning 
disabilities art occupies in the wider art world. Social geographer Hester Parr (2011) observed 
that despite the studio’s good reputation, there was a lack of non-marginal space for Project 
Ability’s mental health workshop participants to exhibit their artworks alongside professional 
artists in mainstream arts fairs. Parr argued that while some of the participants were well 
recognised as artists in the mental health-related artworld, their artistry was usually deemed 
less accomplished when measured against mainstream professionals.  
A reason for this is the historical lack of access artists with disabilities and mental 
illness have to art making facilities and resources – a problem that persists to this day 
(Guardian Editorial, 2018). Due to the lack of space in the mainstream art world, one of the 
few arenas where artists with disabilities can safely create, exhibit, and experience art is 
within disability arts. Disability arts started as a branch of the 1970s disability rights 
movement. Informed by the experiences of disability (Solvang, 2012), disability arts 
transformed audio-visual and performance art into platform through which disabled people 
could reclaim their experiences of disability from the medical establishment (Wexler, 2012; 
Wexler and Derby, 2015). Since then, it has grown into a thriving field of academic enquiry, 
artistic practice, and a political movement, enabling artists to contest the meaning of the 
disabled identity, reclaiming the power of representation, using art in special education for 
promoting social inclusion (see Hadley and McDonald, 2018; Hall, 2013). 
Yet, the relationship between disability arts and Project Ability is ambivalent: despite 
disability being at the forefront of the studio’s activities, Project Ability does not explicitly 
align itself with the political objectives of disability arts. On the one hand, the workshops are 
advertised as an artistic space for people with learning disabilities and ill mental health, and 
the studio regularly hosts guest artists and exhibitions from other organisations for people 
with learning disabilities or from psychiatric hospitals – albeit without much mention of 
disabilities or psychiatric diagnoses. Project Ability also leads outreach programmes to 
provideg art workshops for people with learning disabilities who would not otherwise have 
access to art-making facilities. The staff further undertake longer term, collaborative mixed-
media art projects to commemorate people’s experiences as residents in the now closed-down 
long-stay hospitals. 
On the other hand, unlike disability arts, Project Ability never explicitly mentions 
disability when presenting its participants’ artworks. For instance, an information leaflet for 
Aysha’s exhibition (shared with two other female participant artists) simply states Aysha’s 
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style: her colour choices, recurring patterns, and refined lines. There is no mention of 
disability-related meaning or intent. This omission can be construed as a political statement: 
few artists with learning disabilities partake in disability arts (Hall, 2013). “Generally 
speaking, learning disabilities art does not sit within disability arts,” Lesley, the director 
explained. “Disability arts has a sort of social political history to it, which is well-
documented, and learning disabilities arts just doesn’t sit within that at all. It’s often actually 
been excluded from it, and learning disabled artists not been welcomed into that particular 
genre.”  
What Lesley meant was that disability art, like much of the disability rights movement, 
was led by people with physical disabilities, with little consideration of how the people with 
learning impairment could be accommodated. Most studies on disability art focuses on well-
spoken artists, curators, and academics – the kind of politically aware individuals who have 
been at the forefront of the disability rights movement. Kulick and Rydström (2015) observed 
“[t]hat provocative, talented, eloquent, and politically committed individuals with disabilities 
are challenging stereotypes, making demands, and staking claims is significant and 
transformative. Nevertheless, one might wonder: where exactly does this kind of focus on 
vanguard verbal articulateness, performance virtuosity, and activist “claiming” leave disabled 
people who can do none of those things?” (p. 269). The problem with disability arts is that – 
like much of the disability rights movement – in requiring verbal eloquence to articulate 
artistic and political intention, it inadvertently directs attention away from people with the 
most significant disabilities. While some of the participants are well capable of articulating 
artistic and political intent (some with the tutors’ support), many of them struggle or lack 
adequate support to do so – for them, disability arts has little to offer in terms of recognising 




I used these examples to reflect on the value of engaging with people with learning 
disabilities as artists in relation to the mainstream art world and disability arts. I asked if 
Project Ability valued artists for their artistic competence, may that be of technical, 
conceptual, or the ability to communicate political intent. 
The examples I cited in this section illustrate that the relationship between the 
participants and the artworld outside of the Project Ability studios is complex. Although some 
of the participants have the artistic competence that is on par with mainstream artists, most 
participants are not recognised simply as artists, without the learning disabilities label. Nor 
does Project Ability considers itself to be part of the disability arts movement, which 
recognises the value of the art in the artist’s ability to articulate political intent.  
Project Ability presents its artists without emphasising their disability; yet, it does not 
reject the label either. Artistry and artistic value, as framed by the mainstream art world and 
disability arts thus do not provide a complete answer to why Project Ability helps the 







Two of Asha’s works exhibited in the gallery. Photos by TTP. 
 
 
The value of pleasure and process 
 
Of course art is not necessarily about the creative output. Certainly, most people 
(disabled or not) do not pursue artistic activities with the intention of creating a masterpiece: 
sometimes, the value of artmaking lies in the process rather than in the final product. In this 
section, I examine the value of supporting participants’ enjoyment of the artistic process. 
So far, I have discussed at length how artmaking in the workshops enabled choice-
making, sociality, and a sense of independence. It allowed participants to leave their flats, to 
meet other people, and, generally speaking, to exist in a space where they were supported in 
doing something they enjoyed. Artmaking is, above all, fun: touching the wet clay, slapping 
thick paint, or watching complementary colours of inks flowing into each other is gratifying 
in a fundamental, sensorial, visceral way.  
This recognition is shared by the staff members, support workers, and family members. 
This is why the staff are happy for participants to attend without any pressure for them to 
produce any artwork. This is why participants can work at their own leisure, leave the 
workshops when they please, or not attend at all. This is why it is okay for participant to just 
show up and not make any art at all, if they do not feel like it. Staff engagement with 
participants is partly aimed at facilitating experiences of joy and pleasure. 
Foregrounding enjoyment offers a more comprehensive answer to the question of why 
one should engage with people with learning disabilities. It resonates with a growing body of 
scholarship which seeks to articulate what value and development could mean for people with 
significant learning disabilities. As Kittay writes (2010), “[T]here is so much to being human. 
There’s the touch, there’s the feel, there’s the hug, there’s the smile. To be human is not a 
bundle of capacities. It’s a way that you are, a way you are in the world, a way you are with 
another” (p. 407). Reflecting on her relationship with her daughter Sesha, who was born with 
profound cognitive impairment, Kittay resists the idea that cognitive capacity or competence 
should be central to one’s value. Much of Kittay’s body of work discusses why engaging with 
Sesha holds value, despite her lack of competence, intentionality, or verbal skills. Sesha has a 
great love for music, from Beethoven, to Mary Poppins, to ballets. She is also emotional, 
responsive, and affectionate to the people around her. Supporting Sesha to flourish means to 
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strengthen her capacities experience joy and meaningful relationships (also see Kittay, 1999, 
2005).  
I agree with Kittay on her main points. In focusing on affection, pleasure, and 
relationships, her work invites us to imagine what value may look like beyond cognitive 
capacities. Applying Kittay’s approach to the workshops foregrounds the benefits to 
artmaking that are not related to the art per se: the pleasure, the sociality, the respite from the 
outside world. 
 However, Kittay’s framework offers little guidance on how regard the participants’ 
artistry and the quality of their artworks. In solely focusing on the value of the artmaking 
process, there is a danger that we de-emphasise the artworks and the artistic competence that 
brings them to life. Doing so risks participants being denied the possibility to explore and 
develop their artistry altogether. 
This is what happened to Craig, a former academic in his early sixties whose life and 
career came to a halt when he suffered a major stroke, as a consequent of which he lost most 
of his speech and mobility. I learnt that Craig’s social life had suffered significantly after his 
stroke. The aphasia caused by the stroke meant that he struggled to keep in conversation with 
his friends and family. The people around Craig had also found it awkward and perhaps 
inconvenient to speak slower, in simpler sentences, and to give Craig the time and space to 
express himself.  
It was Jenny, his wife, who encouraged Craig to go to art classes. Jenny had never seen 
Craig draw or paint before. Much to her surprise, she found out that Craig had an affinity for 
visual arts. His paintings were intricate: he worked with small brushes, letting the different 
shades ink in the brushstrokes bleed into each other, creating a rich texture.  
Before Craig joined Project Ability, he had attended a different art workshop for people 
with disabilities. Craig had spent most of his time there working on a watercolour painting. 
However, on one occasion, a tutor gave him acrylic painting instead of watercolour. When 
Jenny called the tutor’s attention to the mistake, the tutor said that it did not matter. This 
response made Jenny very upset.  
She explained that acrylic acted different from watercolour, and the mix-up ruined the 
painting Craig had been working on. When the tutor shrugged off the mistake, she also 
dismissed Craig’s artwork, artistry, and the possibility of engaging with Craig as someone 
who had preferences and aspirations, artistic or otherwise. In attributing value solely to the 
process of artmaking, there is a risk of neglecting the potential that participants can develop 
artistic capacities and grow as artists. In worst cases, it denies participants the recognition as 
artists. 
The tutors at the Project Ability workshops do care about the end product. They go to 
lengths to ensure that the art is technically and aesthetically well-executed: they make sure, 
with painstaking attention, that the clay is not too thick, that canvases are thoroughly primed, 
or that the oil paint is dry in between sessions. Some of these are tedious, time-consuming, 
and not necessarily the most enjoyable aspects of artmaking. All this illustrates that for the 
tutors, the value of engaging with the participants surpasses simply facilitating an enjoyable 
artmaking process. In fact, it demonstrates that the tutors recognise a distinct type of artistry 
that participants have. 
 
 
An idiosyncratic artistry 
 
That distinct type of artistry that the tutors recognise is not obvious at first, certainly not 
for the uninitiated. When I first started volunteering at the workshops, despite my best efforts, 
I struggled to see many of the participants as artists. I use this section to reflect on how I came 
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to recognise and appreciate the participants’ artistry. I will then discuss how the recognition 
of this artistry contributes to the debate on the value of engaging with people with learning 
disabilities. 
The first participant I ever assisted as a volunteer was a blind woman. Tutor Rory asked 
me to set up a canvas while he mixed paints for her. From the corner of my eye, I caught a 
glimpse of the emerald green, mustard yellow, and steely blue acrylics. I understood that 
painting had a sensorial character, and slapping thick acrylic on a canvas with broad strokes 
was a fun and satisfying thing to do. However, the attention Rory spent on making sure the 
colours were right and that the canvas was properly primed did not strike me as necessary.  
I was not the only one who experienced such confusion. 
The tutors told me stories about support workers who did not understand how to 
facilitate participants’ artmaking. For instance, there was a support worker who drew outlines 
and asked participants to colour them in, which the tutors perceived as patronising. I also 
heard about a support worker who drew a local football club’s logo on their client’s painting, 
thus disrespecting not only the participant’s work but also the studio’s. In most cases, 
however, tensions stemmed from support workers who exerted overt control over the 
artmaking process. They tended to do so out of the assumption that the participant did not 
have the capacity to do art “the right way”.  
I witnessed these tensions come to surface during an outreach programme I attended 
with tutor Rory and participant Joshua (which I discussed in chapter four). Each week the 
three of us went on a road trip to a community centre in the outskirts of Dundee, a small city 
on the east coast, famous for allegedly being the sunniest region in Scotland. Dundee, despite 
its lively grassroots arts and music community, has very little art provision for people with 
learning disabilities. The eight-weeks-long outreach was a pilot for setting up a longer-term 
local workshop series.  
Ella was one of the local participants, a middle aged woman with mild learning 
disabilities, a broad smile, and pixie blond hair. Ella was also a dog lover. One of projects she 
undertook at the outreach was a large collage: using colourful, semi-transparent papers, Ella 
traced the outlines of small photographs of different breeds, then cut around the figures, and 
glued them together on a heavy paper. Ella’s drawings were remarkable. Her outlines did not 
follow the photographs she used as references. Instead, her dogs had eerie proportions, and 
expressive, anthropomorphic faces.  
Ella attended one of the workshops with her support worker, Grace, a jovial, middle 
aged woman. Grace seemed invested in Ella’s work, and kept a close eye on Ella’s drawings, 
instructing her to follow the lines closely when tracing outlines. At the end of the workshop, 
Grace remarked to tutor Rory that Ella did not have the attention to detail to do these 
drawings right. 
Rory disagreed. In response, he pulled out Ella’s drawings from the previous week and 
showed Grace that although some of the dogs did not look like the original picture – some 
hardly looked like dogs – that was what made them unique. The ones Ella made under 
Grace’s supervision looked like an outline-filter on Photoshop. Ella’s own drawings, on the 
contrary, were unexpected and had so much more character to them.  
Originality, quirkiness, charm, and the ability to surprise were among the most cited 
reasons for appreciating someone’s work. Trained artists who frequented the studio, including 
tutors, volunteers, and resident artists often spoke about the quirky elements of participants’ 
works that made the art so charismatic and instantly recognisable. For instance, anything with 
small repeated patterns concentrated in a small part of the canvas would be Aysha’s work. Or: 
confident, unbroken, broad lines depicting jovial figures were indicative of Amir’s paintings. 
Alternatively: Wes Anderson-like pastel colours in ornament graphite outlines were most 
defining features of Rhona’s artwork.  
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Some of these stylistic idiosyncrasies derive from participants’ sensorial preferences for 
techniques, materials, and colours, which they develop over time by trying out different ways 
of making art. But some of them are extensions of their learning impairment. For instance, 
Gerard, one of the elderly participants who often dresses in colourful shirts reminiscent of 
summer beach holidays is well known for his lively, fluid non-figurative paintings. Gerard’s 
paintings have a beautiful serene quality and spontaneity of ink patches with complementary 
colours coming together.  
Gerard has limited mobility in is hands and wrists. He can only hold a brush in a 
slightly tilted way; he struggles with tools that require specific angles and pressures, like 
fountainpens or roller brushes. He also has very little verbal language, so it is usually up to 
the staff and volunteers to prepare him the papers, brushes, and paints. Gerard seems to be 
happy drawing with whatever material is presented to him. He usually grabs the brush closest 
to him and seemingly does not look at the paint pot he dips his brush in. He then paints the 
same corner of the paper – the one he can reach with his hand – until a tutor or volunteer 
either moves the paper for him, or asks him if he thinks the painting is done (which means 
they think it is at the edge of being overworked), to which he drops his brush and makes a 
sound that sounds like he says “done”. 
Arguably, part of what lends Gerard’s works their balanced character is the tutors’ and 
volunteers’ ability to select the paper, colours, and materials for Gerard. However, it is the 
way Gerard moves his wrists with sudden, tight, forceful movements – indicative of the 
restricted mobility he has in his hands – that make the brush strokes bold and striking. 
Gerard’s impairments, learning and physical, enable his artistry rather than limit it. 
 
Two of Gerard’s exhibited paintings exhibited in the studio gallery. Photos by TTP. 
 
Similar to Gerard, a participant’s lack of ability to translate two-dimensional shapes into 
three-dimensional clay models may result in a sculpture of a rabbit that looks like an adult 
cartoon high on psychoactive substances; unawareness of the rules of glazing can create a 
clay tile that resembles one of H.R. Giger’s nightmarish visions; or the inability trace lines 
can transform Degas’s painting into an expressionist piece of work. The limits posed by 
impairment can translate into a recognisable artistic style. 
The opposite can also happen. Participants can take longer to develop a style, which the 
staff sometimes attribute to their high levels of technical mastery. Glynn, a former house 
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painter in his early fifties is one of these participants. Glynn has grey hair, a gregarious 
presence, and a walking stick to assist him. Unlike the majority of the participants in the 
workshop, he does not have learning disabilities. He started attending the workshops seven 
years ago when he suffered a serious stroke, as a result of which he lost mobility to the right – 
the dominant – side of his body. The stroke had a major impact on his speech. The staff 
members told me that when he had first started coming to Project Ability, he could not talk. 
By the time I met him, albeit slow in verbal articulation and comprehension, he was able to 
have conversations. Glynn taught himself to paint with his left hand. Over the years, he 
developed such dexterity and technical mastery that he became a minor sensation in the local 
newspaper.  
Glynn is well versed in most techniques, from oils to acrylics to pastels. Like most 
participants, he uses photographs as references. Unlike most participants, Glynn can recreate 
these photographs almost perfectly. Although his skills are much admired, some staff 
members told me they are now working together with Glynn to help him develop his own 
style. One of the staff members explained, Glynn’s ability to copy other artists’ works makes 
him a bit of a “forger”: stylistically, there is little in his paintings that are his own. This sets 
him apart from most other participants, most of whom radically reinterpret their photographic 
references while recreating them.  
The unique, spontaneous qualities of participants’ work is admired partly because 
trained artists struggle to reproduce them. I asked Flora, a recent art school graduate and 
painter by training why that was. She said, “In art school, it’s always in the back of your mind 
that your work might be graded, or you’re going to have to explain yourself, explain your 
process, justify why you’ve done something, show people your research. I think that really 
hurts your practice,” she said.  
Flora’s sentiment reflects the tradition of outsider art (or art brut, as it was originally 
called). The concept was first articulated by painter and sculptor Jean Dubuffet in 1948 to 
describe to art made by artists without any formal training. Dubuffet saw these artists as 
original, raw, untainted alternative to academic art at the time, which was weighed down by 
unnecessary and arbitrary rules. Outsider art has lost some its novelty in the decades since, as 
its value has been widely acknowledged by academic art institutions as well as the art market 
(Maclagan, 2010). However, for people with disabilities, outsider art has opened up new 
venues of recognition, via acknowledgement as legitimate artists, reclaim their identity from 
the medical establishment, question the socially sanctioned standards for ‘normality’, and 
provided new venues for communication in artistic practice and in special education (Wexler 
and Derby, 2015). Because proponents of outsider art saw creative value in art created beyond 
the establishment, it inevitably developed an affinity for art made at the margins of society: 
prisons, asylums, and mental hospital.  
Art made by people with disabilities was heavily represented in the genre. Many of the 
Project Ability artists share a history with the outsider art movement as former residents of 
long-stay institutions. There are also elements of outsider art in the way Project Ability 
appreciates its participants’ art. The originality, quirk, and unexpected qualities in 
participants’ artwork are similar to what Dubuffet saw in the works of untrained artists.  
However, the staff do not identify with the practice nor ethos of outsider art. This is 
partly because of the current state of outsider art: once a fringe and radical movement, 
outsider art is now widely acknowledged, recognised, and valued by the mainstream. Perhaps 
most indicative of this is that several volunteers I spoke to regarded themselves outsider 
artists – despite their art school training. “Anybody can be an outsider artist,” Lesley, the 
director said. She did not seem to attribute much descriptive value to the term. “It’s very 
fashionable,” she said with a shrug.  
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Another reason why outsider art does not quite fit with the studio is that outsider art 
locates value in the artistic unintelligibility stemming from the social exclusion of outsider 
artists (Maclagan, 2010), which echoed pre-existent, romanticised, and highly problematic 
associations of creativity with vulnerability, and mental illness in particular (Cardinal, 2009; 
Parr, 2011; Wexler and Derby, 2015). Although the workshops work with their participants’ 
impairments to develop their artistic style, it does not romanticise participants’ disabilities.  
Instead of locating the value of the artworks in its technical mastery or ability to 
represent the artists’ inner world, tutors emphasise the surprising, quirky charismatic, 
unexpected, unique, and recognisable elements in the participants’ style. Tutors often take the 
time to take in the artworks and articulate what they like to support workers, other staff 
members, or to the participants themselves. They point at the colour combinations, the 
patterns, placement, and lines they find striking. They speak about famous artists whose work 
they are reminded of: contemporary neo-expressionist artists, such as Jean Michel Basquiat 
and Cy Twombly are recurring names.  
Vocalising appreciation for someone’s artwork has a pedagogical quality. It serves to 
explain to outsiders – like support workers, family members, or visitors – why the artworks 
hold an artistic value. Tutor Rory remarked that some support workers did not know how to 
appreciate the participants’ art because a lot of it looked like messy paint. “But a lot of 
famous art is just messy paint,” Rory said. “It’s the energy and spontaneity that we’re trying 
to channel.” 
The practice of vocalising appreciation was a way in which tutors rendered themselves 
open to the artistry of participants. Staff worked to reframe the idiosyncratic elements of 
participants work as not a result of impairment but as an extension of their artistic style. For 
instance, Gerard’s solo exhibition at the studio gallery made no mention of Gerard’s limited 
mobility in his hands that limit the ways in which he can apply brushstrokes to his canvas. 
Instead, the information pamphlets emphasised his unique style comprising a balance of 
delicate line work and heavy brushstrokes, artistic confidence, and ability to work across 
multiple mediums and adapt materials to suit his style.  
These practices of appreciation not only enable staff to admire the participants’ art but 
also trains them to see the artistry, and open themselves to the possibility to be touched by 
participants as artists. I was similarly encouraged to spend time looking at participants’ works 
this way: to speak about what I found aesthetically pleasing, funny, surprising about them, or 
what they reminded me of. Some of them evoked admiration because they looked striking. 
Others made me laugh by their wit and humour, intentional or not. Following my initial 




The examples I cited, as well as my journey of learning to see the artistry of and 
appreciate the artworks of the participants reveal a number of things about the value of art in 
the workshops. The tutors valued helping participants not (only) because they demonstrated 
technical competence or conceptual intent, or because they perceived art to be an enjoyable, 
therapeutic activity in itself, regardless of output. Instead, the tutors recognised a form of 
idiosyncratic artistry in the participants’ works, one whose value lay in its ability to be 
unexpected, quirky, and charismatic. This kind of artistry was supported not by helping 
participants overcome the limitations of their impairments; rather, it was developed as an 
extension of participants’ learning disabilities.  
More importantly, participants’ idiosyncratic artistry is not immediately obvious to an 
uninitiated observer. Instead, the ability to recognise and appreciate is a capacity that is 
cultivated by actively seeking and highlighting the unexpected elements of the work. This is 
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not to say that the value of the participants’ artwork lies completely in the eyes of the tutors. 
Instead, what I aimed to demonstrate with these examples is that the value of art is an active, 
relational achievement, as it requires the beholder to sensitise themselves the artworks 
aesthetic and affective value. 
 
 
A different form of agency 
 
How do the ethnographic examples on the artistry and value link to broader question on 
valuable engagement? Going back to the debate around the debate around the relationship 
between rational agency and valuable engagement, so far, I have examined the value of 
facilitating artmaking in relation the two opposite positions: 1) one which argues that 
engagement with people with learning disabilities is valuable because, with support, they are 
capable of developing the same capacities associated with rational agency, and 2) one that 
considers rational agency irrelevant to the value of engagement. While I am sympathetic with 
both positions, I observed that neither provide a complete picture of tutor-participant 
engagement. 
Anthropologist Patrick McKearney (2018a) observed similar limitations when he 
examined carer interactions with people with significant learning disabilities. Working as a 
caregiver in a group home, McKearney noted that the carers often told each other stories 
about participants in which they emphasised the residents’ emotional sensitivity and ability to 
evoke emotional responses from their caregivers. McKearney, having undergone training as a 
carer himself, noted that these stories served to sensitise carers to the ways they could 
recognise residents as agents, and subsequently become open to be affected by them. The 
carers did not deny residents’ agency on the basis of the argument that agency was not 
necessary for people to be treated with justice and dignity. Yet, neither did they imbue the 
residents with rational agency. Instead, carers engaged with the residents as “unruly, 
immediate, disruptive, embodied and charismatic” agents (p.56).  
The idea that agency can be other than rational is helpful. Rational agency locates one’s 
capacity for action – comprising the capacity to engage in valuable social relations and make 
moral decision – in one’s ability to be rational: to reason and act with intent in accordance 
with one’s deliberation. However, McKearney’s (2018a) account as well as my ethnographic 
examples make the case for decoupling agency from rationality. The residents who  
McKearney (2018a) worked with affected their care-givers not by the exercising the 
capacities associated with rational agency, i.e. by their reasoning skills, intent, or moral 
action. Similarly, neither did (most of) the participants at Project Ability participants impress 
with their technical or conceptual mastery. In both cases, residents and participants 
demonstrated agency, but in neither cases was their agency perceived and appreciated as 
rational. 
The interaction between tutors and participants reveals that tutors recognise a distinct 
form of agency participants. Tutors do not equate participants’ artistic abilities with the 
abilities of trained artists who have technical and conceptual mastery. They do not operate 
under the assumption that given adequate support, participants at the workshops will be able 
to produce artwork that is just like the art made by artists without learning disabilities. Instead 
of cognitive competence, this kind of (artistic) agency manifests as one’s ability to experience 
and sensorial and affective pleasures: to experience these pleasures when making art, and to 
evoke such pleasures in those observing the art.  
Supporting participants to exert such agency means providing them with the personal 
and material necessities to explore their sensorial preferences, to encourage their confidence 
with materials and colour, and enable them to experience pleasure. This is in line with 
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Kittay’s (1999) argument that development for people with significant learning disabilities 
should concentrate on relational, affective, and sensorial capacities. Yet, I differ from Kittay 
in that I am interested in how these capacities enable agency. Kittay (1999) is little concerned 
with exploring the agentive possibilities of these capacities because her central argument is 
that valuable interaction does not need agency. However, the ethnographic examples from the 
workshops suggest the opposite: that the ability to experience and evoke pleasure and 
emotions can contribute to one’s capacity for action. In this case of Project Ability, this means 
creating art and growing as artists, making an impact on other artists’ work, and evoking 
appreciation and affect from audiences.  
There is a rich body of scholarship which examines pleasure as an enabler of agency. 
Writers in this field examined the various ways in which dancing (Driessen, 2018), self-care 
(Pols, 2006), and eating (Vogel and Mol, 2014) can produce sociality, preferences, sense of 
self, and a sense of achievement. However, their primary focus are the benefits of engaging in 
the process of these activities; they rarely discuss the qualities of the said activity – i.e. the 
dance, the cleanliness, food – itself.  
Similarly, the literature on learning disabilities and the arts in service provision does not 
discuss the qualities of the artistic outputs. Visual arts, music, and theatre performed by 
people with learning disabilities is almost exclusively discussed in the context of art therapy 
and service provision, both of which locate the value of art in the artistic process. These 
analytical frameworks examine art in relation to its potential to promote sociality and 
belonging (Hall, 2013; Venn et al., 1993), mental health and wellbeing (Heenan, 2006), 
perception and self-expression (Wexler, 2012), to reclaim the meaning and experience of 
disability (Ware, 2011).  
Often neglected are the qualities of the artistic medium – including the people, ideas, 
and materials – that are an essential part of this. Hall (2013) suggests, the physicality and 
sensoriality of the materials generate emotional and bodily engagement. “People with learning 
disabilities are often constrained in their daily lives by sociocultural expectations of behaviour 
and appearance;” Hall (2013) writes, “in the private and free space and open process of 
devising,” meaning collaborative artmaking, “bodily and mental creativity can be expressed 
and emotions explored away from the judging gaze of the majority society” (p.251). The 
artists that Hall (2013) spoke to (disabled and non-disabled alike) all felt that the embodied 
character of their art allowed them to be safe, spontaneous, and unhinged.  Hall (2013) 
subsequently concludes that by it is by investing in the creative work and the artistry that 
enables learning disabled artists to engage in practices of belonging: of gifting and receiving 
the artwork or performance. In his interviews, the staff members tell Hall (2013) what they 
see in the artworks: the “human hand”, the “energy”, the palpable “love of creating” (p.253). 
These elements echo how the tutors at Project Ability perceive the participants’ artworks. 
However, Hall does examine the cultivation of artistry and appreciation further than this, as 
his interest lies in the relationships that giving and receiving art creates. 
Notably, Hall (2013) is one of the few writers who makes the art central to analysing the 
benefits of the artistic process. The literature on learning disabilities art in the context of art 
therapy and service provision considers the artistic product secondary to the benefits that its 
making brings.  
I contribute to these bodies of scholarship by approaching value and appreciation as 
practice. The ethnographic examples I cited reveal that appreciating the artworks takes work: 
it is an ongoing practice of training one’s attention to the details in the artwork that convey 
the energy and spontaneity that non-disabled artists working with learning disabled artists 
take note of. Focusing solely on the value and appreciation of the process misses a 
fundamental element of value: that it is investment and care about the end product that 
enables participants’ artistic agency and enables engagement with them as artists. This kind of 
 120 
engagement comprises not only the technical aspects of artmaking but also a commitment to 





What makes one valuable to the lives of others is a central preoccupation of citizenship 
theories in that they seek to describe how we live with others as a collective, and what makes 
a collective more than the sum of individuals (Lazar, 2013). In contractarian theories, the 
value of engaging with fellow citizens is conceived in terms of mutual advantage (discussed 
in chapter one), which relies on one’s ability to act with rational agency (Nussbaum, 2006). 
Liberal theories place value in one’s ability to reason, deliberate, and act with intent, as these 
are the capacities that enable citizens to consent to and uphold the social contract. The same 
theories often denied people with learning disabilities rational agency, thus excluding them 
from venues of social participation through which they could become a valuable part of 
society.  
The learning disability scholarship has traditionally resisted this exclusion by either 
setting out to prove that with support, people with learning disabilities could develop rational 
agency too; or by dismissing the importance of rational agency altogether.  In this chapter, I 
explored an alternative ways in which engaging with people with (significant) learning 
disabilities could valuable beyond the notion of rational agency. I did so through examining 
why tutors found helping participants make art valuable. I contended that neither of the two 
major approaches in the learning disability scholarship provided a complete answer. The 
tutors did not see (most) participants as artists who could develop the same technical and 
conceptual competence as non-disabled artists, nor did they dismiss the importance of artistry 
altogether in favour of foregrounding the benefits of the artistic process alone. Instead, I 
observed that the tutors recognised participants as idiosyncratic, charismatic, and quirky 
artists, the value of whose art lay in their ability to surprise and affect those who viewed it. I 
further observed that the tutors actively learnt and taught others to appreciate the participants’ 
art and to recognise their artistry by vocalising what they liked about the art and seeking out 
the quirky elements they liked. These practices sensitised them to aesthetic and affective 
value of the artwork. 
Examining art and other creative practices provides answers to the larger question of 
why any of us should engage with people with learning disabilities? A key message to take 
away from this is that even if people with learning disabilities are not perceived as rational 
agents, they have the capacity to act upon others by evoking appreciation, surprise, affection, 
and enjoyment. And to be able to recognise their charisma, we need to put in the work to 
sensitive ourselves to it, render ourselves vulnerable and appreciative of it.  
Therein lies two lessons for citizenship. Although I have discussed at length in this 
thesis how the social contract is exclusive of people with learning disabilities, it is worth 
noting that its narrow view of personhood can limit the way we understand all social 
exchanges, not only ones with people with learning disabilities. Evoking appreciation, 
surprise, affection, enjoyment are forms of agency that anyone can develop or already 
possesses: recognising it more explicitly can contribute more inclusive understandings of 
citizenship. The second lesson is this: the citizenship of people with learning disabilities is a 
relational achievement. For them to become citizens, it is not enough that they learn to inhabit 
the ideals of citizenship, but it is essential that non-disabled people also undertake a similar 









Chapter eight:  






I started this thesis by asking what citizenship means for people with learning 
disabilities in their everyday lives, and how they can be supported by those who work with 
and care for them. I set out to explore these questions with the goals of, firstly, to document 
positive practices of support, and secondly, to articulate more inclusive conceptualisations of 
citizenship that take into account people with learning disabilities as a diverse group of 
individuals who require specific social arrangements to accommodate their impairments. In 
my enquiry, I departed from rights-based approaches to citizenship. Instead, I regarded 
citizenship as an essentially contested and polyvalent concept, which could be 
ethnographically derived from everyday practice. In framing my approach to citizenship, I 
partly drew on philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s (2006, 2009) capabilities approach. 
Specifically, I focused on the notion that a just society promotes conditions that allows 
individuals to live a life of dignity, and provides affirmative measures for humans to develop, 
flourish, and engage with others to the best of their capacities. This helped me foreground 
positive interventions and atypical social arrangements, and led to examine what should 
happen once the social minimum – such as civil, political, and economic rights – are granted. 
Secondly, to frame citizenship as a set of practices, I followed anthropologist Aihwa Ong’s 
(1996) observation that individuals became citizens by the dual process of “self-making and 
being made” (p.737). Subsequently, I examined how people with learning disabilities and 
those who worked with them navigated, negotiated, and rearticulated liberal ideals of 
citizenship, which have been dominating social policy and service provision discourses. 
As I discussed in my first chapter, the challenge and urgency of the task lies in that 
learning disabilities question the very foundations of the way we understand citizenship. The 
problem of learning impairment challenges common liberal Western political philosophy and 
its narratives about how and why we live together as a society: it highlights the contradictions 
in the tale these theories tell about humans, as rational individuals, coming together and 
cooperating in pursuit of mutual advantage.  
I have argued that liberal ideas are fundamentally exclusive of people with learning 
disabilities. Yet, their understanding of personhood and participation frame the way society 
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engages with and relates to people with learning disabilities, from policy, to service provision, 
to personal support. These ideas are present in the way institutional prioritises employment, 
financial independence, and autonomy over emotional and social life. In addition, they often 
provided justification for the privatisation and funding withdrawal from the social care sector. 
All this contributes to the social exclusion, isolation, discrimination that are part of the day-to-
day existence of many individuals with learning disabilities. As long as social policy and 
service provision uncritically deploy liberal understandings of citizenship, they will struggle 
to address the enduring social inequalities and injustices people with  continue to experience.  
Taking seriously the contention that people with learning disabilities are citizens requires 
rethinking what citizenship entails beyond being a buzzword in policy publications.  
At the same time, what has hopefully become apparent from this thesis is that liberal 
ideals of citizenship are not simply exclusive and oppressive. On the contrary, individuals 
also demonstrate tremendous agency in manipulating, negotiating, navigating, and 
strategically deploying various meanings of citizenship. They do so to claim rights, pursue 
their personal aspirations, and to engage with others and in activities they hold valuable. 
Enacting citizenship is thus an ongoing process, which takes a lot of work on the part of 
individuals with learning disabilities and those who work with them. This means that 
advocating for their citizenship requires the recognition and support of these practices, in 
addition to upholding and enforcing legal rights. 
I had two goals when presenting my ethnographic material. The first one was to 
examine what liberal ideals of citizenship meant in practice, and simultaneously demonstrate 
that it was possible to help people with learning disabilities to make choices (chapter four), 
to become independent (chapter five), to be social (chapter six), and to be recognised as 
valuable to the lives of others (chapter seven). The practicalities of such support are 
important not only because they provide a know-how for care provision, but also because they 
represent various forms of ethical engagement with people whose inner lives, desires, and 
aspirations are often brushed off, and whose historical mistreatment continues to present day. 
My second goal was to demonstrate that a different, more inclusive understandings of 
citizenship was possible. Past ideologies, such as deinstitutionalisation, normalisation, the 
social model, independent living, and personalisation have all shaped the ways in which the 
social position (and hence the citizenship) of people with learning disabilities was imagined. 
Since their conception, these theories have been extensively critiqued and revised. Yet, 
learning disability scholars Johnson and Walmsley (2010) lament, some of the constructive 
criticism has raised such negative reactions, which seemed to have stifled the development of 
new ideas. I discussed this in chapter two, where I argued that the lack of theorisation on 
learning disabilities resulted in disability studies and activism glossing over the specific needs 
of people with learning disabilities, especially of those with significant impairments. This has 
been partially responsible for the lack of imagination in learning disability policy and service 
provision, leading to the regurgitation of the same debates around autonomy and 
independence. 
I took upon the anthropological task to move beyond these tired debates: as 
anthropologist Tim Ingold (2017b) writes, anthropology is, after all, a “critical inquiry into 
the conditions and possibilities of human life in the one world we all inhabit” (p.22). In order 
to focus on the “possibilities of human life”, I drew on Kulick and Rydström’s (2015) 
suggestion to approach learning disability as a productive condition that creates new 
understandings of agency, personhood, relationships.  
I explored these questions by observing the way people with learning disabilities make 
art. Artmaking reveals much about citizenship: it requires engaging with concepts that imbue 
citizenship narratives, such as (artistic) choice-making and community membership. It 
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demands us to reflect on what being independent and responsible means, especially when the 
activities carry an element of risk. It finally asks: what is the value of any of these activities?  
I discussed these in my ethnographic chapters. I dedicated chapter four and five to 
explore the way leaning disabled citizens can practice self-determination. In chapter four, I 
looked at the ways participants were helped to make choices in the art workshop. I argued that 
because participants did not always know what they wanted to do, and often had difficulties 
verbally articulating their desires, the tutors looked for sensorial cues to help them explore 
different options and develop preferences. Chapter five I dedicated to exploring the idea of 
independence, and what it meant to support someone in the age of risk management. I argued 
that independence inevitably carried risks that could be either minimised by removing the 
individual from the environment, or by increasing support to ensure that individuals could 
safely navigate it. I observed that while the workshop opted for the latter, many participants 
experienced the former approach to risk management in other areas of their lives.  
In the second half of the thesis, I turned my attention to the relational aspects of 
citizenship. In chapter six, I discussed the diversity of social lives. I demonstrated that 
although many participants may not have seemed like they were engaging with the social 
environment, they were often social in a quiet, unconventional, blink-and-you-miss-it way. 
Finally, in chapter seven I asked why the tutors (and the organisation) cared about the 
participants’ artworks, and what their care revealed about the value of engaging with people 
with learning disabilities. I argued that the tutors recognised the participants as idiosyncratic 
artists whose recognisable style was an extension of their learning impairment.  
In this final chapter, I want to return to my initial questions of citizenship: how is it 
lived, what support does it require, and what new articulation of citizenship does it reveal if 
any? Following a methodological reflection, I will explore these questions through three 
overarching themes that emerged from the ethnographic material. These themes are: 1) 
citizenship as (self-)cultivation, 2) the sensorial aspects of citizenship, and 3) the material 
conditions of citizenship. Once I unpacked these three themes, I will discuss what all this 
means for the citizenship of people with learning disabilities.  
 
 
A methodological reflection 
 
Social research with people with learning disabilities has predominantly involved so-
called inclusive research, a method that engages people with learning disabilities as co-
researchers. I did not undertake inclusive research; instead, I conducted a long-term 
ethnography and participant observation. I approached fieldwork as a form of cultural 
apprenticeship: a process whereby I immersed myself in the world of the participants, 
systematically questioned my pre-existent assumptions, and acquired new skills and 
perceptions through engaging with, responding to, and undertaking collaborative action with 
the people in the field (Jenkins, 1994). 
I started fieldwork as a complete outsider. Prior to joining the Project Ability 
workshops, I had very little experience in interacting with people with learning disabilities, 
and I did not know much about artmaking outside of the occasional hobbyist’s venture into 
life drawing. I came to this project as someone who completed a graduate degree in medical 
anthropology and was interested in theories of citizenship and embodiment. For me, learning 
disabilities had been first and foremost a concept through which I could explore questions 
about the margins of belonging and the possibilities of mobilisation – the workshops radically 
shifted my priorities and perspective in this respect.  
At the beginning of the fieldwork, I felt a sense of disjuncture and displacement – a 
common sentiment for anthropologists as they enter the participants’ world as novices (Blasco 
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and Wardle, 2006). I was pushed out of the comfort of academia, and was dropped into an 
environment where I found the interactions impenetrable, and the activities far beyond my 
skillset. As I developed familiarity with the people in the workshop, I went from being a 
complete outsider to being accepted by the Project Ability community. As part of this 
transformation, I became familiar with a wide range of artistic techniques, which enabled me 
to work more closely with the participants as volunteer-researcher. As part of this process, I 
came to further appreciate life within the workshops. I recognised the level of skill, attention, 
patience, and empathy that the tutors and participants demonstrated towards each other. I also 
learnt to recognise the artistry of the participants. I developed close relationships with them 
and became deeply invested in their wellbeing. By the end of the fieldwork, people with 
learning disabilities ceased to be a topic of purely intellectual interest for me; they shaped and 
fuelled my sense of justice.  
I also developed further appreciation for Project Ability as a service provider. The 
standard mode of knowledge production in which anthropology tends to operate is critique 
and judgement, which goes hand in hand with the analytical imperative to deconstruct and 
contextualise practices that anthropologists observe (Jenkins, 1994; McKearney, 2019). 
However, not only did Project Ability’s treatment of people with learning disabilities stand up 
to my anthropological scrutiny; I found myself humbled by the level of skill, experience, and 
labour that the organisation demonstrated in engaging with its service users. 
The learning process I undertook as a kind of apprentice was a series of trial and error, 
throughout which I made mistakes in my role as a volunteer. For instance, I overwhelmed 
participants with options because I had thought it helped their choice-making; I suggested 
artmaking techniques that did not consider their impairments; I handed them the wrong art 
material because I did not listen carefully enough to what they had wanted. As much as I was 
mortified at these mistakes at the time, they had a methodological value. They highlighted the 
discrepancy between my pre-existent assumptions about things such as choice, friendship, and 
value, and the way these were understood and practiced by participants. Such anthropological 
engagement is a long-term undertaking: it takes time to get to know people. It also takes time 
to unlearn preconceptions about them, and become open to new ways of knowing.  
My fieldwork presented me with ethical challenges that required me to continuously 
reflect on my roles as researcher and volunteer. In my methods chapter, I wrote that I opted 
for obtaining individual verbal consent for participant observation, which I did by asking 
participants and their support workers if I could sit with them. However, upon reflection, 
some participants may have consented because they perceived me as a volunteer, rather as a 
researcher conducting participant observation. In fact, some of the participants continued to 
refer to me as a volunteer, despite me identifying myself and regularly reminding participants 
about my role as a researcher. In retrospect, instead of verbally explaining my research to the 
participants and their support workers, I should have prepared an easy-read version of my 
research proposal, and formally consulted them prior to my fieldwork – this would have better 
ensured that the participants were informed about my research and about my role. At the time, 
I was concerned about being intrusive and taking up too much of their time by talking about 
my research. I was keenly aware that participants paid for their attendance, and that for many 
of them, being at Project Ability was the highlight of their week. However, my concern may 
have interfered with their ability to give informed consent. 
To help me navigate the ethical complexities resulting from the multiple roles I held as 
researcher, volunteer, and inevitably, friend, I followed the principle of “do no harm” 
(American Anthropologial Association, 2012; Association of Social Anthropologists of the 
UK and and the Commonwealth (ASA), 2011). A subsequent ethical conundrum I faced when 
presenting my ethnographic material was the risk of breaching internal confidentiality 
(Kaiser, 2009; Tolich, 2004). I addressed this by I carefully considering the possible negative 
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impacts that my thesis could have on people if their identities were revealed from my 
descriptions. Because of this, I decided not to include information that I felt could breach 
individuals’ trust, or would present a person in an undignified manner, even if this meant that 
I had fewer ethnographic examples to work with.  
I argued in my methods chapter that although ethnography and participant observation 
were not inclusive by the standards of inclusive research, they were an ethical and 
collaborative way of engaging people with learning disabilities in research. The knowledge I 
acquired during my fieldwork was produced collaboratively with those I encountered and 
engaged with. I did so not by inviting them into the field of academia, but by me entering the 
spaces of their ordinary lives (Kleinman, 1999). I became privy to their knowledge by having 
been present with them, responding to them, and undertaking activities with them. The 
insights I gained were not only “propositions about the world”, but also “skills of perception, 
and capacities of judgement that develop in the course of direct, practical, and sensuous 
engagement” with the surrounding social and physical environment (Ingold, 2014: 387). It 
was an ethical form of engagement because, instead of expecting participants to become 
quasi-researchers, it required me to adapt my research activities to work around individuals’ 
needs and interests. 
By the standards of inclusive research, I was not inclusive. A resultant drawback was 
that the topic of my thesis might not have born correspondence with what people with 
learning disabilities found relevant to their everyday lives. I set the research topic and agenda 
in consultation with other academics and healthcare professionals; however, I did not ask 
people with learning disabilities (and those who worked with them) about their research 
priorities. 
During my fieldwork, I found that participants had little interest in discussing my thesis 
with me; they were more interested in talking about art, politics, and the films they saw over 
the weekend. It may also reflect the gap between what I found interesting as a doctoral 
researcher and what they held important in their everyday lives. In retrospect, having involved 
people with learning disabilities from the outset of the research would have helped me 
formulate, translate, present my research questions in a way that better aligned with the 
interests of my participants. To partially rectify this, during my fieldwork, I had ongoing 
conversations about my research questions and the emerging themes with the people at the 
workshops. Their insights and interests helped me shape the arguments presented in my 
ethnographic chapters. 
However, diverting from inclusive research afforded me a couple of methodological 
advantages. First of all, conducting an ethnography and participant observation allowed me to 
seek out and apply other forms on inclusion in research. By entering the world of participants, 
I took part in the activities they held valuable, adapted to their pace of working, and learnt 
about the stakes they held in their everyday lives. By doing so, I was able to recognise and 
reflect on forms of engagement, interaction, and value that I would have not noticed and 
appreciated otherwise. In the process, I continuously reflected on my positionality, and used 
my misconceptions and mistakes as ethnographic material that held epistemological value. In 
short, my methods allowed me to produce insights I could have not gained with employing 
shorter-term and less participatory forms of qualitative research. 
What transpired from the methodological approach I took is that the inclusivity of the 
research has to derive from ethical engagement and the obligation to respond to participants in 
a genuine and human manner. This involved listening to them, understanding their aspirations 




Citizenship and self-cultivation 
 
In this thesis, I approached citizenship as an essentially contested concept that emerged 
and could be ethnographically derived from everyday practice. As opposed to rights-based 
approaches that use Marshall’s (1950) definition of citizenship-as-status as starting point, the 
practice-based framework allowed me to study citizenship from the “bottom-up”. I 
approached citizenship as a dual process of “self-making” and “being made”, which 
recognised its dynamic nature, and people’s ability to manipulate its meaning and deployment 
for their own ends (Ong, 1996).   
In social policy and service provision, the citizenship for people with learning 
disabilities revolve around the ideals of choice-making, independence, sociality, and social 
contributions. In the past – prior to deinstitutionalisation and the emergence of disability 
rights – people with learning disabilities were seen as lacking the capacity to achieve these 
ideals. Subsequent rights-based perspectives focused on inadequacies in the social, political, 
and material provisions that prevented people from making claims. A practice-based approach 
complements these rights-based perspectives by highlighting that ideals of citizenship are 
cultivated capabilities that develop with time and practice. Having social, political, and 
material rights are a necessary but insufficient condition of citizenship. In addition to being 
guaranteed rights, people with learning disabilities become citizens by continuously engaging 
in acts of citizenship. This engagement helps people develop preferences, imagine further 
possibilities, and thus foster broader aspirations.  
Note that the ways in which these ideals of citizenship are practiced in the workshops 
are different from the way they are understood in social policy. First of all, in the workshops, 
the “success” of these activities is not determined by their outcome, but by their sustainability 
and ability to enable further engagement and activity. Citizenship is not accomplished when 
individuals make a choice, meet a friend, or sell a painting; rather, it is an ongoing process 
that necessitates institutional support and materials by which they can continue to develop the 
capabilities associated with citizenship. This is because each act of citizenship enables further 
acts of citizenship: the more one makes a choice or participates in social life, the better one 
becomes at choice-making and socialising.  
Whereas the rights-based approaches conceptualise citizenship as a status, citizenship-
as-practice is interested in the mechanism by which individuals are transformed into citizens. 
Such a practice-based approach has been recognised in republican traditions of Western 
political philosophy. As opposed to the liberal narratives that envision political life as a 
competition between individuals, republicanism offers a counter-narrative in which 
citizenship is a collective endeavour to pursue the “good life”. These elements can be found in 
Aristotle’s early accounts of citizenship, in which he argued that it was this collective 
undertaking that transformed an individual into a citizen (Beckett, 2006: 25). Such 
foregrounding of collective praxis makes republican narratives an alluring alternative to the 
individualism of liberalism. However, much like liberal theories, republican narratives also do 
not discuss how people with learning disabilities could participate in citizenship practices 
(Carey, 2009a).  
Supporting citizenship practices involves more than ensuring that material conditions 
for citizenship are provided (e.g. options for choice-making, people they can socialise with, 
and venues in which they can be responsible and contributing members of society). Support 
also entails nourishing the inner lives of people by helping them develop preferences and 
aspirations through dialogue and persuasion. As I discussed in my introduction chapter, this 
presents a set of difficulties when inner lives seem incomprehensible or impenetrable by the 
standards of Western liberal philosophy. 
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Unexpectedly, anthropologists working in the field of ethics of Islam in the Middle East 
offer some theoretical directions. A rich body of this anthropological literature has been 
preoccupied with understanding why individuals partook in practices that contradicted 
Western liberal ideals of a “good life”. This confusion is most apparent in the way Muslim 
women in the Middle East are framed, Saba Mahmood (2001, 2005) observes. The subject of 
Mahmood’s seminal ethnography are Egyptian women who participate in the mosque 
movement, which formed as part of a larger wave of the 1970s Islamic Revival. As part of 
their daily practice, women of the mosque movement women undergo strict religious 
education to cultivate modesty. They read Islamic scripts, participate in lectures, and organise 
meetings to teach each other about Islam. Their self-cultivation carries a significant embodied 
dimension: they train their emotions and bodily comportment to align with ideals of modesty.  
The mosque movement enabled women to enter and take on public roles within 
formerly male-dominated field of religious institutions. Yet, Western observers were 
perplexed that these women seemed to willingly engage in practices that reinforced their 
subjugation. Mahmood (2001) argues that this confusion derives from the way Western 
political philosophy understands action and agency in terms of oppression and resistance. For 
Western observers, there are two ways individuals can act in relation to power: one can render 
themselves subservient to power, and hence be oppressed by it; or they can resist it. “What is 
seldom problematized in such an analysis is the universality of the desire – central for liberal 
and progressive thought, and presupposed by the concept of resistance it authorizes – to be 
free from relations of subordination and, for women, from structures of male domination,” 
Mahmood (2001: 206) writes. This dichotomous understanding of agency makes Western 
liberal philosophy ill-equipped to explain why women intentionally participate in Islamic 
practices, apart from circular and patronising explanations that label their actions false 
consciousness and internalised oppression. 
Seeking an alternative framework to make sense of the mosque movement, Mahmood 
(2001) draws on the concept of habitus as embodied pedagogy: “a conscious effort at 
reorienting desires, brought about by the concordance of inward motives, outward action, 
inclination, and emotional states through the repeated practice of virtuous deeds” (p. 215). 
Whereas the liberal framework sees women veiling, practicing patience, and denying 
themselves mundane pleasures as a form of reinforcing patriarchal norms and gendered 
submission, Mahmood suggests that these acts are “technologies of the self” (Foucault, 1976), 
which imbue women with a different modality of agency, and enable them to inhabit the 
world as virtuous subjects. She likens this mode of subjectivation to the way virtuoso pianists 
master their instrument by rendering themselves under strict regimes of practice: the more the 
pianist is acquainted with the musical rules and scales, they more he or she will be able to 
improvise. 
Self-cultivation is an influential and enduring analytical framework in the anthropology 
of Islam and Middle Eastern ethics. Scholars have drawn on it to problematise Western 
interventionism (Abu‐Lughod, 2002; Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2002), and examine a wide 
variety of everyday practices, such as veiling (Crăciun, 2017), dreaming (Mittermaier, 2011), 
or listening (Hirschkind, 2006). Self-cultivation provides a productive theoretical ground for 
this thesis, not least because the desires and aspirations of people with learning disabilities – 
much like that of the women in the mosque movement – pose a similar challenge to Western 
liberal philosophy and the oppression-resistance dichotomy prominent in disability activism. 
It is further helpful for explaining the process of becoming citizens: much like it unveils the 
practices by which Muslim women come to be virtuous, self-cultivation helps document the 
acts by which people with learning disabilities come to be citizens. Self-cultivation provides a 
theoretical framework for the question of: if we recognise people with learning disabilities as 
citizens, how do we engage with them as citizens?  
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A notable example for applying self-cultivation as a framework to understand 
engagement with learning disabilities is anthropologist McKearney’s (2018a) ethnography on 
carers working in group homes housing people with significant learning disabilities, whose 
works I have cited in my previous chapters. Taking theoretical inspiration from 
anthropologists of the Middle East, McKearney frames the carers’ interaction with the 
residents as a form of self-cultivation. Carers in these care homes tell each other stories in 
which the residents – people with significant learning disabilities – are portrayed as 
charismatic and emotional agents who have the capability to surprise those around them. 
McKearney argues that these stories act as form of training through which carers taught 
themselves to relate to the residents as agentive individuals. Drawing on McKearney (2018a), 
I similarly drew on the notion of self-cultivation to frame the process by which the Project 
Ability tutors and volunteers learnt to appreciate participants’ artistry, and rendered 
themselves to be affected by the artworks. 
I wrote in my introduction that the anthropological literature on citizenship-as-practice 
predominantly focuses on organised collective action that redress the relationship between the 
state and individuals. Citizenship as self-cultivation complements these anthropological 
accounts by calling attention to the smaller, less visible practices that focus on less so the 
relationship with the state, and more on interactions between individuals. The lens of self-
cultivation reveals the mechanism by which small, everyday interactions constitute citizens 
and citizenship. It opens the space for enquiries on how the capacities that make someone a 
citizen can be acquired. The ethnographic examples I cited should make it clear that one’s 
capacity for action – to make art, be with people, or make choices – is achieved by 
undergoing said action.  
However, while the self-cultivation scholarship primarily focuses on the individual’s 
intentionality, my fieldwork highlighted that cultivating citizenship is a relational and 
tentative achievement. Firstly, Mahmood’s ethnography focuses on an individual’s cultivation 
of the self; she is less concerned with how such cultivation manifests and is constitutive of 
one’s engagement with others. The women in Mahmood’s ethnography may partake in group 
lectures and seek each other’s advice, their journey is ultimately an individual undertaking. 
The art workshops however demonstrate that such self-cultivation is undertaken in 
relationship with other. The tutors cultivate appreciation by making art together with the 
participants, and the participants cultivate their artistic and social capabilities with the help of 
the tutors and support workers. Ultimately, both processes of self-cultivation are conditional 
to the support relationship.  
Secondly, the women of the Mosque movement work towards clearly defined ideals of 
modesty with intention. They are “success stories” (Schielke, 2009: 36) that have little space 
to acknowledge the indeterminacy and fluidity of their desires and aspirations. On the other 
hand, the workshops demonstrate that developing the capacity to act is a process of trial and 
error, rather than a straightforward pedagogical process that has clear goals from the outset. 
Participants are encouraged to try new things; some take such encouragement more readily 
than others. Not all of the suggestions take to the participants’ liking, but those that do, 
generate further possibilities for participants to partake in activities and engage in 
relationships that they value. 
This is not to say that artmaking in the workshops is a directionless and haphazard 
process, whereby options of all sorts are thrown at people to see what sticks. On the contrary: 
much of it hinges upon the careful and close attention of those who work with people with 
learning disabilities, who ensure that these capacities can be nourished and explored. Recall 
tutor Eilidh, who, by watching the quiet and introverted Scott taking joy in picking dried paint 
deducted that he would enjoy drypoint etching; or support worker Helen, who observed the 
selectively mute Stewart’s amusement at other people’s conversations, and thus inferred that 
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Stewart enjoys being around people, despite appearing disengaged; or tutor Rory, who looked 
for the idiosyncrasies in the participants’ works, and went out of his way to explain to others 
why these unique qualities made the artworks one of their kind. It is by these ongoing efforts 
that people with disabilities were helped to become citizens. 
There is a lot of learning that social policy and service provision can distil from these 
observations. Thinking of citizenship as a form of self-cultivation calls for a relational and 
practice-oriented approach to supporting the citizenship of people with learning disabilities. It 
asks policymakers to take note of the everyday acts and relationships that make individuals 
into citizens, and provide the support needed so that people’s engagement in these practices 
and relationships can be sustained. My ethnographic examples highlight how artistic activities 
and building creative capacity are a vehicle through which people with learning disabilities 
can become citizens. Obviously, more opportunities for people to make art with organisations 
like Project Ability would be welcome. However, more broadly speaking, engagement with 
others in activities that one deems valuable can help people with learning disabilities cultivate 
capabilities associated with citizenship. A shift of emphasis in service provision from 
personal goal setting to the value of collective engagement would be helpful. People with 
learning disabilities need venues in which they can pursue various activities and engage with 
others; they need support services that focus on helping them explore and develop their 
preferences, without a pressure to achieve goals; and they need supportive relationships with 
people with whom they can undertake such activities. 
 
 
Citizenship and sensorial attunement 
 
The relationship between people with learning disabilities and those who support them 
emerged as a second overarching theme of this thesis. One question stood out in particular: 
how did support workers, care givers, and tutors understand the desires of the people who had 
significant impairments and a limited capacity to express themselves with verbal language of 
assistive technologies.  
I observed in my ethnographic chapters that the body of people with limited verbal 
language played a central role in interactions between participants and social care and 
workshop staff members. This was apparent in the way tutors offered participants options, 
suggested new techniques, and helped participants make artistic choices, based on their 
observations of the participants’ sensorial preferences. It is documented by the way support 
workers seemed to be attuned with the participants’ mood, and could tell if they were bored or 
engaged by their silence or posture. This kind of silent, embodied attention also underlay the 
nonverbal sociality of participants who enjoyed and appreciated one another’s company 
without saying a word. 
In the medical and psychiatric literature, preoccupation with  non-verbal interactions 
has predominantly revolved around so-called augmentative and alternative communication. 
This comprises communication technologies that assist individuals with limited speech, 
ranging from simplified language and gestural communication, to visual aids, to speech 
generating devices. The medical and psychiatric discussion is generally concerned with the 
effectiveness of and preferences for different technologies a variety of social and clinical 
contexts (Chinn, 2017; Gevarter et al., 2013; Hong et al., 2016; van der Meer et al., 2011). 
There is also a rich body of literature evaluating interventions to teach communications skills 
to individuals – children, in particular – with significant learning disabilities (Akamoglu and 
Meadan, 2018; Hatton, 1998; Hong et al., 2016; Neely et al., 2018). These studies and 
technologies are undisputedly useful in aiding interaction for people with significant learning 
disabilities. Yet, it is notable that at the workshops, tutors and support workers did not use 
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assistive technologies apart from sign language. Instead, the tutors often spoke about 
developing an embodied connection with the participants through long-term sustained 
engagement, which was the primary – albeit not exclusive – aid for their engagement. 
Surprisingly, the ways in which the body can facilitate communication is little discussed 
in social research on learning disabilities; the body is generally reserved for the medical 
literature where it is regarded as an object of clinical enquiry, which passively endures 
comorbidities. While embodiment is a prominent lens of analysis in disability studies, it is 
predominantly applied to the examination of lived experiences of physical impairment. This 
gives little direction regarding non-verbal engagement with people with limited means to self-
expression. 
An example of research that analyses how care workers interact with people with 
significant learning disabilities is Kulick and Rydström’s (2015) ethnography on disability 
and sex. During his ethnographic fieldwork at a Danish group home, anthropologist Don 
Kulick (in Kulick and Rydström, 2015: 193–195) met Rasmus, a man who had restricted 
mobility and whose verbal language consisted of one-syllable words. Kulick and Rydström 
note that for most of the uninitiated, the noises that Rasmus makes would seem unintelligible. 
That is why they were surprised to find that the staff managed to discern that Rasmus 
preferred to have sex with men. Kulick and Rydström recount the process by which both 
parties were able to understand and discuss these preferences: first, Rasmus’s carers noticed 
that he took little interest in women. Then, a sexual advisor spoke to Rasmus to confirm these 
observations, leading to a social worker helping him find out what exactly Rasmus’s 
preferences for a sexual partner were.  
Getting to this point took much “time, patience, alertness, and empathy,” Kulick and 
Rydström later reflected on the episode (p. 193). Although the staff working with Rasmus 
were able to interpret his sounds and worked out a method by which they could follow up his 
answers with yes/no questions, they did not learn about Rasmus’s preferences using an 
assisted communication strategy with which Rasmus could declare his sexual identity. They 
learnt about it because they paid attention to him and pursued the cues he gave them: they 
sensitised and attuned themselves to the Rasmus’s bodily, sensorial, and tactile preferences.  
Phenomenological literature may shed light on the nature of this type of engagement. 
Unlike the medical literature, which considers the body a passive object of study, the 
phenomenologist’s starting point is that the body is an active subject that provides an 
“existential ground” through which sociality is experienced and practiced (Csordas, 1990). In 
his seminal essay, Csordas (1994) argues for “culturally mediated ways of attending to and 
with one’s body in the surroundings that include the embodied presence of others” (p.138). 
Attention, he writes, is not purely a cognitive and disembodied act, but requires bodily ways 
of engagement.  
An example for what this means in practice is anthropologist Jason Throop’s writing on 
traditional bonesetting on the island of Yap in Micronesia. Throop (2012) takes a 
phenomenological lens to examining embodied forms of understanding between healer and 
patient. Lani, a healer Throop spent time with is generally recognised as an exceptional healer 
in the Yapese community. As a bonesetter, she has developed a sensorial familiarity with the 
joints, muscles, and bones of the body; instead of X-rays and medical tests, she uses her 
tactility to tell if something is wrong. Lani told Throop that her ability to diagnose and heal a 
patient is conditional to the patient feeling the pain: Lani works out what is happening to the 
patient’s body by touching and massaging the pained tissue. However, Throop observes that 
Lani is particularly perceptive of people’s emotional states; this is significant for her 
therapeutic practice, as a misplaced touch could cause further injuries. Even with less 
expressive patients, Throop writes, Lani could tell how much pain they were feeling from 
minuscule changes in muscle tension. 
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What Throop observed between Lani and her patients resonates with the interactions I 
observed at the workshops. The way tutors and support workers understood participants’ 
seemingly fleeting and indiscernible body language is indicative of an embodied form of 
attention. Throop (2012) writes that these forms of understanding “complement and yet 
importantly extend what are at times the often overly intellectualist, emotional, or discursive 
views of empathy that are prevalent in contemporary philosophical and social theories” (p. 
424).  
If embodied experiences mediate social relationships, it does not take a big leap to 
examine the way in which they shape the rules of belonging that constitute citizenship. In 
much of disability studies, embodied citizenship is discussed inasmuch as it relates to the 
ways bodily difference excludes people from participation, such as access to employment and 
education. These are important works from a social justice perspective. However, in 
predominantly framing embodied citizenship in terms of what is being done to the bodies of 
disabled people, there is a risk of framing bodies as passive objects onto which oppressive 
structures – disablist policies, language, imagination – are inscribed (Bacchi and Beasley, 
2002). As feminist scholars Bacchi and Beasley (2002) argue that contrary to bodies being 
simply a blank canvas that reflect social structures, embodied experiences of the everyday life 
simultaneously shape and are being shaped by individuals’ self and sociality. In line with the 
phenomenological tradition, examining embodied citizenship is must not be limited to the 
study of how citizenship excludes certain bodies; it also needs to explore how embodied 
experiences make citizen subjectivities.  
Although it has been long recognised that bodies and sociality are co-constitutive (see 
Bourdieu, 1977; Howes, 2010), the anthropological scholarship has only recently started to 
explore it in relation to the concept of citizenship. In their edited book, Trnka et al. (2013) 
display a wide range of ways in which communities are constituted through the cultivation of 
sensorial practice in relation to, for example, taste (Newcomb, 2013), dance (Hughes-
Freeland, 2013), and sound (Booth, 2013).  
For instance, Rachel Newcomb (2013) discusses they ways in which the post-2000s 
economic liberalisation changed the sensorial modes in which Moroccan people engaged with 
their food, thereby the way Moroccan citizenship and identity were formed. Newcomb argues, 
economic liberalisation created the citizen-consumer via fundamentally changing diets, eating 
schedules, and grocery shopping habits. This also changed people’s sensory experience of 
food: the introduction of ready-made meals to Moroccan cuisine, while sanitised 
supermarkets replaced olfactory overload of traditional food markets. Newcomb’s work 
highlights how facets of citizenship are mediated by the senses: the construction of the citizen 
predicates upon the naturalisation of certain ways of sensing, tasting, smelling. 
These sensorial aspects of the citizenship of individuals with significant learning 
disabilities often go unacknowledged in favour of cognitivised, abstract, and disembodied 
formulations of citizenship. In the art workshops, embodied forms of attention, empathy, and 
connection provide a language by which the tutors, support workers, and participants interact 
with each other. The tutors and support workers rely on this type of embodied understanding 
to help participants make choices, make art, and socialise.  
These are more than just strategies tutors and support workers employ to help 
participants make art. They are the basic mechanism by which participants are supported to 
practice the ideals of citizenship. This approach to the body is different from that in pre-
existent medical and psychological literature, where bodies are seen as passive objects onto 
which social and health inequalities inscribe themselves (as ill health, comorbidities, and 
impairment). When the embodied basis of interactions are foregrounded, the bodies of people 
with learning disabilities transform into an active subject that makes individuals into citizens. 
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Examining and documenting the existence and cultivation of sensorial citizenship therefore 
provides an alternative to current exclusive narratives of what makes a citizen.  
These observations give a clear outline of the qualities that make a good care and 
support worker: someone who recognises different forms of communication, is perceptive to 
sensory cues, and has the attention, patience, and sensitivity to interact with care-recipients 
with an embodied language. These qualities need to be recognised and nurtured, as they can 
be taught and learned. Although most people I met at the workshops engaged with people 
with learning disabilities with a sensorial attentiveness which they learnt on the job, social 
policy and service provision could provide more formalised training and support for those 
who are new to the field. 
 
 
The material conditions of citizenship 
 
This kind of personal support is contingent on the relationship between care provider 
and recipient, the space for experimentation and indeterminacy, and material resources. 
However, social care provision not only falls short by failing to provide adequate time, 
materials, and space for care-relationships to develop (Needham, 2014); the principle under 
which social care is organised – personalisation and austerity – is fundamentally unprepared 
to meet these needs. 
The spending cuts created working conditions that prevented carers and care recipients 
from being able to establish a close and personal working relationship. The cuts resulted in 
staff shortages and increased workloads for support workers, which meant they had to take on 
caring responsibilities for multiple people in a day. Subsequently, they were afforded reduced 
time that they could spend with individual care recipients (Brimblecombe et al., 2018). Both 
care workers and families of care recipient have raised concerns with the subsequent decrease 
in the quality of care (Malli et al., 2018).  
At the same time, paid care work was deskilled and devalued: there is little training for 
people entering support work. Those who provide care do so on low wages, and their labour is 
considered replaceable (UNISON, 2018). This means that care recipients do not have 
continuity of care and may be assigned a different person to help them with their daily 
activities without much notice. The hours of support care recipients are entitled to have also 
been reduced, placing additional time and emotional pressures on unpaid carers, many of 
whom faced difficulties balancing their care responsibilities and their employment 
(Brimblecombe et al., 2018). The language of choice, control, and independence in the 
personalisation agenda offers little guidance for such a resource-poor context: policy 
documents do not discuss the care provider-recipient relationship. 
The same applies to the working conditions of staff employed at third sector service 
providers like Project Ability. Unlike many similar services in Scotland, Project Ability’s art 
workshops survived austerity. However, despite a growth in their attendance – due to cuts to 
other services – staffing did not increase: the same number of tutors continue to run the 
workshop, while number of attendants doubled in size. At the time of my fieldwork, the tutors 
had not received a pay raise for fifteen years. Because they were employed as freelancers, 
they did not receive income from Project Ability when the workshops went on their monthly 
breaks. To compensate for the unreliable salary, many of them juggled several freelance 
projects simultaneously, and some of them were considering the possibility of finding more 
stable employment. 
When service provision is underfunded and overstretched, there is little space for carers 
and care recipients to experiment and explore by taking part in different activities. Public 
services that provide leisure activities for people with learning disabilities – such as the art 
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workshops of Project Ability – are oversubscribed (Walker and Hayton, 2017). This means 
that there are hardly any options for individuals with learning disabilities who want to pursue 
one activity, let alone enough for them to alternate between different programmes the way 
participants in the Project Ability workshop are encouraged to experiment and explore with 
different artmaking techniques. This kind of experimentation is further discouraged when care 
recipients are expected to set goals to develop their knowledge, skills, and self-management. 
Their care plans are set up to systematically pursue these goals in a cost-efficient manner. 
Although at the time of my fieldwork, Project Ability successfully renewed its core 
funding for their main workshops for an extra five years, many of their extracurricular 
activities have been either cut or significantly shortened due to the lack of resources. For 
instance, the walking group that took participants around the city’s art galleries and heritage 
sites had to cease due to lack of funding. 
Ultimately, recognising and supporting the citizenship of people with learning 
disabilities requires a better redistribution of resources. There is a difference to be made here 
between citizenship-as-recognition and citizenship-as-redistribution, a conceptual distinction 
coined by Fraser and Honneth (2003). Arguably, the citizenship of people with learning 
disabilities has been widely recognised: it is generally accepted that they are citizens, have 
rights, and should be treated with dignity and respect. However, to be able to live the 
dignified life as citizens, people with learning disabilities also require extensive affirmative 
measures, which rely on a more equal redistribution of resources. This comprises more 
support staff, whose labour should be valued more with higher wages and better work 
conditions. More resources need to be spent on support hours: this would help people with 
learning disabilities and those who work them spend more time with each other. This in turn 
enables better communication and support. People with learning disabilities also need more 
options for spaces of friendship and belonging, in addition to the activities aimed at 
improving skills and employability. 
Besides spending more on social care, the economistic logic of public services need to 
be rethought. Current services are geared towards efficient delivery, which means that they 
are often required to demonstrate clear goals, timeframe, and efficient delivery. However, not 
all activities lend themselves to quantifiable outcomes, such as artmaking in Project Ability, 
where participants are not expected to meet clearly defined goals within any set timeframes. 
Efficiency means that there is no wasted time and materials in delivering an end result: but 
waste is not in a vocabulary of the workshops. Participants do not have to account for how 
they spend their time in the workshop, and how they use the materials. Their enjoyment with 
the artmaking is valued equally, even though for some participants it may take months – 
sometimes years – to demonstrate that they are engaged. Because the workshops escape the 
economistic logic of social care delivery, they enable a space where people with learning 
disabilities can be supported to engage in activities that cultivate their citizenship.  
Ultimately, the issue with a scarcely funded care sector propped up by an economistic 
logic is that it frames dignified treatment of people with learning disabilities and the working 
conditions of people employed in the care sector as a zero-sum game. There is an insidious 
assumption behind the funding cuts which claims that because there are limited resources, one 
needs to choose between the interests of people with learning disabilities and care workers: 
the money can only either go to fund services, or improve working conditions. This is a false 
dichotomy that advocates of disability rights must not fall for. Firstly, because as Project 
Ability demonstrates, it is untrue: the more that the labour of care providers are recognised 
and valued, the better they are able to provide improved services for people with learning 
disabilities. Secondly and more importantly, better treatment for one group cannot be 
achieved at the expense of another. Justice has to be built  by expanding solidarity between 




What does this mean for the citizenship and learning disabilities? 
 
I opened this thesis by observing that for much of the learning disability scholarship, 
policy, and service provision, citizenship has been predominantly understood as a status that 
granted people to political, civil, and social rights. In this thesis, I departed from these 
accounts and examined citizenship as practice. In this final section, I will reflect on what a 
practice-based approach says about the citizenship of people with learning disabilities, and 
discuss the key messages for future research and social policy. 
In my first chapter I wrote that even though ideals of liberal citizenship disregard the 
interests of people with learning disabilities, an anthropological examination has the potential 
to highlight how these ideals guide everyday practices, are constitutive of desires and 
aspirations, and may therefore be emancipatory despite their philosophically exclusive 
origins. The ethnographic examples I cited in this thesis clearly illustrate that citizenship is a 
valuable tool for addressing issues of inequalities and injustices, and for examining and 
advocating for better practices regarding engagement with people with learning disabilities. 
Citizenship-as-practice reveals how these ideals are lived: how they manifest in relationships 
and routines, what conundrums they pose in everyday situations, and how people negotiate 
and resolve these conundrums. Not only does citizenship as an analytical tool reveal 
discrepancies in equality and justice, but it also foregrounds the everyday strategies people 
employ to mitigate these, which, in turn, can generate policy action. The relative novelty of 
practice-based approaches to citizenship in learning disabilities research means that there is 
still much untapped emancipatory steam left in the concept for future research and advocacy 
to explore. 
Secondly, citizenship-as-practice produces new takes on old philosophical debates, 
understandings of ethical engagement, and examples of best practice. A practice-based 
approach moves the focus of citizenship theories beyond individuals’ basic entitlements, as it 
seeks to envision what life could be like once those entitlements are granted. Rights guarantee 
what Nussbaum (2006) refers to as a social minimum: a threshold provision under which it is 
not possible to live a dignified life. However, rights say little about what happens once one 
reaches this social minimum. A rights-based approach may help uncover what is wrong with 
the provision of justice; a practice-based approach can help generate discussions around what 
kind of society we want to build. This thesis argued that the practices around citizenship could 
help individuals with learning disabilities flourish: to explore their desires, develop their 
preferences, and pursue their aspirations. Being a citizen not only means that individuals have 
the right to not suffer or die prematurely; there is room in there for play, imagination, and 
affection (Nussbaum, 2006). Approaching citizenship this way not only provides directions 
on the sort of engagement that would support individuals to flourish, but it also argues that 
such engagement should be the fundamental organising principle of society. 
My thesis focuses on the way one organisation helps people flourish. Although I used 
my observations to reflect on broader assumptions about justice, equality, agency, and 
personhood, much can be learnt by taking this anthropological lens elsewhere. I discussed 
artmaking, but there is a question of how the observations on citizenship manifest other in 
other learning disability services and organisation; in families, employment, education; with 
regards to housing, healthcare, or parenting. How is citizenship lived, negotiated, facilitated, 
and hindered in these contexts?  
I have emphasised the importance of Project Ability providing a space where people 
with learning disabilities could exist without being pressured, judged, harassed, or disciplined. 
Besides being a shelter, the studio also served as a space of friendship and positive social 
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encounters, exploration, self-development, and care. The studio’s microcosm offered an 
alternative to managerial and economistic social relations. The question is, can the features 
that make Project Ability an exemplary service be applied to other organisations? Could these 
features be taken up outside of service provision, to non-segregated spaces, in order to make 
“mainstream” society more welcoming for people with learning disabilities? What would 
such a space look like, what kind of sociality would it enable, and what kind of institutional 
and material conditions would that require?  
Finally, I examined the nature of the support relationship between the art tutors, support 
workers, and the participants, and highlighted how they are essential to the citizenship of 
people with learning disabilities. Future research could examine how these support 
relationships could be extrapolated to wider society. The way participants in Project Ability 
are treated exemplify what treating people with learning disabilities as citizens truly means: it 
is not only defined by the recognition that people with learning disabilities are capable 
individuals, but also by the ability to listen to and interact with them based on their capacity 
of self-expression, and by the willingness to render oneself vulnerable to and appreciative. 
These abilities are not only relevant for people working in care provision, but serve with 
lessons for us all on how to ethically engage with one another. 
This thesis could potentially contribute to improving policy and practice in relation to 
social care and support of people with significant learning disabilities. First of all, the findings 
highlight the importance of increasing public spending and providing more funding for 
services. The atypical social arrangements that people with learning disabilities require to 
practice citizenship relies upon the services of organisations like Project Ability, who need 
funding for art materials, staff, and studio space. In addition, more funding is needed to 
improve the working conditions of service providers – in this case, freelance art tutors and 
support workers. I also hoped to demonstrate the centrality of spaces like the Project Ability 
art studio and the importance of the infrastructure that people with learning disabilities rely on 
to get there. Affordable and accessible public transport and safer streets are a necessary 
condition of the citizenship of people with learning disabilities; therefore, it is crucial to put in 
place policies that improve and maintain this infrastructure. Finally, as part of the aim of this 
thesis, I highlighted exemplary practice that support people with learning disabilities to 
become citizens. I specifically focused on the non-verbal, sensorial modes of attention, 
communication, and care tutors and support workers demonstrated towards the participants. 
These qualities should be better recognised and supported in social care services for instance 
by providing formal training to new entries. All this could contribute improved services and 





In this final chapter, I presented the overarching themes that emerged from the 
ethnographic material. I observed that citizenship was a process rather than a status; that it 
was mediated by embodied relationships as opposed to abstract and cognitivised rules of 
belonging; and that the recognition of citizenship was conditional to a more equal 
redistribution of resources. I then discussed what these observations said about the citizenship 
of people with learning disabilities, and reflected on the possibilities of future research based 
on these findings. 
I hope to have conveyed three overall messages with this thesis. The first is the merit of 
anthropological, practice-based approaches for examining abstract, taken-for-granted 
concepts, and for outlining new visions of social life. If anything, this ethnography should 
have made the case for how practice-based approaches could enrich epistemological debates 
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and intellectual projects by grounding them in everyday life, and thus revealing the sociality 
and agency that emerge in their wake. Secondly, I hope to have demonstrated the 
methodological possibilities of ethnographic research and long-term participant observation 
with people with learning disabilities, especially with individuals with significant 
impairments. Conversely, I hope to have illustrated how researching with people with 
learning disabilities could challenge and further develop the principles of the ethnographic 
method. 
Finally, my aim with this thesis was to contribute to a so far limited body of scholarship 
that sits at the intersection of anthropology and learning disability studies. I hope that this 
work illustrated how marrying the two fields could generate productive conversations. 
Embracing an anthropological lens of analysis could infuse the field of learning disability 
studies with new theoretical and methodological directions; in exchange, anthropological 
interest in learning disabilities can contribute to anthropology recognising further forms of 
equality, justice, agency, and personhood. 
Such recognition is humbling. It highlights the expanse of each individual’s potential, 
and it makes visible the work that goes into responding to and realising such potential. More 
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❖ the material may be used in future publications, both print and online 
❖ the anonymised material will be retained in secure storage for use in future academic 
research 
❖ my identity will not be disclosed in the subsequent research and that I will be referred 
to by a pseudonym in any publications arising from the research. 
 
5. I understand that the information I give will be kept confidential, subject to legal 
limitations. 
 
6. I agree to waive my copyright to any data collected as part of this project. 
 





           













I would like to hear what you think about citizenship for people with learning 
disabilities and Project Ability. 
 
• You do not have to answer any questions you do not like. 
 




Do you want to talk to me about what it is like to be a citizen, and take part in 
Project Ability and other similar activities?  
 








Can I record our chat? 
 










Can I tell other people what you think? I will not tell them your name. 
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I understand  
• that personal information will be destroyed after the research 
• the material will be stored for future research 
• the material may be used in future publications. 
• I agree to waive my copyright to any data collected as part of this project. 
 















Easy-Read Participant Information Sheet 
 













Who can take part in the study? 
People who  
❖ Are aged 18 or over 
❖ Have a learning disability 
❖ Are part of Project Ability 
 
What is this study about? 
This study will be finding out what citizenship means for people with 
learning disabilities. As part of the study, I take part in the Project 
Ability workshops, and watch how people make art together. Then, I 
interview people on their experiences of Project Ability and 
citizenship. 
 
What will I do if I take part? 
We will meet for an interview. 
We will talk about what it’s like to do activities 
with people in Project Ability and outside. 
We will meet three or four times. We will talk 20 
minutes each time. It could be at your home or 
somewhere else. 
























Do I have to take part? 
No. You don’t have to do this study. You can 
decide if you would like to take part. 
 
 
Can I change my mind? 
Yes, you can change your mind at any time we talk. We 
will stop talking. 
You don’t have to tell me why you want to stop. 
 
What happens to my information? 
Your information will be kept safe and private. 
What we talk about will be tape recorded. 
Then, it will be written down. Your name will not be on it. 
If I think you, or someone else is not safe, I will have to tell 
other people about it. 
When the research is finished, I will destroy the tape 
recordings and the personal information. I have to keep 
the interview transcripts and observations for 10 years for 
future research.  
 
Good things about taking part? 
Talking about what you like or dislike about your 
daytime activities will be helpful for others. 
Risks when taking part? 
Some may feel sad or upset. 
Tell me if you feel sad or upset. We can stop. I 
can support you if you to get more help if you 






















What will you do to the results? 
I will write about the results. 
I will use the results to write a PhD thesis for the University of 
Glasgow. 
I will use the results to write to a journal so other people can 
read about it. 
We can meet again to talk about the results. I can send you a 
written copy. 
Who is sponsoring this research? 
The Scottish Government. 
The College of Social Sciences Ethics Committee of 
University of Glasgow will also check this study. They 
make sure that the study is run well. 
 
If you would like to know more, you can contact me or my 
supervisors. 
Researcher 
Thu Thuy Phan (PhD candidate) 
❖ Email: [Email address removed] 
❖ Telephone: [phone number removed] 
Supervisors 
Prof Craig Melville 
❖ Email: [Email address removed] 
❖ Telephone: [phone number removed] 
Prof Nicholas Watson 
❖ Email: [Email address removed] 




Participant Information Sheet – Service user 
 
Title  
Enacting a citizen: An ethnography of everyday citizenship practices of people with learning 
disabilities 
PhD research project undertaken by Thu Thuy Phan within the Institute of Health and Wellbeing, 
University of Glasgow. 
 
Introduction 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the 
following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that 
is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to 
take part. 
 
What is the purpose of this study?  
The goal of this research is to understand the different meanings of citizenship for people with 
learning disabilities. Using participant observation and face-to-face interviews, I will explore what 
people with learning disabilities do in their everyday life that can be interpreted as an act of 
citizenship, and what rights they claim with these acts, if any. I will specifically document 1) the 
financial and infrastructural conditions of citizenship, 2) experiences of the collectivising and 
individualising tendencies of citizenship ideals, and finally 3) the communities people with learning 
disabilities are or desire to be part of.  
During the participant observation, I’m attending Project Ability workshops to document how people 
make art together, and how that creates a sense of belonging. In the second part of the study, I 
interview people about their experiences of Project Ability and community participation. 
The research started in November 2016 and is expected to be completed by 2020. The data 
collection will take place between 2017 and 2018. 
 
Do I have to take part in the study?  
You can decide whether or not to take part. If you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving a reason, and any information you have given will not be used in the 
research. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part?  
If you decide that you would like to take part, I will invite you to a series of informal, one-on-one 
interview to talk about your experiences. The interviews will be semi-structured, which means you 
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will be asked open questions and encouraged to give your opinions. The questions will be about your 
activities and experiences as a service user. 
The interviews can take place in your home, or at a place of your convenience. The interviews will 
take place over three or four sessions, and will last about 20 minutes each time. I will audio record 
the interviews to transcribe and analyse them. There may be need for a follow-up interview in case 
of any recording problems or need for further clarification on any answers you have given. 
 
Will my participation be confidential?  
All your personal details will be kept strictly confidential, subject to legal limitations (e.g. the 
Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002). I will remove all data that could identify you in the 
transcripts, such as your name or address. All audio-recorded interviews will be kept in password-
protected files, and they will only be available to the researcher. I will destroy the audio recording 
and the original transcript when the research is finished. 
❖ Please note that confidentiality will be maintained as far as it possible, unless during our 
conversation I hear anything which makes me worried that someone might be in danger 
of harm, I might have to inform relevant agencies of this. 
 
What will happen to the data of this research? 
When the research is finished, I will destroy the audio recordings and the original transcripts. I will 
also delete the personal information that links your identity to the data. I will keep the anonymised 
transcripts for any publications beyond this research, for example for journal articles or conference 
papers. All data will be kept in password protected files and in locked filing cabinets. The university 
requires all research material to be archived for 10 years after the research is finished. The 
anonymised transcripts will be kept in the data repository of the University of Glasgow. I will keep 
the observational material on a password protected PC and store the back up in a locked filing 
cabinet. Only the transcripts will be available for future re-use. 
The results of the research will form the main part the PhD thesis. A copy of the thesis will be kept by 
the University of Glasgow, and copies can be made available to all the participants on request. The 
PhD thesis will potentially be used to form the basis of further journal, book, or magazine articles. 
You will not be identified in any report or publication that stems from this research. 
 
Who is organising and funding this research?  
The research is organised by a research team at the Institute of Health and Wellbeing, University of 
Glasgow as a PhD project. The PhD research project is funded by the Scottish Government. 
This project has been considered and approved by the College Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Where can I get more information? 
If you would like more information, feel free to contact anyone on the research team: 
❖ Thu Thuy Phan, PhD student, [contact details removed] 
❖ Prof Craig Melville, PhD supervisor, [contact details removed] 
❖ Prof Nicholas Watson, PhD supervisor, [contact details removed]  
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If you have any complaints, please contact the College of Social Sciences Ethics Officer, Dr Muir 





Participant Information Sheet – Service provider 
 
Title  
Enacting a citizen: An ethnography of everyday citizenship practices of people with learning 
disabilities 
PhD research project undertaken by Thu Thuy Phan within the Institute of Health and Wellbeing, 
University of Glasgow. 
 
Introduction 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the 
following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that 
is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to 
take part. 
 
What is the purpose of this study?  
The goal of this research is to understand the different meanings of citizenship for people with 
learning disabilities. Using participant observation and face-to-face interviews, I will explore what 
people with learning disabilities do in their everyday life that can be interpreted as an act of 
citizenship, and what rights they claim with these acts, if any. I will specifically document 1) the 
financial and infrastructural conditions of citizenship, 2) experiences of the collectivising and 
individualising tendencies of citizenship ideals, and finally 3) the communities people with learning 
disabilities are or desire to be part of. 
During the participant observation, I’m attending Project Ability workshops to document how people 
make art together, and how that creates a sense of belonging. In the second part of the study, I 
interview people about their experiences of Project Ability and community participation. 
The research started in November 2016 and is expected to be completed in 2019. The data collection 
will take place between 2017 and 2018. 
 
Do I have to take part in the study?  
You can decide whether or not to take part. If you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving a reason, and any information you have given will not be used in the 
research. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part?  
If you decide that you would like to take part, I will invite you to an informal, one-on-one interview to 
talk about your experiences. The interview will be semi-structured, which means you will be asked 
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open questions and encouraged to give your opinions. The questions will be about your activities and 
experiences as a service provider. 
The interview can take place in your home, or at a place of your convenience. The interview will last 
about one hour. I will audio record the interviews to transcribe and analyse them. There may be 
need for a follow-up interview in case of any recording problems or need for further clarification on 
any answers you have given. 
 
Will my participation be confidential?  
All your personal details will be kept strictly confidential, subject to legal limitations (e.g. the 
Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002). I will remove all data that could identify you in the 
transcripts, such as your name or address. All audio-recorded interviews will be kept in password-
protected files, and they will only be available to the researcher. I will destroy the audio recording 
and the original transcript when the research is finished. 
❖ Please note that confidentiality will be maintained as far as it possible, unless during our 
conversation I hear anything which makes me worried that someone might be in danger 
of harm, I might have to inform relevant agencies of this. 
 
What will happen to the data of this research? 
When the research is finished, I will destroy the audio recordings and the original transcripts. I will 
also delete the personal information that links your identity to the data. I will keep the anonymised 
transcripts for any publications beyond this research, for example for journal articles or conference 
papers. All data will be kept in password protected files and in locked filing cabinets. The university 
requires all research material to be archived for 10 years after the research is finished. The 
anonymised transcripts will be kept in the data repository of the University of Glasgow. I will keep 
the observational material on a password protected PC and store the back up in a locked filing 
cabinet. Only the transcripts will be available for future re-use. 
The results of the research will form the main part the PhD thesis. A copy of the thesis will be kept by 
the University of Glasgow, and copies can be made available to all the participants on request. The 
PhD thesis will potentially be used to form the basis of further journal, book, or magazine articles. 
You will not be identified in any report or publication that stems from this research. 
 
Who is organising and funding this research?  
The research is organised by a research team at the Institute of Health and Wellbeing, University of 
Glasgow as a PhD project. The PhD research project is funded by the Scottish Government. 
This project has been considered and approved by the College Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Where can I get more information? 
If you would like more information, feel free to contact anyone on the research team: 
❖ Thu Thuy Phan, PhD student, [contact details removed] 
❖ Prof Craig Melville, PhD supervisor, [contact details removed] 
❖ Prof Nicholas Watson, PhD supervisor, [contact details removed] 
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If you have any complaints, please contact the College of Social Sciences Ethics Officer, Dr Muir 





INTERVIEW GUIDE – SERVICE USERS 
 
My aim with the interview is to compare experiences of policy rhetoric of citizenship with a 
relational definition of citizenship that may emerge from participating in inclusive spaces. I 
will explore the kind of communities that services users are part of, or desire and imagine to 
belong to. The questions will aim to tease out the relationship between (imagined) community 
participation, the type of inclusive space that hosts this participation, social relationships, and 
material conditions.  
 
I regard the interview as an inductive tool, where my expectations of what counts as important 
might not correspond with what the participants hold important for community participation 
or social membership. Therefore, it has to be flexible enough to allow participants to talk 
about what they find important. Additionally, I conduct interviews 2 months into the 
fieldwork, so that I can incorporate the themes that emerge during the initial observations. 
Therefore, I expect that the rough guide below will change, and that some themes will prove 
more important than others. Furthermore, I may do repeat or follow-up interviews to track 
changes in the participants’ narratives. 
 
Narrative:  
Can you start with telling me a bit about yourself? 
 
Semi-structured interview 
Experiences of participating in Project Ability and other third sector organisations 
Project Ability 
• Can you talk about how you got involved with Project Ability? 
• Can you describe what you do when you come to the studio? 
• Questions about how often they come, whether they come alone or with support 
worker, how long have they been involved, etc. 
• Questions about what they like/dislike 
• Questions about the relationship with the other service users, service providers, 
volunteers, etc. at Project Ability 
 
Possible membership in other groups: e.g. experiences of day centres, activities at other 
organisations, hobbies that they may pursue with other voluntary groups, self-advocacy 
groups 
 
Online communities/forums they might be part of 
 
Experiences outside the third sector: This section aims to probe the policy rhetoric on what 
makes a citizen, such as independent living, being in paid employment, being off benefits, 
being part of “mainstream society”. Questions about these experiences will pay particular 
attention to the relational aspects of policy-defined citizenship. 
 
Questions may include the following: 
Can you describe what you do on an average day/week? 
Can you tell me with whom you spend the most of your time on an average day/week? 
 
Work: sheltered or paid employment, voluntary work 
 180 
• Can you tell me a little bit about what you do on days you’re not at one of the 
workshops? Do you work, or do voluntary work? Additional questions about 
experiences of that 
• Relationships with colleagues? 
• Ideal work, questions on whether being in paid employment is an aspiration at all  
 
Housing 
• Living alone, with family, with other people? 
• Relationship with people they live with 
 
On benefit payments 
 
On experiences of social care services 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE – SERVICE PROVIDER 
 
Narrative:  
Can you start with telling me a bit about yourself? 
 
Semi-structured interview 
Experiences of participating in Project Ability and other third sector organisations 
Project Ability 
• Can you talk about how you got involved with Project Ability? 
• Can you describe what you do when you come to the studio? 
• Questions about how often they come, how long have they been involved, etc. 
• Can you describe the people who participate in these workshops? What is the appeal 
of these workshops, in your view? 
 
Questions about the art created during the workshops: 
• Can you talk about how you work with the participants during the workshops? 
• What do you think about the art created during these workshops? 
• Questions about any exhibitions, purpose of the workshops 
 
Questions about the relationships formed during the workshops: 
• Can you talk about who attends these workshops? What is the turnover in attendance? 
• Do you keep in touch with people outside the workshops? 
• Can you describe the relationship between you and the participants of the workshops? 
 
Can you talk about what you perceive as the benefits of these workshops? Potential 
drawbacks? 
How did these workshops change over time?  
 
 
